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SU M M A R Y
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the effects on relative prices arising from public 
pricing policy and economic performance of public enterprises as well as commercial policy in 
Mexico
For that purpose, a consolidated Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for input-output (I-O) 
analysis is constructed, for the year 1980. This framework then serves as a basis for developing a 
fix-price model in order to simulate different public pricing scenarios, and to calculate effective 
rates of protection (ERP). In doing that, deviations of price from marginal cost and inefficiency of 
public firms are treated as indirect taxes, insofar as their effects on relative prices are concerned. 
The analysis is therefore carried out very much in line with the studies of tax reform, usually 
based on 1-0 models.
However, compared with these studies, the present model, while retaining its fix-price 
nature, incorporates some features so far not dealt with by others: (i) input substitutability is 
incorporated at various points; (ii) commodity transactions arc valued at market prices; and (iii) 
production activities are classified, in addition to the principal product criteria, according to their 
form of organisation, i.e. public and private.
Thus, public pricing policy and economic performance of public enterprises are analysed 
allowing for substitutability between domestic production and imports and. also, some public 
prices can be allowed to be fixed. Likewise, the notion of ERP is generalised so as to remain 
meaningful as a concept, when moving from the fixed coefficients assumption to the more gen­
eral case in which substitutability is allowed for. Finally, the SAM approach allows for several 
sources o f distortion in prices to be analysed together in a systematic framework.
The following are some of the main conclusions derived from the study:
- The policy of regulating public prices has generated a very distorted price scenario which has 
benefitted all sectors but. specially, capital goods and intermediates.
- The estimations of ERP suggest that commercial policy has worked in the same direction, even 
though the mentioned sectors are not the most efficient in terms of their comparative advantages.
- The bulk of the distortions from public pricing, however, comes from two sectors -petroleum 
and electricity. The remaining public activities do not seem to affect relative prices very much, 
since they concentrate on the production of Anal consumer goods, mainly non traded.
- Trade elasticity values and the assumption that some public prices are Axed seem to afTect the 
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades the public sector has expanded very rapidly in both developed and 
developing countries. In 1980. for instance, public expenditures represented 40 percent of GDP in 
industrial countries. In the developing areas, the participation o f the public sector was no less 
important; in 1980 the public sector accounted for 15 to 23 percent of value added in GDP and 
some SO to 60 percent of total investment (World Bank [1983]).
The increasing public presence in the economies of developing countries in the sixties and
taxation, as well as the introduction of various forms o f regulation, such as quantitative restric­
tions on imports, and price controls. Thus, while the average share of government revenue in 
GDP in less developed countries (LDCs) was 14 percent in I960, by 1970 that figure had risen to 
18 percent, and to 24 percent by 1980. (Newbery and Stem [1987]). Likewise, in 1980. the con­
tribution of PEs to GDP averaged 10 percent (World Bank [1983]). Equally important was the 
inward oriented policy adopted by many countries -especially in Latin America- since the fifties, 
in which a complex system of protection to promote infant industries was created. Although ori­
ginally designed to be temporary, such a system became a permanent characteristic of these coun­
tries throughout the sixties and seventies. Finally, the introduction o f price controls, particularly
inflation, as well as a mechanism to achieve social goals.
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While successful in the sense that high rates of economic growth were achieved in many 
countries, such a pattern of economic growth seemed to have reached its limits by the end of the 
seventies. Indeed, the perception in the eighties is that too much public intervention has led to a 
very distorted scenario, in which, in many circumstances, prices no longer reflected opportunity 
costs, thus creating room for widespread inefficiency. As Newbery and Stem [1987] pointed out.
The 1980s present a very different economic and intellectual environment. Economic 
performance has been disappointing, the international environment appears hostile, 
and critics complain o f the inefficiency of the public sector. We often And that 
emphasis has shifted from planning for growth to increasing efficiency, reducing pub­
lic expenditure, undertaking structural adjustment, and. in particular, 'getting the 
prices right'.
In ‘getting the prices right', the economic theory has unequivocally moved in a single and 
clear direction; that is. to avoid distortions in prices, for. it is argued, prices constitute the best 
system of incentives that encourages resources to be allocated efficiently and used optimally. It 
has for a long time been recognised, however, that a ‘Arst-best world' is purely a theoretical exer­
cise. and that a much more realistic scenario belongs to the so-called 'second-best world'. In this 
context, the theory of domestic distortions developed remarkably fast, and has by now a well
by the theory of optimal taxation, pioneered by Ramsey [19271. and formulated within the cot 
text of the literature of the second best, as originally developed by Lipsey and Lancaster [1936],
Yet, when it comes to empirical work, one finds that there has been a long gap between the 
theory and the empirical analysis. Indeed, as argued by Dixit [1983). empirical implementation of 
the theory in an ideal way is still not possible. One finds, for Instance, that despite the theoretical 
insights of the theory of tax reform, it has very little connection with actual policy analysis, even 
though the whole issue o f tax reform was conceived as a practical one.
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One particular area in which relatively little progress has been made corresponds to the 
empirical analysis of the price system. Indeed, most of the empirical analysis of the price system 
are based on 1-0 models, thus adopting assumptions that, on the theoretical literature, are often 
seen as extreme situations.1 The reason is not hard to find, since 1-0 ubles provide a rich picture 
of the production structure, so that it is relatively simple to focus on the main determinants of the 
relative price structure from the production side, without having to resort to many behavioural 
assumptions that more complex models such as the type of computational general equilibrium 
models (CGE) require.
The first aim of this thesis is to construct a framework for analysing the price system. While 
remaining within the tradition of fix-price models in the sense that prices are determined only on 
the supply side, our approach incorporates some additional features in the spirit of general equili­
brium. which, so far. have not been dealt with by others. The idea is to develop a model of prices 
for the Mexican economy, in an attempt to investigate the effects that public pricing policy and 
performance, as well as commercial policy, have on the relative price structure. In a second stage 
we consider the consequent effects on the reallocation of resources, by looking at the changes that 
take place in the value added of production activities. The analysis, it should be said, is very 
much in line with existing studies of tax reform in that departures of price from marginal cost and 
inefficiency of PEs are viewed as a system of indirect taxes (or subsidies), insofar as their effects 
on the price system are concerned. Our approach, however, departs from the standard 1-0 models 
in several respects, all of which derive from our decision to use a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) approach for modelling purposes. These departures are. briefly, the following.
First, unlike the traditional 1-0 models which assume that inputs combine in fixed propor­
tions. our approach enables us to consider the issue of input substitutability at various stages. 
Thus, for instance, when analysing public pricing policy and performance of PEs we postulate 
some limited degree of substitutability between domestic production and imports, thus recognis-
1 For recent studies focusing oo las reform issues sac Ahmad and Stem (1917] and Scads [ I9M|.
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ing the fact that producers usually do have some possibility o f choice between these two sources 
when formulating their cost minimising decision. More generally, it will be seen that substituta­
bility can be generalised to any set of inputs. In doing that, we intend to move away from the par­
ticular view of production technology which essentially involves the Leontief notion of fixed 
coefficients. This notion is an analytical abstraction which minimises the role of the price system 
in modifying the use o f raw materials.
This Leontief notion of production technology also gives support to the argument that com­
modity transactions should be valued at basic prices (that is, without including indirect taxes and 
trade and transport margins), in order to maintain the assumption that each commodity is sold at 
the same price irrespective of who buys it. That constitutes the rationale behind the valuation of 
commodity balances at basic prices in most 1-0 tables. This view, however useful for some pur­
poses. fails nevertheless to recognise the fact that economic agents are not insensitive to prices. 
Therefore, in our rejection of the fixed coefficients technology model we have made an effort to 
construct a SAM in which commodity transactions are valued at market prices, thus incorporating 
not only indirect taxes but also trade and transport margins. In doing that, we recognise the fact 
that, from the point of view of economic agents, the same commodity sold at two different stages 
o f the distribution process represent, in fact, two different commodities.2 Our second departure 
from 1-0 models, therefore, derives from our decision to value commodity transactions at market 
prices, thus recognising the fact that it is market prices that economic agents respond to. Such 
recognition, we think, is essential if our accounting framework is to lend itself to being an accu­
rate framework for the analysis of economic behaviour.
A further area in which we feel that current conventions as envisaged by 1-0 tables are 
incomplete for modeling purposes is in the criteria for classifying production activities. The con­
vention in building 1-0 tables is to classify activities according to the principal product criteria. 
That is. the principal product approach to grouping establishments is to first group commodities 1
1 This issue is exptoied la  depth by Pyan |IW 3 |.
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(and services) and then to allocate establishments, which often produce several goods, to these 
groupings according to their principal products. In such a system, therefore, there are as many 
activities as there are commodities, and the 1*0 structure can be looked at as an interdependence 
between demand for different commodities.
When it comes to modeling, however, such an approach neglects several forms of dualism 
usually present in developing economies. One very common form o f dualism, among many oth­
ers. is the presence of a very marked public/private dichotomy which, given the purposes of the 
present enquiry, needs to be incorporated. Thus, in building our SAM this approach has been 
relaxed to allow greater flexibility in the definition of activities. Specifically, in addition to the 
principal product criteria we have also classified activities according to their form of organisa­
tion. namely public and private. The 1-0 structure of the economy must now be conceived not 
only as an interdependence of commodity demands as before, but also as an interdependence 
among public and private activities.
An obvious implication of introducing this second criteria is that it is no longer appropriate 
to have the same number of activities and commodities. Activities can now produce more than 
one commodity or. alternatively, each commodity can be produced by more than one activity. We 
move away from the simple theory of square matrices. Given the present computational capabili­
ties. however, the symmetry of square matrices is no longer an indispensable condition. Instead, 
by Introducing this second criteria the modeling capabilities are greatly enhanced, since we are in 
a better position to model more accurately the behaviour of the public sector which, very often, 
differs substantially from that of the private sector of the economy.
Last but not least, our modeling of the price system benefits a great deal from our SAM
is considerably facilitated
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Taken together, these different aspects of our approach take us some way down the road to 
a richer and more flexible analysis o f the price system. Yet, we retain the power and simple 
appeal of models in which prices are determined without reference to the demand side.
The second aim of this study derives both from the relevance of the topic and from the scar­
city of empirical analysis on the issue o f public sector pricing policy. As already pointed out, dur­
ing the previous two or three decades most countries have experienced an increasing growing 
intervention of the public sector in their economies. It seems that the general feeling among 
economists is that the increasing importance of the public sector led to excessive intervention and 
regulations in many facets of economic activity, which in turn led to excessive price distortions 
and misallocation of resources that, ultimately, resulted in widespread inefficiency. Not surpris­
ingly. during the eighties PEs became a major concern of economic policy, particularly in LDCs 
where they are often seen as a drain on public finances while, at the same time, domestic savings 
are needed to cover external imbalance.3 This brought to the fore the questions of efficiency and 
pricing policies of PEs. because it became increasingly clear that PEs were exerting considerable 
effects on the mobilisation of resources of many economies.
Despite this, very little empirical work exists on the modeling of public pricing policy and 
economic performance of PEs.4 Perhaps the main reason for this is the scarcity and inadequacy of 
data on PEs. Indeed, none of the international organisations publishes comprehensive information 
on PEs. and statistical sources for individual countries do not generally identify PEs' operations 
separately. Moreover, as pointed out by Short [1984], there are differences between countries 
-and sometimes even between different sources for the same country- in the exact definition of PE 
sector used for statistical purposes (see also Pleskovic and Trevino (1983]).
From this perspective, an important by-product of the present study is the construction of a
* In many LDCl an Important proportion of (he tiM raal debt contracted by government, during the 
Mvantie. w a. devoted to PH». Trtvedi II9S6), for instance, point, out that between 1976 end 1971 33 percent 
o f  all borrowing on international capital market, was attributable to PB . In LDCl.
4 Some recent w ort include. Ahmed et el |  I9S4|. Pleakovtc 119«2|. and Pletkovic and Trevino 119>3|.
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consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis, where an effort is made to organise and put together data 
related to the public sector in the Mexican economy, for the year 1980, which is the latest year for 
which a published 1-0 table exists.3 While in our data framework we place especial emphasis on 
the production structure, extensions for future research work are both possible and desirable.
The thesis is also of interest as an applied study of economic policy. Mexico, as many other 
Latin American countries, followed an inward oriented policy, thus relying heavily on high levels 
of protection. Indeed, since the early fifties the whole economic policy was designed to promote 
the industrialisation of the country. Various instruments o f economic policy were used as a 
means to concentrate resources in the industrial sector. On the one hand, commercial and 
exchange rate policy combined to promote the development of infant industries by protecting 
domestic producers against foreign competition. On the other hand, a second important mechan­
ism used to concentrate resources in the industrial sector, was the increasing direct participation 
of the public sector in the economy through PEs. As will be seen later, since the forties PEs have 
played a key role because, at that time, the state assumed control over the so-called strategic 
industries, aiming to promote the industrialisation process not only by providing the basic 
economic intrastructure, but also by subsidising industrial activities with cheap raw materials.
While successful in the sense that high rates of economic growth were achieved (averaging
6.7 percent growth of real GDP from 1953 to 1970), the coat of such a pattern of economic 
growth became evident in the mid-seventies, when the accumulated external disequilibrium 
became a serious obstacle to economic growth, leading to a devaluation of the Mexican peso in 
1974.*
The oil discoveries of the mid-seventies, however, allowed the country to postpone the 
correction of the accumulated disequilibria As a result o f the huge revenues obtained from oil
exports, and the abundance and easy availability of foreign borrowing, the country was again in a 
position to grow without having to resort to major economic adjustments, thus postponing, once 
again, many decisions usually imposed by the trade-offs that a high economic growth rate 
implies.7 Government expenditures grew very quickly so that by 1979 the deficit o f the public 
sector as a proportion of GDP had reached 7.3 percent, jumping to 14.5 percent in 1981 (Banco 
de Mexico (1983]). Because o f the abundance of resources, the government was able to keep the 
prices of several publicly produced commodities down, in an attempt to combat inflation, 
'favour' some groups of the population, and 'promote* industrialisation.8 At the same time, while 
it was intended that commercial policy would be changed after the devaluation of 1976, it essen­
tially remained the same, and so did the exchange rate policy. As a result of the overheating of 
the economy imports increased substantially, while exports were not helped by the exchange rate. 
The external disequilibrium became a severe problem once again.
This situation was to change dramatically, however, in the 1980s. With the sharp reduction 
of the oil price and the squeeze on foreign borrowing in the international markets, Mexico found 
itself incapable of continuing to grow without correcting its major disequilibria, especially the 
external imbalance. The economic policy in recent years has. in contrast, been oriented towards a 
much more realistic scenario, in which programmes or structural adjustment aimed at correcting 
the several sources of distortions.
Remarkable changes have been carried out recently, particularly in the areas of trade 
liberalisation and the reduction of the public sector deficit. As a result, in 1989 less than 20 per­
cent of the value of imports is now subject to any form of quantitative restrictions. Likewise, after 
several decades of deficits, the public sector has recorded primary surpluses every year since 
1983. This has been achieved through expenditure reductions and increases in public sector reve- 1
1 The rate of growth of leal ODP was 1 2  percent la  1971 and 9.2 percent in 1979 (Banco de Mexico
119831).
•  Paradoxically, such a policy induced inflationary pressures, since it led so deficits in many PEs. which in 
turn had to resort to transfers from die treasury, hence increasing the size o f  the public deficit and conse­
quently exerting pressures on the money aipply
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nucs. generated by fiscal reform and adjustments in public sector pricing policies.
Regardless of the eventual success or failure of such a programme of structural adjustment, 
this scenario provides an excellent opportunity to apply our methodology. Indeed, the whole pro­
cess of economic growth since the forties, led the Mexican economy to a very distorted scenario. 
Not surprisingly, the relative price structure of the Mexican economy has been characterised as a 
'm ajor source of disequilibria in both microeconomic resource allocation and macroeconomic 
aggregates' (see Sem i [1986]).
Public pricing and commercial policy have both played a major role in this situation. Public 
prices determine, to a great extent, the size of the public deficit and. at the same time, they 
influence the absolute price level as well as the relative price structure, particularly when -as in 
the Mexican case-, PEs are involved in the provision of raw materials and intermediates of gen­
eral use. such as petroleum and electricity. Likewise, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) affect 
domestic prices not only by allowing domestic producers to charge higher prices, but when the 
affected commodities are intermediates, the effects are spread over the whole production struc­
ture.
Therefore this thesis focuses on public pricing policy and performance, as well as on com­
mercial policy. Basically, the purpose of the model is to carry out several policy experiments by 
simulating different pricing policies and changes in efficiency levels of public activities, in order 
to ascertain how the relative price structure is affected and what the effects on the reallocation of 
resources are by looking at changes in the value added of the different production activities. In 
the same spirit, some additional experiments are intended to calculate levels of ERP, induced by 
the nominal protection structure. Some very important results emerge from these exercises.
The policy of regulating public prices has benefltted all production activities but. especially, 
it has benefited those industrial activities producing capital goods and intermediates which, para­
doxically. are not the most efficient in terms of their comparative advantage. Such a result is
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reproduced when we look at the ERP, suggesting that the whole protection structure has been 
oriented to the benefit of the sectors mentioned above.
Another important result is that petroleum and electricity alone accounted for the bulk of 
price distortions caused by public sector pricing policies, hence suggesting that the remaining 
public activities are not very involved in the production of intermediates. It is interesting to note 
that despite the large number of PEs in 1980. our base year, only two PEs cause the bulk of the 
distortions arising from public pricing policy.
More generally, and interpreting the results of public pricing and commercial policy 
together, it can be said that, with the exception of the public activities petroleum and electricity, 
the main cause of distortions come from protection accorded to private activities by means of 
high levels of protection to manufactures, whereas public pricing policy affects mainly non traded 
goods, most of which are final consumer goods. That is not to say that public activities producing 
intermediates other than petroleum and electricity do not produce distortions, but rather that their 
effects are on a relatively small scale.
From the methodological perspective several important points also emerge. First, trade 
elasticity values and different assumptions regarding the pricing behaviour of public activities 
have shown to be important in terms of the resulting relative price structure. Second, our 
approach generalised the analysis of ERP in that the traditional estimates build on a particular 
version o f our model viz the case in which market shares between domestic production and 
imports are constant. In our model it is no longer necessary to assume that domestic and interna­
tional goods are perfect substitutes. And thirdly, our SAM approach enabled us to analyse 
several sources of distortions of the price system together. In particular, in estimating ERP our 
model not only incorporated the effects of removing protection provided by commercial policy 
but also the effects of domestic indirect taxes. More generally, the whole issue o f tax reform can 
easily be incorporated into the analysis. The contents of the thesis are as follows.
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Chapter Two aims to serve as a historical background, concentrating on a brief review of 
the process of economic growth o f the Mexican economy from the forties to the eighties. In par­
ticular. the focus of attention is on the industrialisation process that took place in this period, and 
the analysis of the three main instruments of economic policy on which industrial growth rested: 
exchange rate policy, commercial policy, and direct government intervention through PEs. The 
aim of the chapter is to clarify how the use of these instruments o f economic policy, while suc­
cessful in the sense that high rates of economic growth were achieved, led to a very distorted 
price scenario.
Chapter Three is devoted to a review of the existing literature on some aspects related to 
public sector intervention in economies. Thus, in a first part we emphasise the theoretical 
developments related to the normative theory of public pricing policy as well as the more recent 
positive approach to the economic performance of PEs. Some additional comments are also made 
regarding alternative forms of regulation that affect the price structure, particularly commercial 
policy. In a second part we review the literature on the empirical analysis of the price system. 
However, since most of the existing studies addressing this issue are based on 1-0 models, we 
will review the study developed by Seade [1986). first because it will enable us to illustrate the 
underlying assumptions of the 1-0 approach to modeling, and secondly because it addressed 
issues similar to those considered in this thesis.
The data framework is set out in Chapter Four. As explained above, a consolidated SAM for 
1-0 analysis for Mexico in 1980 was constructed. This chapter is therefore devoted to explaining 
in detail the methodology followed in its construction. This is done in several stages. For exposi­
tion purposes three SAMs are developed, starting from an aggregated version. Then, further 
disaggregations are made in order to reach a final SAM that will serve as a basis for modeling 
purposes.
The modeling of the price system is the subject of Chapter Five, which is presented in two 
main pans. The aim of the first part is to comment on the general characteristics of fix-price
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models as a basis for analysing the price system, emphasising both their advantages as well as 
their limitations. In particular, we will briefly review some o f the limitadons imposed by the use 
of 1-0 models. In the second pan, we set out our own model and see how some of the limitabons 
of 1-0 models can actually be overcome.
Chapter Six focuses on the analysis of the results of some policy experiments on public sec­
tor pricing policy and performance of PEs. Two models are presented: in the first model, all pro­
duction activities are assumed to follow the cost-plus pricing rule, and in the second model, pub­
lic petroleum and electricity are assumed to face a regulated price by the government In the last 
part we incorporate the effects on relative prices brought about by the removal of tarifTs.
The analysis of commercial policy is undertaken in Chapter Seven, in which we concentrate 
on the estimation o f ERP. In contrast to the previous chapter, in which the analysis centers on the 
public sector, this chapter focuses on the private sector since, as we shall see. commercial policy 
has been directed to the industrial sector o f the economy, which is primarily operated by private 
agents. In the first pan we discuss the concept of ERP and how it can be derived from our model. 
It will be seen that the traditional concept of ERP becomes a particular case of our model. In the 
second pan. the results of our estimations of ERP are analysed.
Finally. Chapter Eight offers some concluding remarks, discusses the limitations of our 





Mexico, like many other LDCs in Latin America, it  a country where the degree o f industri­
alisation. and more generally, the degree of economic growth has been achieved by following an 
inward-oriented policy, which relied heavily on high levels of protection in many areas of the 
economic activity.
Whilst successful in some respects, such a strategy created huge economic imbalances 
which, at the beginning o f the eighties, became unsustainable, thus leading the country to its 
worst economic crisis in modem history. Contrary to the 'fiesta’ of the second half o f the seven­
ties. which was the result of large revenues provided by oil exports and excessive foreign borrow­
ing. the eighties have been characterised by a lack of economic growth and a continuous fall in 
the living standards of the population. Irrespective of the current debate as to what the best 
economic policy for the future is. it seems that there is a general consensus that the country can 
no longer rely on the high levels of protectionism that characterised the previous decades.
The state played a major role in this protectionist strategy both by intervening directly in 
the economy as an economic agent, and by providing the institutional framework to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competition.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical background to this thesis, by analys­
ing in some detail the role played by the state in the economic growth process, focusing on two 
main areas, namely, public sector direct intervention in the form of PEs, and commercial policy.
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There exists an extensive and very well documented literature on the process of economic 
growth in Mexico over the past four decades and. therefore, we shall not rehearse the whole issue 
here.1 Rather, the idea is to provide the necessary elements to characterise the role of the state in 
the industrialisation process, focusing on the distortions that its intervention created, which con­
stitute the primary focus of this study.
The chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 2.2 is devoted to a general review 
of the period 1940-1985 and to a description o f the main characteristics of the industrialisation 
process that took place in these years. Since exchange rate policy, direct public intervention, and 
commercial policy played a major and determining role in this process, they will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.3. Finally. Section 2.4 summarises the contents of the chapter and out­
lines the main features of the structural adjustment process on which the Mexican economy has 
embarked during the eighties, emphasising yet again, the role played by the state.
2 J  The Period 1940-1985
Mexico's modem economic history and. in particular, its industrialisation can be said to have 
begun in 1940. Although this period is usually seen as crucial, it followed a previous period 
characterised by the consolidation of political stability and the setting up of an appropriate insti­
tutional environment, after the end o f the Mexican Revolution. Thus, during the decades of the 
1920s and the 1930s various important measures were taken, including the creation of the Central 
Bank (Banco de Mexico) in 1925, and of several other financial institutions.2 In addition, the oil. 
electricity and railway companies were nationalised, and. of no less importance, a land reform 
programme was implemented between 1934 and 1940.
1 Set. for mstanc*. C arden  and Orive (1911). Mamen (1971). O ra , Mena (1970). Soili (1970). T n jo  
[ 19S71. and Villaneal (1976). arooag many od ie n
1 Banco Nactooal de Crédito Agrícola (1926). Nacional Financien (1933). Banco Nacional Hipotecario 
Urbano y da Otea* Publica* |I934 |, Banco Nacional de Comercio E*tañar (1934). and Banco Nacional 
Obrero y de Fomento Industrial 11937|.
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After these yean of political and institutional consolidation Mexico entered a period of high 
rates of economic growth that would last for four decades. Table 2.1 shows annual average rates 
of growth of real GDP for the whole period, both at the aggregate and at the sectoral level. As can 
be seen, until 1980 GDP grew, on average, above 6 percent. From 1980 onwards the economy 
entered a period of crises which led to a sharp reduction in the economic growth rate registering 
negative rates of growth o f real GDP in 1982 and 1983.3
Table 2.1
Growth Rales of Real GDP
SECTORS 1941-52 1950-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85
GDP 6.5 7.2 6.5 6.6 1.6
Agriculture 5.0 4.9 2.9 3.9 2.6
Mining a) 0.8 3.5 5.8 12.6 4.7
Petroleum 6.2 8.9
Manufactures 8 0 8.6 7.6 7.5 0.2
Construction 6.1 6 1 8.2 7.1 -3.4
Electricity 6.5 11.3 9.8 88 6.2
Transport 7.8 9.2 12.8 10.9 1.1
Commerce & Services 7.3 7.9 6.9 6.7 •1.1
Government & Other Services 7.6 6.5 9.0 6.6 4.5
Source: The periods 1941-52 and 1950-70 were obtained from Trejo [1987], p. 29. The subse­
quent periods are estimates based on National Accounts (1987]. 
a) After 1970 it includes basic petroleum.
Such high economic growth rates were accompanied by and indeed brought about sharp 
changes in the productive structure of the economy. For instance, the agricultural sector, whose 
contribution to GDP in 1940 was 23.1 percent, reduced its participation to 8.9 percent in 1980, 
while the industrial sector went from 21.4 percent in 1940 to 35.1 in 1980 (see Table 2.2).
» Such growth rates of real O D P were -0.5 percent in 1912 and -2.9 percent in 198) (estimates bered on 
Nationel Accounts (1987)).
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T ab ic  2.2
SECTORS 1940 1950 1960 1970 1978 1980 1985
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture 23.1 21.3 17.4 12.6 10.2 8.9 9.5
Industry 21.4 24.4 27.7 33.5 37.2 35.1 34.8
Services 55.5 54.3 54.9 53.9 52.6 56.0 55.7
Source: From 1940 to 1978. Boltvinik and Hernandez (1981], p. 464. The years 1980 and 1985 
were estimates based on National Accounts [1987].
An almost inevitable consequence of the rapid and, as will be seen, induced industrialisa­
tion process, was the concentration o f economic activity in very few urban areas. This situation, 
combined with a very high rate of population growth transformed the country from a predom­
inantly rural economy in the twenties and thirties, into a primarily urban society in the seventies. 
Table 2.3 shows, for instance, that while in 1940 only 30 percent of the population lived in urban 










SHARE OP URBAN 
POPULATION (%)
1921 14.435 -0.5 4.440 30.1
1930 16.653 1.6 5.542 33.3
1940 19.654 1.7 5.901 300
1950 25.791 2.8 11.149 43.2
1960 34.923 3.1 18.185 52.1
1970 48.256 3 8 29.128 604
1980 66.847 3.3 44.110 66.0
* A town with more than 2.500 inhabitants is considered u  urban. 
Source: Trejo [1987], p. 43.
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Indeed, the whole process of economic growth was to be determined and defined by the 
industrialisation objective, which became the primary concern o f the government and which ulti­
mately defined the quantitative and qualitative degree of economic development.
The process, however, was not uniform, but went through different stages which are often 
identified by the degree of import substitution reached by the country at different points in time. 
It has become almost a standard approach to identify three periods, each of them with its own 
peculiarities. A first period is broadly defined between 1935-40 and 1954, which is characterised 
by erratic economic growth rates, currency devaluations and price instability. A second period, 
lasting from 1955 to the end of the seventies, is known as the 'stabilising development* period. 
And finally, a third period, from the beginning of the seventies onwards, when many of the 
economic imbalances accumulated in the previous years started to become obstacles to the 
economic growth. Let us then briefly refer to  these three periods.
L2.1 1940-1954
The forties marked the beginning of the industrialisation of the country. We have seen that in the 
two previous decades some important measures were taken in order to set up an appropriate insti­
tutional and political environment for the industrialisation of the economy to take place. It was 
the international situation, however, with the Second World War, that actually triggered the 
industrialisation process. On the one hand, although export markets had been depressed in the 
previous years, the fact that the main industrial countries were engaged in a war increased the 
demand for Mexico's products, so that export markets opened up and hence export revenues and 
purchasing power increased.4 On the other hand, the scarcity of available imports from industrial 
countries obliged domestic producers to initiate a more generalised process of import substitu­
tion, which had until those years concentrated on consumer goods.3
in 1939. wen. up 10 20 p e n » ,  in l943°i*od  processing b ever*^.. u .h lx o . end chemicals, whose p sro l.p . 
tioa in exports were negligible in 1939. repreaeaied I  percent in 1943 (see Venmo 11963J).
* Thou**' the scarcity of industrial machinery prevented any large investments in equipment it was still 
possible to improvise in many ways. Textile plants throughout the country went from a ooe-shift to a three-
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Thu*, the international environment created favourable conditions for the import substitu­
tion process to begin. For it to be a permanent process, however, it was necessary to adopt an 
explicit policy at the domestic level, encouraging national producers to "continue in the line", 
once the war was over. Indeed, a no less important element in explaining import substitution was 
the clear and firm decision on the part o f the state to industrialise the country, at any cost. Two 
main areas of public intervention are particularly characteristic of this period.
First, in the forties trade policies started to acquire an evident protectionist purpose. During 
the twenties and thirties, import duties and tariffs were used mostly for revenue collection pur­
poses. Thus, for instance, in 1930 trade duties and tariffs represented 37 percent of total federal 
revenues (see Story [1986]). From the forties, however, a radical change in trade policy took 
place, so that tariffs and trade controls in general started to be used for the purpose of protecting 
particular industries from foreign competition.
Secondly, in its attempt to industrialise the country, the state began to intervene directly in 
the economy, which in this period concentrated on investment in basic infrastructure. The next 
section will analyse these two points in detail. Here it will suffice to point out that in this period 
the state played a very active role in the construction of basic infrastructure. In the forties, for 
example, the state had control already over the so called strategic activities such as petroleum, 
electricity, transport and communications (specially rails), as well as credit for the promotion of 
agriculture (see Cabral [1981]).6
In general terms, however, the period was not stable. It was in fact characterised by price 
instability, erratic economic growth rates, and devaluations of the currency.7 Essentially, the 
main difficulties were the presence of a budget deficit and investment in excess of savings. Thus.
7 Tbs Mexican peao « a  twice devalued in chi. period, In 194« and 1994.
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it was argued by policy makers that a more stable environment was necessary , for which a Axed 
exchange rate was required. As suggested by Cardoso and Levy [1988], this period fortunately 
coincided with an era of uninterrupted economic growth in the rest of the world. It was. therefore, 
the beginning of an era of rapid and stable economic growth that would last until the end of the 
sixties. Such a period has often been referred to as the 'stabilising development' period.
1955-1970
The so called 'stabilising development’ period. - also referred to as the 'Mexican miracle'-, was 
characterised, as suggested above, by low rates of inflation (3.8 percent a year on average) as well 
as stable and high economic growth rales (6.7 percent growth of real GDP. on average). In con­
trast to previous years, when import substitution took place mainly with consumer goods, in these 
years a new stage of the import substitution process began, concentrating mostly on intermediates 
and capital goods, since the substitution of consumer goods had, to some extent, already been 
covered.1
At the risk of over-simplification it can be said that, in essence, with the exception of the 
exchange rate, the economic policy did not change. Thai is. on the one hand trade policy not only 
continued protecting domestic producers but the number of commodities under protection 
increased substantially. Thus, for instance, while in 1956 25 percent of imports were subject to 
import permits, in 1965 60 percent of categories required licencing. On the other hand, the direct 
intervention of the public sector in the economy was spreading to new areas of the industry.
The new element in the economic policy during this period was the Government commit­
ment to maintaining a Axed exchange rate, which kept its parity of 12.5 pesos per dollar from 
1954 until 1976.
1 Vernon ( IMS) potau out that by the «od at the flfbet. lets than •  ftfth of tm pora war« <
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While the macroeconomic indicator« behaved remarkably well in the period, the associated 
costs were, however, beginning to become evident. First, in a situation where resources are not 
precisely abundant, a fast expansion of industrial activities has to be achieved at the expense of 
another sector. The Mexican economy was no exception. Indeed, most of the resources within the 
economy were devoted to supporting and promoting industry, and. to a great extent, an important 
share came from the agricultural sector, whose role was to provide cheap inputs to the industrial 
activities. Thus, while in the fifties the agricultural sector was a net exporter and hence one of the 
main generators of resources from abroad, by the end of the sixties, and particularly during the 
seventies, it became a net importer.
Second, excessive dependence upon government measures to promote the industrialisation 
process meant that most industrial activities concentrated in very few geographical areas, which, 
together with a very rapid increase of the population, led to a marked regional disequilibrium.
Third, while the population increased its overall living standards, in terms of consumption, 
employment opportunities, and access to social services, the benefits of economic growth were 
not equally shared, leading to serious mal distribution of income. Moreover, it can be said that no 
explicit income redistribution policy existed in the period, since somehow it was assumed that the 
benefits o f economic growth would eventually 'trickle down', once enough wealth had been 
created (see Trejo (1987)).
Finally, and most importantly, the high levels of protection granted to domestic producers, 
combined with a Axed exchange rate, led to the most severe imbalance -the external disequili­
brium. On the one hand, exports became gradually lets competitive not only because of the over­
valuation of the currency but also because export activities themselves had not been promoted. 
On the other hand, while in its early stages the import substitution process led to saving of 
resources because imports were reduced, in subsequent yean the multiplier effect of industrial 
growth meant that imports were to expand in large quantities.
2 0
Therefore, it became clear at the end of the sixties that efficiency and opportunity costs had 
not been taken into consideration. Domestic producers, given the excessive degree of protection­
ism in which they grew, were inefficient and hence unable to compete in the international mark­
ets, if  such external disequilibrium was ever to be corrected. The industrial complexity, on the 
other hand, meant that as the country advanced in the import substitution process, more highly 
processed intermediates and more sophisticated capital goods were demanded, hence exerting 
pressures on the balance o f payments. It was evident that fresh resources were necessary if 
economic growth was to be maintained. This was the scenario at the end of the sixties.
2 J J  1970-1985
It was clear, at the beginning o f the seventies, that the strategy followed had reached its own lim­
its in the sense that the economy was unable to generate enough resources in order to maintain a 
permanent growth. It was also clear that the economy had to be more efficient and. in particular, 
that a much more dynamic export sector was necessary in order to generate the resources required 
by the industrial sector.
Yet. the economic policy of the seventies, in essence, remained unchanged. During the first 
half o f the seventies the exchange rate continued to be fixed, even though there were pressures 
arising from inflation and balance o f payments deficits. Accordingly, trade policy started to be 
used more for the purposes o f solving balance o f payments problems.9 On the domestic side, the 
public sector increased its participation in the economy substantially, so that the proportion of 
public sector deficit to GDP went up from 3.0 percent in 1972 to 10 percent in 1973. (Interna­
tional Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics (1987)).
The expansion of public sector spending, however, was made possible only by increasing 
foreign borrowing, which in nominal terms rose from 6,641 million of dollars in 1971 to 20,094 *
* la  1973 o w  hundred p e n » «  of Import! were .objected to  import licencing. (Cerdoeo end Levy (I9SSJ.
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in 197S (see Trejo [1987]).10 1Inflation continued to grow and capital flight increased substan­
tially. with the result that a significant part o f the contracted external debt actually ended up 
financing capital flight11 Finally, in 1976 the exchange rate was devalued after a period of 23 
years during which the parity was 12.3 pesos per dollar, it went up to 13.4 pesos per dollar in 
1976 and again to 22.5 in 1977.
Luckily for the government, the oil boom was about to begin in 1977. Once again it was 
possible to postpone the corrections o f the major disequilibria. Revenues from oil exports 
increased substantially and so did foreign borrowing, which reached a level of 84,874 million 
dollars in 1982. Such a buoyancy allowed the country to register, again, very high rates of 
economic growth. Thus, for instance, the rate of growth of real GDP was 8.2 percent in 1978.9.2 
percent in 1979, 8.3 percent in 1980, and 7.9 percent in 1981. (Banco de Mexico [1983]). Public 
expenditures increased considerably and rapidly, so that whereas the proportion of public sector 
deficit to GDP was 6.8 percent in 1977, by 1981 it had reached 14.5 percent (ibid). As a result of 
the overheating of the economy and the again overvalued exchange rate, imports increased 
rapidly and exports became less competitive, with the result that the deficit of the current account 
of the balance of payments moved from a negative 1,596 million of dollars in 1977 to a negative 
12444 in 1981 (ibid).
The vulnerability of the economy to the huge external disequilibrium became evident when 
oil prices plummeted in the international markets in 1982. Since then the economy has hardly 
grown registering in 1982 and 1983 negative growth rates of real GDP of -0.5 and -2.9 percent, 
respectively.
After the 1982 crises Mexico declared Itself unable to service its large foreign debt and, 
since then, the country has embarked on a programme of adjustment in an attempt to correct the 
major economic imbalances and liberalise the economy by gradually removing several sources of
10 Of this figure, in 1973,14.449 w en  public debt and 3,643 private. (Trejo (1917».
11 According to Cardoao and Levy [I9SS|, the a m in  and omissions a rm  In the halanre of payments 
jumped from a negative 479 million of dollars in 1974 to a negative 2.996 In 1976 (p. 339).
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distortions. The characteristics o f these changes will be dealt with later. To end this section, how­
ever, it is useful, by way of summary, to make explicit mention of the three major instruments of 
economic policy that have prevailed over the past four decades, and that served as mechanisms 
for concentrating resources in the industrial sector. These are exchange rate policy, commercial 
policy, and direct public sector intervention. In the following section we will discuss these three 
mechanisms, focusing particularly on the last two, since they constitute our purpose of study in 
this thesis.
2 J .1  T he Exchange Rate
An important mechanism of economic policy used to favour the industrialisation of the economy 
was the exchange rate. As has already been noted, the nominal exchange rate was kept fixed for a 
period o f 23 years, from 1954 to 1976, at a parity o f 12.5 pesos per dollar and then, from 1977 
until 1981 its nominal value changed very little. Obviously, since inflation was permanently 
higher than in the United States, which is the country's main commercial partner, the result was a 
persistent appreciation of the Mexican peso in real terms.12 Figure 2.1 shows the effective real 
exchange rate, defined as the ratio o f domestic to foreign prices of main trade partners, between 
1948 and 1982. As can be seen, in twenty years between 1955 and 1975 the real exchange rate 
appreciated slowly but continuously (see Cardoso and Levy (1988]).
This exchange rate policy clearly benefited some groups and damaged others. First, sectors 
which were traditionally generators o f external resources in the first half of the century, such as 
agriculture and mining, were severely affected, suffering large reductions of their export volumes. 
This was particularly true of agriculture. Secondly, since imports become cheaper when the 
exchange rate overvalues, in the case of Mexico, the most favoured groups were those who
»  According to Balassa 11983|. In the sUdcs and seventies w ho!cu lt prices rose by 32 percent in Meaioo 
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imported intermediates and capital goods in large quantities. In contrast, imports of consumer 
goods were largely reduced by means of import permits and tariffs.
Therefore, the industrial sector not only benefited from the availability of cheap imported 
intermediates and capital goods, but also from a protected domestic markets since competition 
from abroad was ruled out by the imposition of trade barriers, whenever domestic production 
existed. This last point takes us to the second major mechanism used for concentrating resources 
in the industrial sector -namely, commercial policy.
2 J J  Commercial Policy
The evolution o f commercial policy in Mexico can be analysed with reference to the stages 
of the industrialisation process. From the twenties until the mild forties trade policy was essen­
tially used for tax collection purposes. During this period Mexico enjoyed a current account 
surplus and, therefore, balance of payments problems did not constitute an important element in 
the objectives of commercial policy.
However, by the 1940s, balance of pay menu considerations and industrial promotion 
started to play a role in the implementation of commercial policies. In 1947, several important 
modifications were carried out. among which the most important were the introduction of specific 
quotas and ad valorem duties, levied on the basis of 'official prices', that differed from the prices 
at which trade actually took place (see Bueno [1971]). While industrial promotion was gaining 
importance, during the forties and until the middle of the fifties balance of paymenu problems 
determined, to a great extent, the course of commercial policy. This occurred because, as has 
been noted, strong pressures on the balance of paymenu were present during those yean, which 
led to two currency devaluations
From 1933 until the beginning of the seventies, however, commercial policy played a key 
role in promoting the industrialisation of the country. As already mentioned, this period coin­
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cided with the so-called 'stabilising development’ period, and the role of trade policy was to 
create an environment for industrial growth, basically by providing an umbrella for domestic pro­
ducers in an attempt to cover them against foreign competition.
Unlike other Latin American countries where a similar process took place. Mexico was to 
rely more heavily on the use o f direct controls, particularly import permits, as opposed to tariffs, 
although, formally, commercial policy measures were made up of a combination of the two.
Indeed, from the forties direct controls in the form of import permits became the corner­
stone of protection policy, and extended throughout the period to cover an increasing num ber of 
items. Thus, for instance, while in 1936 33 percent of import categories required import permits 
(28 percent in value terms), in 1973 the number o f categories subject to licencing represented 80 
percent (64 percent in value terms). This is shown in Table 2.4
Table 2.4 
Proportion of Import C atq
YEAR 1956 1962 1966 1970 1973 1975 1977 1978 1979
Controlled <%) 33.0 4 4 0 600 65.0 800 100.0 77.4 43.4 31.1
F ree d .) 67.0 5 6 0 400 3 50 20.0 0.0 22.5 56.5 6 8 9
YEAR 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 .
Controlled (%) 23.9 264 1000 78.7 647 10.3 7.7 6.1 .
Free d j _______ 76.0 73.5 0.0 21.2 35.3 . .» 9 6 92.2 9 39 -
Source: Balassa (1983], p. 800. and Comercio Exterior (1987].
It is important to note that although trade policy in Mexico has formally been based on a 
combination of tariffs and import permits, the fact that the latter is heavily used makes tariffs 
superfluous, as far as the protection effect is concerned.
It is also interesting to consider that although 37 criteria had to be satisfied to grant an 
import licence, in practice, two criteria were the most relevant:
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(a) Is the commodity produced in the country?
(b) Is it produced in sufficient amounts to supply national needs?13
These criteria, being the central ones, reveal the explicit emphasis placed on the idea o f pro­
tecting domestic producers in order to achieve some degree of industrialisation. It also suggests 
that those criteria concerned with efficiency and opportunity costs were most certainly not in the 
mind o f policy-makers.
As expected, the actual levels of protection were concentrated on manufactures. Table 2.3 
shows an aggregated version of the effective rates o f protection for the years 1960 and 1970.
T able 2 J
Effective Protection in Mexico. 19*0 and 1970




-Forestry and Fishing 3.0 -1.4
-Mining -0.3 -12.3
Non-Durable Consumer Goods 216 31.6
Intermediate Goods 13.2 168
Durable Consumer and 
Capital Goods________________ 64« 77.2
Source: Kate and Wallace (1980], p. 133.
Note: Based only on tariffs, not quantitative restrictions.
One of the associated costs of these high levels of protection, as noted, was a permanent 
loss of competitiveness in the export markets. Not surprisingly, during this period manufactured 
exports rarely accounted for more than 23 percent of total exports. Likewise, export o f primary 
commodities showed a very poor performance. Thus, for instance, while non-ferrous metals 
accounted for 15 percent of total exports in the period 1955-37, this proportion shrank to 4 per­
cent in the period 1970-1972. More generally, primary exports increased, altogether, by only 2 1
11 See Kale and W allace [ 19*0). pp. 44-43.
27
percent during the sixties, whereas these exports rose by 16 percent in Korea and 18 percent in 
Taiwan, countries which followed an outward oriented policy (see Balassa (1983). p. 801).
We have seen that during the 'stabilising development' period the primary concern of com­
mercial policy was to protect the domestic industry. In the seventies, however, balance of pay- 
menu considerations regained importance since, as has already been suggested, the external dise­
quilibrium accumulated during the previous years was becoming the main constraint to  economic 
growth. Not surprisingly during the seventies commercial policy was very erratic.
Indeed, during the first half of the seventies the system of protection was reinforced. In 
1973, import permiu were extended to ail import categories. After the devaluation of the 
currency in 1977, and the oil discoveries that took place in these years, an attempt w as made to 
reduce the levels o f protection since balance of paymenu problems were not a serious limitation 
any more, and somehow it was clear that some openness of the economy was necessary. In this 
event, the proportion o f commodity categories subject to import permiu was reduced from 77.4 
percent in 1977 to 34.1 percent in 1979. These changes were accompanied by a rise in tariffs, 
which were supposed to be temporary, so that eventually they would fall gradually. T his, how­
ever. did not happen, mainly because of the overvaluation of the currency and the imminence of 
the economic crises o f the eighties. Thus, by 1982. all import categories were subject to the 
licencing mechanism once again (see Table 2.4)
As can be seen from Table 2.4. after 1982 the proportion of import categories subject to 
permit has been falling dramatically. We will see later that the process of trade liberalisation in 
the eighties appears to be permanent, not only because of the reduction on the categories subject 
to any form of control but also because of the adhesion of Mexico to the GATT in 1986. We will 
come back to this point later. Meanwhile, it should be underlined that as far as the previous 
decades is concerned, it seems that the main role of commercial policy was to protect domestic 
producers, in an attempt to industrialise the country at any cost
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2.3.3 Direct Public Sector Intervention
A third major mechanism of economic policy to promote the industrialisation of the country was. 
undoubtedly, the direct participation of the public sector as an economic agent, mainly in the 
form of public enterprises (PEs).
We have already mentioned that in the twenties and thirties some important institutions 
were created, mainly financial institutions, which were aimed to promote and finance the 
development of basic infrastructure. Of these, perhaps the most important was the creation o f the 
National Development Bank (NAFINSA) in 1933, which subsequently participated in the crea­
tion of many PEs. Likewise, in the thirties three major corporations were nationalised: the oil 
enterprise (PEMEX). the electricity company (CFE), and the National Railways.14
Thus, at the beginning of the forties the state already had control over the so called strategic 
industries. It was not. however, until the mid-forties and after that public investment started to 
expand in a significant way and with it. the creation of PEs. Table 2.6 shows the evolution of 
public sector expenditures in Mexico, and the share that PEs took.
Tabic 2 4










1895 1.622 0 0
1900 1.924 0 0
1905 2.903 0 0
1910 1,782 0 0
1925 2,874 296 10.3
1930 3.108 300 9.7
1935 3.660 320 8.7
1940 5.195 822 15.8
1945 6,392 1.178 184
1950 10.305 3.197 31.0
1955 13,551 3.392 25.0
1960 24,097 8.499 35.3
1965 39.948 14.343 35.9
1970 55.378 19.202 34.7
1975 98.890 31.241 31.6
1980 162.971 69.263 42.5
1981 1.182.200 430.400 36.4
1982 2,829.300 705.300 24.9
1983 4.468.200 1.171.500 26.2
1984 6.746.600 1.833.400 27.1
1985 11.783.800 3.023.800 25.6
1986 22.799,700 4,292,200 18.8
Source: From 1893 to 1980. Story [1986], p. 42. From 1981 onwards are own estimations based 
on International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics [1988].
Note: From 1893 to 1980 million of pesos of 1960. 1980 to 1986 current values.
As can be seen, in the twenties and thirties PEs started to participate in the expenditures of 
the public sector, and from 1940 onwards their participation increased steadily (with the excep­
tion of 1933) to reach as much as 42.3 percent in 1980. Prom 1980 onwards the proportion started 
to decrease, which is a reflection not only of the privatisation programme that was implemented 
after 1983 but also o f the fact that after this year an increasing proportion o f total public expendi­
ture was devoted to service the foreign debt We shall come back to this point in the next section.
The allocation of public sector expenditures, however, was not constant. Its variation 
reflects the stages of economic growth of the country. Thus, in the forties and fifties the bulk of 
public sector investment was devoted to building up basic infrastructure (mainly transportation).
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whereas in the sixties and seventies the industrial sector took the major share. This is explained 
by the expansion of PEs into the production of basic raw materials. Table 2.7 illustrates this 
point.
Table 2.7
Sectoral Allocation of PuMkc Investment - Mexico
Public Investment (%) 
1940-49 1950-59 1960-68 1969-72
Agriculture 18 13 9 13
Industry 14 30 39 37
Transportation 54 39 26 22
Social Benefit 12 14 23 26
Administration A  Defense 2 2 2 2
TOTAL 100 100 10() 100
Public Invesur•ent (%>
Sector 1973-76 1977-79 1980-82 1983-86
Agriculture 18 21 12 13
Industry 34 43 41 35
Transportation 23 14 17 16
Social Benefit 23 20 28 34
Administration A  Defense 2 2 2 2
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: From 1940 to 1979. Story [1986], p. 44. From 1980 to 1986 are own estimations based 
on International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics [1988].
It should also be stressed that, although the tendency of public sector investment has been to 
concentrate on industrial promotion, it has always played an Important role in the provision of 
social services, such as education and medical health.
The reasons for the active participation of the public sector in the Mexican economy are not 
difficult to find and. as in many developing countries, have more to do with the promotion of 
economic growth than with ideological considerations. In the particular context o f the Mexican 
economy it can be said that, in most cases, the presence of PEs is explained by the absence of 
private investors willing to embark on projects that require huge initial Investment and are 
characterised by long gestation periods. While this can be said to be the main reason, there are
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several other explanations. Rey [1987], referring to Mexico, suggests some additional causes: 
national security considerations: the rescue of private Amu from bankruptcy; the provision of 
basic goods to some groups of the population; and. Anally, the development o f  new technologies.
What seems clear, however, is the tendency of public sector investment to concentrate in 
industrial activities. It is then interesting to take a closer look at the way in which the participa­
tion of the public sector in the industry is structured. Before that, however, it is important to note 
that although the participation of the public sector in the Mexican economy increased per­
manently since it started in the twenties, during the seventies its expansion was particularly 
significant. Thus, for instance, until the end of the sixties the public sector deAcit as a proportion 
of GDP was kept at relatively low levels: it averaged 1.4 percent from 1966 to 1971. However, 
after 1971 the deAcit increased sharply; it was 10 percent in 197S and reached 15.4 percent in 
1982 (International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics [1987]). In particular, dur­
ing the second half o f the seventies, and as a result of the oil boom, the expansion of the public 
sector was very signiAcant the contribution of the public sector to GDP went from 14.6 percent 
in 1973 to 23.6 in 1983. Public Arms accounted for a very high proportion o f this expansion; they 
increased their participation in the GDP from 6.6 percent in 1973 to 18.2 percent in 1983 (Secre­
taria de Programación y Presupuesto [1983a], Cuentas Nacionales del Sector Publico 1973-1983). 
It should be said that the oil sector alone represented a very high proportion; its contribution was 
M m e 14 percent o f GDP in 1983.14
Keeping this in mind, let us move on and look at the participation o f public Arms in the 
industrial sector. The participation of the public sector in the industry is not difficult to character­
ise: it concentrates on the production of raw materials of very general use. Thus, almost half of 
the production of PEs is concentrated in the production of petroleum and petrochemicals, and is 
followed in importance by the production of other intermediates. Table 2.8 shows the structure of 
production o f the public sector in terms of types of goods.
14 Thr petroleum lector alone war reaponalble far 40 p a n » *  of the medium term debt o f  die Mexican 
public lector »  commercial bank*. dunn« ifaa nU boom yean (am Balaaaa et. aL ( 19S6])
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Table 2 J
S tructure of Production of PE* in the Industrial Sector
GOODS 1970 1975 1981 1983
Non Durables Consumer Goods 9.7 10.5 16.6 15.6
Durables Consumer Goods 7.7 9.6 13.1 3.1
Non-Petroleum Intermediates 31.6 28.2 33.3 26.8
Capital Goods 3.4 3.2 3.9 2.8
Sub-Total (non petroleum prods.) 52.4 51.5 669 48.3
Petroleum u d  Petrochenudl 47.6 485 33.1 51.7
Source: Delgado e t  al. [1986], p. 126.
In fact, it can be said that, to some extent, the production of PEs is concentrated in very few 
industrial classes. Delgado e t  al. [1986] shows, for instance, what he calls the 'co re  o f the paras- 
taud industry', where more than 80 percent of the production of PEs is located in eight industrial 
classes. This is shown in table 2.9.
Table 2.9
The Core o f the Parastatal Industry
PRODUCT 1970 1975 1981 1983
Sugar 4.9 3.8 6.2 5.1
Other Food Products 2.1 2.1 3.0 4.5
Petroleum and Derivatives 42 1 398 263 42 6
Basic Petrochemicals 5.5 8.7 6 8 9.1
Fertilisers 4.2 3.7 2.6 3.2
Iron and Steel 17.0 15.9 24 8 17.4
Automobiles 6.9 7.6 9.7 1.5
Transport Machinery St Equipment 2.4 2.2 2.3 1.7
Sub-Total Core 85 1 83 8 81.7 85 1
T ool Imlu.U}__________ _______ 1000 1000 1000 1 0 0 0
Source: Delgado e t  al. [1986], p. 128.
The main characteristics of PEs in the industrial sector in Mexico are w ell described by 
Peres [1982] and Delgado e t  al. [1986]. First, PEs have concentrated their production in inter­
mediate goods; they represented 89.2 percent of such production in 1965, 79.9 percent In 1975, 
and 81.3 percent in 1983. Secondly, PEs are large, capital Intensive, and concentrated in a few
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sectors: approximately 80 percent of PEs' production in 1983 was concentrated in only twelve 
activities or industrial classes.19 Thirdly, the productivity increase o f PEs in the period 
1965-1975 was below the increase in productivity in the manufacturing sector, the increase in the 
manufacturing sector was 4.6 percent while that o f the parastatal sector was 3.0 percent.16 
Finally, the most important characteristic is that the general policy followed by PEs has been to 
bold prices down, in a deliberate attempt to subsidise economic activity. According to Peres 
[1982]. in the period 1965-1975 price increases were lower in those activities in which the state 
participated than in the non-oil Mexican industry. Thus, for instance, the domestic prices of com­
bustibles did not change for a period of IS years, until 1974. and even after this increase, if prices 
are measured in dollars, the price increases were very low (see Table 2.10).
Table 2.10
Internal Prices o f Petroleum Derivatives
________ (In Dollars per Gallon)_________
OIL PRODUCTS 1970 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Diesel 009 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.39
-Petrol (Nova) 0.30 0.42 0 4 6 0.46 0.46 046 0.46 0.50
-Petrol (Extra) 
NATURAL GAS









S 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.40
Source: Sxekely [1983].
In general, as suggested by Trejo [1986], the policy followed by the group of PEs hi 
to subsidise the economic activity by keeping the prices of many publicly produced goods 
Trejo [1986] point* out that rail transport, fertilisers, electricity, and iron and steel were 
the more controlled prices in the seventies, and suggests that such a policy has mean
transfers of resources to the industrial sector. 1
11 Sec also Villane*] ( 1VS6)
M ThU may be ■ reflection of the fact that PE* had baso under 
don o f  lbs labour ta n a .  and of the fact dim such productivity ind 
gross output and number o f  w o rtan  employed (tee Philip (I984|).
il
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Moreover, it has often been the policy of the government to control inflation by holding 
down prices in the public sector. Philip [1984] stresses that this policy was particularly important 
in the period 1976-1982.
Finally, it should be noted that although a few large PEs, such as PEMEX (petroleum), CFE 
(electricity), National Railways, and S1DERMEX (iron and steel), account for a very large pro­
portion o f resources, the number of PEs increased very significantly in the w hole period. Rey 
[1987] mentions that between 1940 and 1981 the state founded 111 enterprises that introduced 37 
new basic products, was partner in 124 more enterprises in 33 o f which it participated as a major 
shareholder, and 39 more were created by enterprises in which the state already participated (sub­
sidiaries).
2.4 Summ ary and Conclusions
The analysis of the economic growth of the Mexican economy over the past fou r decades sug­
gests that, although to some extent the country succeeded in achieving some degree of industriali­
sation. efficiency and opportunity costs were not taken into consideration.
In its attempt to develop the industrial sector, three major mechanisms of economic policy 
were used as a means o f concentrating resources in industry: a fixed exchange rate, a clear protec­
tionist commercial policy favouring manufactures, and a growing intervention o f  the public sec­
tor in the economy, whose role was to provide cheap inputs to the industry
Such a set o f policies, while successful in promoting industrial growth, led to  a very dis­
torted scenario in which prices no longer reflected opportunity costs. Indeed, the relative price 
structure of the Mexican economy has been characterised as a major source o f  micro and 
macroeconomic disequilibrium.
Many economic imbalances were created during the past four decades such as a very 
marked regional disequilibrium, a very concentrated income in relatively few hands and, more
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important, to the extent that it became the main obstacle to the economic grow th in the seventies, 
the external disequilibrium.
The picture in the eighties has changed dramatically. With the second largest foreign debt in 
the developing world and most oil export revenues going to service this debt. Mexico has 
embarked on a programme of structural adjustment in an attempt to correct the major economic 
disequilibria.
Without entering into the discussion of the merits of such a programme, o r  of whether it has 
succeeded or not, it should be pointed out that major economic reforms have been carried out 
with the aim of liberalising several areas o f the economy.
Thus, for instance, after several decades of public deficits, the public sector has recorded 
primary surpluses1* every year after 1983 through reduction in public expenditure, adjustments in 
public sector pricing policies, and fiscal reform. Additionally, the structural reform  o f public sec­
tor enterprises has entailed divestiture programmes that have favoured public sector finances.19
As far as trade policy is concerned, after joining the OATT, a comprehensive external trade 
liberalisation programme has been carried out. the result o f which is that by 1989 less than 20 
percent of imports by value is subject to any form of quantitative restrictions (see International 
Monetary Fund. Survey [1989] and Table 2.4). Likewise, with the help of a programme of export 
promotion and an undervalued exchange rate, exports have increased substantially. In particular, 
it is interesting to note that non-oil exports, which in 1982 represented 23.6 percent of total 
exports, increased their participation to 39.2 percent in 1987.
It is perhaps too early to assess with certainty whether or not such structural adjustment pro­
grammes will succeed or not, particularly because of the macroeconomic constraints imposed by
'* It riXMild a lto  ba mentioned dial in I9 U  the Mexican government sat up tba to  called 'p ac to *  (PBCB). 
which essentially is a programme to control several prices in the economy. So far it has succeeded in  bringing 
inflation down.
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the huge extern*] debt However, it seems beyond doubt that some degree of liberalisation o f the 
ecooomy is required if Mexico is to maintain growth in future Surely the effects will have far 




A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing liteiature o n  public sector intervention 
in economies. Since we are particularly interested in the effects that PEs have on relative prices 
special emphasis will be put on the most relevant theoretical developments that focus on depar­
tures of price from marginal costs as well as the economic performance of PEs. Some additional 
comments will be also made regarding alternative forms of regulation. In the last part some com­
ments will also be made regarding the empirical evaluation of price effects arising from public 
sector intervention.
The exposition is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we look a t the main theoretical rea­
sons why prices usually deviate from marginal costs in PEs. This section will cover the classical 
theoretical developments on normative issues concerned with public sector pricing policy. In 
recent yean, however, a growing literature has flourished, shifting its focus of attention from nor­
mative to positive issues, emphasising the role of economic performance o f PEs. and arguing that 
inefficiency is a very common cause of distortions created by PEs. W e shall therefore devote Sec­
tion 3.3 to highlighting the most relevant elements of this approach. Section 3.4 focuses on a dif­
ferent source of distortions of the price structure, namely commercial policy. Finally, in Section
3.5 some comments will be made on the existing literature addressing the empirical analysis of 
price effects arising from taxation and public pricing policy.
It should be mentioned that rather than attempting an exhaustive review of the literature, we 
shall outline the main theoretical points that are directly relevant to this thesis. From that perspec­
tive. it should be clear that we leave out many sources of distortions o f  the price system which.
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though relevant, go beyond the scope of the study. Thus, for instance, th e  effects of indirect taxa­
tion will not be discussed directly although, as it will be seen at various points of the exposition, 
the theoretical analysis of deviations of price from marginal costs resem bles to the results o f the 
theory of optimal indirect taxation.
3 J  Deviations of Prices From Marginal Costs
Perhaps one of the most standard results in economic theory is that in a  competitive environment 
firms should determine their level of production at the point where p rices are equal to marginal 
costs. Such a result guarantees that the economy as a whole is at its optimum.
In a partial equilibrium framework the marginal cost pricing rule ensures that total surplus 
o f both consumers and producers are at their highest values. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point.
The supply curve is depicted by MC which also represents m arginal cost, whereas DD 
describes the demand curve. It is clear that the equilibrium point is £ .  w here price equals margi­
nal cost. Any other point would result in an efficiency loss. At the very  intuitive level, starting 
from Q0 an increase in the level of production would increase utility o f  consumers by an amount 
Pa. which is higher than it costs to the economy. ATCV At this point the inefficiency loss is meas­
ured by the shaded area i.e. the so-called deadweight loss. Such a situation would prevail until 
production level reaches Q i where price equals marginal cost and the deadweight loss vanishes. 
By the same token, any point beyond Q\, say. Qi, is not optimal because it  would be unprofitable 
for firms to produce since, at this point, marginal cost would be greater than  price.
In an slightly more formal way. if p - p ( * ) denotes the inverse dem and function, the stan­
dard measure of consumer benefit. B, in a partial equilibrium analysis is the integral under the 
demand function
» ( » > • /* « > * ( j . i )
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If  short-run marginal cost measures social cost then net social benefit. S (q ). is simply
5 (f  >-*<«> -C {q )  (3.2)
which, when maximised with respect to q yields
P < f* )«*C  (3.3)
where q* denotes the optimal level o f output.
Equation (3.3) is our famous marginal cost pricing rule. It will also be our starting point.
As is well known, the rule, when applied in an economy in which public production takes 
place has generated a great deal of controversy. Essentially, the reason is that many PEs belong to 
the category of the so-called natural monopolies in which, because o f the presence of increasing 
returns to scale, long-run average cost is decreasing and hence marginal cost is lower than aver­
age cost. It follows that pricing at marginal cost in these industries would require them to operate 
with losses. Despite this consideration Hotelling [1938) supported the marginal cost pricing rule 
for PEs arguing that whenever industries operated under decreasing costs the resulting deficit 
ought to be covered by lump-sum taxation.
It was soon recognised, however, that there is very limited capacity, in practice, to raise and 
redistribute income via lump-sum taxation. In particular, it is often argued that the basic 
difficulty with lump-sum taxes is that the information on which differential taxes would be based 
is not observable or. if observable, is costly to obtain. An additional complication is that individu­
als have no incentive to reveal the relevant information (see Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980], p. 337). 
Accordingly, the subsequent literature concentrated on how to maximise welfare under such a 
constraint This is the well known second best approach, originally formulated by Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1936).
It was Boileux [1971] who formalised the ideas of the second best approach in the context
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of public pricing policy. Given the difficulties of covering deficits by means of lump-sum taxa­
tion. Boiteux reformulated the problem so that the question became: "W hat are the optimal depar­
tures of price from marginal cost subject to the constraint that nationalised industries should 
break even in a world where lump-sum taxation is ruled out ? He found what he called a vector 
of "fictitious prices", that is, those prices that guarantee the smallest welfare losses.
More generally, the so-called Ramsey-Boiteux pricing scheme sets a number of roles to be 
followed in a situation in which PEs are allowed to make a determined level of proflu which may 
be a positive level of profiu, or losses, or, as in the Boiteux model, a break even position. Essen­
tially, what all these scenarios have in common is that deviations o f prices from marginal cosu  
will be determined by two elemenu: (a) the predetermined level of p ro fiu  (losses) in the budget 
constraint, in such a way that, the higher the level o f profiu (the low er the level of losses) the 
greater the deviations of prices from marginal cosu: and (b) on the dem and side, the elasticities 
of demand should determine which producu are going to be priced higher, the more inelastic the 
demand for a particular product the higher the price charge while for producu with high elasticity 
of demand prices should deviate very little from marginal cosu.1
To see this result we can refoimulate our problem of maximising S . as in (3.2), but now for 
the group of public firms2
s -£»,<#■ )-£ < :< * >  (3.4)
subject to the constraint that profiu should be greater or equal than a predetermined value. R,
Ç t o * - C  <*)>** <3J>
1 A very comptait and detailed review of the theory of pricing policy of PEe U In Boe (I9M ). See aleo 
Marchand et. al. (1914] and G ut m ène | IVSO). An historic review on thii Urne ta ta  Baum ol and Bradford
u tm .
1 See Reel 11976).
4 2
Then, necessary conditions are
(36)
3 > f . - G ( * » - f t * 0 ; l * 0  ; K fy .q , - C < * ) ) - 0 (3 7 )
where / -  1.... jt ,  and the demand function is specified as the inverse, p, ................4«). It can be
shown that
where X gives the marginal welfare cost of a tightening of the profit constra in t Then, rearranging 
(3.6) gives our new pricing rule
That is, deviations of prices from marginal costs depend on both the value of the profit con­
straint and demand. For analytical purposes equation (3.9) can be further simplified if we assume 
demand independence so that dp* idq, -  0. i # k Then
where /, is the price elasticity of demand, and t  is the rate of divergence between price and mar­
ginal COSL
As can be seen, the extent of the divergence of price from marginal coat is inversely related 
to the elasticity of demand, which looks very intuitive result since it suggests that the more ine­
lastic the demand for a commodity is the easier it would be for a PE to set a higher price, 





This result is, as a matter of fact, the same that Ramsey [1927] postulated for the problem of 
optimal taxation. All we need is to interpret the divergence between price and marginal cost as a 
tax, h, and the profit constraint should be seen as the revenue constraint of the government. Then, 
the traditional Ramsey rule applies. Notice the similarity of the problems o f  pricing policy and 
optimal taxation. In particular, if  we think that an optimal taxation policy is applied throughout 
the economy. PEs prices will be determined as a pan of this and hence there would not be 
separate PEs pricing policies.
In practice, however, even though the problems of optimal taxation and public pricing look 
very similar, in the former case there is only one general budget constraint whereas in the prob­
lem of public prices each PE faces a particular budget constraint so that the relation between a 
particular PE and the government becomes relevant (see Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980], p. 460). 
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind the similarity because, as will be seen in the last part of this 
chapter, for the purpose of addressing the empirical analysis of the price system deviations of 
prices from marginal costs can be treated as a form o f indirect taxation.3
Marginal cost pricing in industries operating with decreasing costs w ould lead to losses 
since marginal cost is below average cost. One obvious solution to this problem  is to price at 
average cost However, in those cases where demand is insufficient in relation to  costs, even aver­
age cost pricing would lead to losses.
A usual way to deal with this problem is to impose a multi-part tariff pricing policy. The 
most common case is the two-part tariff system, whereby customers pay a fixed amount for the
are present: a variable cost which essentially reflects the marginal cost o f producing, and a fixed 
cost to recoup the resulting deficits. Such a system is essentially a discriminating lump-sum tax
which is welfare optimum.
* The aimu 
( 1*711. Their
ic and electricity are typical examples o f this two-part tariff 
I policy and taxation waa addreaaed by Dtamood and Mintaea
u u
system (see Brown and Sibley [1986], Oi [1971], and Ng and Weisser (1974]).
It should also be noticed that marginal cost pricing in a competitive environment does not 
necessarily lead to a public sector deficit, even if  natural monopolies are present. This may be 
because if all PEs price at marginal cost some of them may end up making losses, while others 
may make profits. If the surpluses o f the latter exceed the losses of the former, then there is no 
need to establish rules for deviating prices from marginal costs, provided inter-firm transfers 
within the government are achievable. This solution, however, deals only with the problem of the 
public sector deficit Welfare considerations are absent Furthermore, such inter-firm transfers are 
in practice difficult to achieve because public firms do not give up revenues easily (see Trivedi 
[1986]).
Remembering, however, that in many circumstances PEs are interrelated in the sense that 
they often buy products from one another, it is perhaps more realistic to recognise the common 
sense argument that it is pointless to make one enterprise achieve its profit target while ignoring 
the tact that this makes it harder for another to do so. and in the end leads to a greater welfare loss 
overall. Accordingly, it might be more realistic to think of PEs policy as a coordinated policy 
package
Essentially, the argument here is that it is better to determine the total surplus generated by 
one enterprise as a derived value rather than predetermining a target value and then deriving the 
divergence between price and marginal cost In other words, the profit target o f each enterprise 
becomes derived rather than predetermined For instance. Rees (1976] (p. 164) demonstrates that 
with m profit constraints the most efficient pricing result should be
— r=---------- -------
T H K m  -MC,
(311)
where M ty, i j  -  IX .» *  1« the effect o f the UM output on the revenue of the jth PE. That is. an
45
efficient allocation of profit targets requires that the marginal welfare loss of each target in each 
PE is the same (X| -  Xj - ....-  X«).
The foregoing analysis has focused on public pricing policies under two main assumptions: 
(a) that the government is only concerned with efficiency, and (b) that the private sector is per­
fectly competitive.
Income distribution considerations however, provide another reason why prices deviate 
from marginal costs in PEs. Indeed, very often public pricing is not only seen as an instrument for 
allocation of resources but also as an instrument for influencing a prevailing distribution of 
income. It was not until 1971 that Feldstein [1972] analysed public pricing rules taking into 
account income distribution aspects. It seems surprising that income distribution elements were 
not analysed until the seventies. Moreover, in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach, the analysis is car­
ried out through compensated demand functions, that is. focusing only on the substitution effects. 
As Bos [1986] stresses, such an approach assumes "that incomes are redistributed optimally by 
some son of compensating lump-sum payments even though the empirical feasibility of such 
payments is at least questionable.” (p. 103).
Perhaps the main reason why it took so long to analyse income distribution elements is the 
belief that public pricing is not the most appropriate instrument for achieving a desired redistribu­
tion of income. This is due to the fact that, while an income tax only distorts the labour leisure 
decision, public prices will distort the whole structure of relative prices. It follows that through an 
income tax the same redistribution objective can be achieved but creating fewer distortions and 
hence a smaller welfare loss.
Whether or not public pricing is an effective instrument for redistributing income is a debat-
To look at this point in a more systematic way assume an economy with no lump-sum 
taxes, n goods, i ■ I,...,*, and m consumers, k -  l,...,m. T he kth consumer's indirect utility func­
tion is represented as
........ (312)
where y is income. And the social welfare function. W, is
R '-H 'iv ,------ v . ) (3.13)
Then it can be shown that maximising (3.13) subject to the same profit constraint as before, 
and assuming also demand independence, leads to the following result4
shadow price associated with the profit constraint
It can be seen that now the mark-up is lower the higher is d, where 4  can be interpreted as 
the marginal social utilities of the consumption share o f various income groups. Notice that now 
a high distributional characteristic would tend to offset the low values of demand elasticities. 
Notice also, yet again, the perfect similarity with the problem of optimal taxation since (3.14) can 
equally be used to determine the optimal pattern of commodity taxes, provided p, -  MC, is inter­
preted as a tax on commodity i . Naturally, the practical implementation of (3.14) becomes much 
more difficult to the extent that now it is not only necessary to estimate demand elasticities and
4 See Reri 11976|, p. 164-163.
(3.14)
where di is the distributional characteristic, and is defined as
(3.13)
i.7
consumption shares, but also trade-offs between the welfare of different groups of consumers.
The relaxation of the second assumption, that the private sector is perfectly competitive, has 
led to some additional work, which focuses on how pricing rules would be affected in the pres­
ence of imperfect competition in the private sector. When the private sector is not perfectly com ­
petitive, that is. when prices in the private sector deviate from marginal costs due to the presence 
of monopolistic competition, for instance, then the theory suggests that prices in the public sector 
would have to deviate from marginal costs as well, in order to minimise the welfare costs that 
such distortions generate. The adjustment of the public sector pricing to a non competitive private 
sector has been analysed from two different perspectives, which Bos [1986] calls general and par­
tial microeconomic models.
General microeconomic models are an extension of the Ramsey-Boiteux model. In that 
case, when the private sector behaves as a monopolistic competitor, the resulting structure of 
prices will depend on whether publicly and privately produced commodities are substitutes or 
complements. If they are substitutes, publicly produced goods would be relatively more expen­
sive so as to reduce the degree of competition with the private sector. If. on the other hand, the 
goods are complementary, then publicly produced commodities should be cheaper, in order to 
guarantee that the purchase of the "composite" good is going to be cheaper. Therefore, no general 
results can be drawn because the direction of the deviation of prices from marginal costs would 
be determined by the kind of commodities actually produced in any particular context. In so  far 
as the question of how far prices will deviate from marginal costs, it will be very much deter­
mined by cross effects of demand (see Spencer and Brander [1983] and Hagen [1979]).
The second approach to analysing the case o f  a non perfectly competitive private sector, as 
mentioned above, is based on partial microeconomic models. Rather than using a general equili­
brium framework, these models are based on a game theoretical approach and hence focus more 
on the interactions in a duopolistic, or more generally, an oligopolistic context, in which one of 
the playen is a PE. Thus, while in the traditional Ramsey-Boiteux approach the public sector
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adapts passively to the behaviour of the private sector, in this mote recent approach PEs play an 
active role, since private firms are assumed to maximise profits given the reaction function o f the 
public firm. The concept of an active public firm w as introduced by Harris [1978]. In short, the 
effects originated by the actions of a public Arm would generate different outcomes depending, 
basically, on the reaction function of both public and private firms. Bos [1986], for instance, ana­
lyses different outcomes in a Cournot type behaviour and Stackelberg type behaviour, in which 
either a public or a private firm is the active player.3
The points above mentioned give a summarised account of the different situations in which 
the economic theory predicts that prices will differ from marginal costs in PEs. Yet, in practice, 
there are several more instances in which PEs set prices away from marginal costs. W eller 
[1982], for instance, argues that because of the inflexibility inherent in many actual indirect tax 
systems, public sector pricing can be thought of as a means of short-run adjustment to changing 
circumstances. A classical example of this point arises when, in a period of rapid inflation, 
governments resort to public pricing changes rather than to taxation changes, since the latter usu­
ally have to go through a process of institutional reforms which usually take a relatively long 
period to be implemented. Politically, it is also easier to modify public prices rather than the 
indirect tax system, because reforming the tax system may find an organised re* is lance from pro­
ducers. whereas changing public prices is likely to meet a softer response since consumers are 
usually widespread and unorganised.
More generally, one finds that very often socio-political criteria constitute an important ele­
ment among the objectives of PEs. It Is indeed quite a common practice, particularly in LDCs. to 
use PEs as instruments for employment generation, o r as instruments for the promotion of indus­
try by subsidising the private sector through the provision of cheap raw materials.6
1 For w ithe r application we also BtMo and Mat Colic I ( IM 4 |.
•  On M s Issue see I -akihman |  IM 4|. World Bank | I 9 U | sod  M alloa 119(2).
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All in all. there are several reasons both from the theoretical point of view and from a more 
practical perspective that explain why prices so often deviate from marginal costs in PEs. It has 
been seen that revenue, efficiency and distribution all come into the pricing rule. One perhaps 
would have to agree with Mallon [1982] when he suggests that, despite its theoretical merits, 
marginal cost pricing is still a rare exception in practice, rather than the rule.
3 J  Economic Performance of PEs
After Hotelling [1938], from the forties until the seventies, most of the economic literature on 
PEs concentrated on normative issues, namely the prescription of the most appropriate pricing 
and investment policies, in order to minimise welfare losses. As we have seen in the previous sec­
tion, a good deal of this literature was developed in those yean.
In recent yean, however, and particularly during the eighties, there has been a shift o f 
emphasis of the economic literature from normative to positive issues, focusing on the economic 
performance of PEs. Indeed, it seems that owing to the growing public intervention of the public 
sectors in many mixed economies in the past two decades, it became increasingly clear that the 
economic performance of the public sector was having significant effects on economies' perfor­
mances as a whole. In its 1987 report the OECD (1987], for instance, pointed out that:
In 1969, an eminent United States specialist concluded a survey of the costs of regula­
tion by noting that though these co m  were increasingly recognised, the prospect for 
reform were slight Y et le u  than two decades later, substantial para o f previously 
highly regulated industries have been liberalised and greater use of market forces is 
widely seen u  indispensable if these industries are to have incentives to be efficient 
and innovative, (p. 299).
As noted above, the economic literature h u  responded by shifting its em phuis towards 
efficiency issues, focusing on the economic performance o f PEs u  the main cause of inefficiency
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losses. Reasons are not difficult to find. First, quite complex rules are prescribed which are. in 
practice, very difficult to calculate because o f the high informational requirements. Secondly, and 
more importantly, even if it were possible to calculate such rules their application would require 
that (a) public managers were only concerned with the interests o f the public and. if that were not 
the case, then (b) managers would be properly monitored by the government, and if such monitor­
ing were not possible, then (c) the government would be able to establish proper incentives so as 
to ensure that managers would not act solely on their own interest (see Marchand e t  al. [1984]). 
None of these assumptions seem to be very realistic. Originally bora as a part o f the economic 
theory of property rights, this new approach intends to explain the performance of PEs from a dif­
ferent perspective, emphasising the absence of proper incentives in a public owned firm to pro­
duce efficiently.
It can be said that, generally, in a private firm the maximisation of profits as the main objec­
tive guarantees that every effort (of managers and workers) is linked to incomes and hence an 
incentive to be efficient is present7 In a public firm, however, since the profit motive is not 
necessarily present there is no guarantee that the interest o f the managers will coincide with the 
interests of the public and hence, in the absence of proper incentives, there is no guarantee that 
X-inefficiency will not arise.8 Sen [1983], for instance, argues tha t
Indeed, it may be argued that the great advantage o f the criterion of profits is the rigi­
dity o f the discipline that managers have to conform to it and cannot provide ad hoc 
justification for their performance by invoking ad hoc criteria. Even if the market 
prices are misleading as signals for resource allocation, the merits o f the firm discip­
line may not be trivial in avoiding managerial and operational slackness, (p. 11). *•
developed in (tie context of a private Ann in an attempt to address the problem  of supply o f  labour effort 
However, it can  be said that in general, in a private Arm it may be easier to establish a proper incentive 
scheme than in a  public Arm. where very often one find, multiple objectives
•  X inefficient y exists when a Aim does not operate in iu  production poasibility curve.
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In its early stages this positive approach was developed by the so called public choice 
school.9 In a few words, the public choice school focuses on issues different from allocation of 
resources and views a PE as a place where conflicts between managers, bureaucrats, and govern­
ment arise. One view is. for instance, that o f Fiorina and Noli [1978] in which the bureaucracy in 
PEs is dominated by politicians who use them to favour their own political position. Although 
quite useful because of the stress on positive elements, this initial approach has often been 
characterised by lack of rigour and by the absence o f  a  coherent theoretical formulation.
A more recent and perhaps better theoretically founded approach is that which emphasise 
the absence of incentives. This ‘'incentive scheme approach" characterises the relation between 
PEs. government, and the public, as a typical principal-agent relationship, in which the public 
acts as the principal and the government as the agent or the government as the principal and pub­
lic managers as agents.10
Whatever the particularities of the approach, the asymmetrical distribution of information 
and the difficulty of monitoring completely the behaviour of the agent are at the heart of these 
models. These characteristics, applied in the context o f the analysis of PEs. refer to the fact that 
managers usually have more information than the government, and when the latter is not able to 
monitor properly the actions of the former, then managers may have the possibility of obtaining 
benefits for themselves by hiding information. The problem is therefore reduced to finding an 
appropriate scheme which guarantees that managers act in the interest of the public.
In addition to the asymmetrical distribution of information, which may lead to inefficiency, 
it is often argued that the relation between government and PEs poses two problems; (a) objec­
tives are sometimes not clear and/or conflicting, and. (b) when government intervention is exces­
sive. PEs may lose autonomy in taking decisions, hence creating room for possible inefficiency.
•  For ■ survey on the public choice school see Blankart |IM 3 ).
10 Aharora |I9S2|. for ■ nuance. conceptualises a PB a* an agent without a principal because, be say*, the 
principal cannot be the public (who do not have shams or ways o f  monitoring) nor the government, which is
the parliament.’  (p. 70).
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since managers of PEs, and not government, are the best informed individuals insofar as concerns 
decisions on the performance of PEs (see Floyd [1984] and Shirley [1983]).
The reasons outlined above help to explain, to some extent, why some PEs may operate 
with levels of X-inefiiciency. Yet, even if productive efficiency were achieved in the production 
process of PEs, it does not necessarily follow that a first best situation would be the final out­
come. This is so because many PEs, as we have already pointed out. belong to the category of the 
so called natural monopolies and, therefore, there is no guarantee that allocative efficiency will be 
reached. In other words, while in a competitive environment a firm would set prices equal to mar­
ginal cost, when a firm enjoys a monopoly position it is likely that such a firm will set higher 
prices and will relate these prices to the intensity o f  competition in its different markets as well as 
to the relative costs of production (see Kay and Thompson [1986]).
The issue is important because, from the theoretical point of view, one of the reasons for 
justifying public ownership of some industries is the presence of increasing returns to scale, 
where "natural monopoly" position arises. Public ownership is then seen as a way of preventing 
the private sector from exploiting such a position.11
The primary concern for precluding the private sector is that the interests of the consumers 
are not affected since, by definition, consumers o f  natural monopolies are unlikely to be able to 
express their preferences by switching to other suppliers. The assumption is then that .if a natural 
monopoly is held in public hands, the interest o f  the public would be the primary concern of a 
PE.
Paradoxically, this situation has led to the argument that lack of competition is another 
source of inefficiency of PEs. Indeed, it is often argued that the presence of productive
11 Whether or o n  •  monopoly ti  natural depend! very m uch  on the poutbilily of entrance of other Ann* to 
the iadttoy and. then, the problem it reduced to knowing whether or not moaopottet ere tuttminable (tee 
Sharkey ( I9S2|). The idea of tustainabiUty It ditcuieed in Baum oi. Bailey and WUlig (1977) and Bautnol and 
WUlif ( I9 t l ) .
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inefficiency in PEs has more to do with operational (competitive) environment than ownership in 
itself (see Hensher (1986]). Accordingly, many supporters of public ownership, invoking the 
theory of contestable markets, claim that a way o f  reducing such levels of inefficiency may be 
simply to expose PEs either to competition or to  the threat of potential entrants. We will come 
back to this point later.
In short, the economic literature on PEs has moved its emphasis from a normative to a 
much more positive approach, strongly emphasising inefficiency of PEs as the main cause of dis­
tortions. In particular, three main explanations have been put forward as causes of inefficiency. 
First, and related to ownership, it is argued that proper incentives for efficiency in PEs are not 
present, especially the profit motive, which in a  private firm constitutes the mechanism that 
ensures productive efficiency. Secondly, and related to the previous point, the fact that the max­
imisation of profits is not necessarily the central objective of PEs. usually leads to the establish­
ment of multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. Finally, to the extent that some PEs are 
natural monopolies, they will be the only suppliers in the markets. It follows that the absence of 
competition may create room for the generation o f  allocative inefficiency. This is also true for 
those PEs which, while not being natural monopolies, operate as the only suppliers in the market.
A considerable part o f the discussion of inefficiency of PEs has been developed within the 
debate o f privatisation, and some authors have pointed out that privatisation, in the absence of the 
introduction of a more competitive environment (o r the threat of competition) will not resolve the 
problem o f allocative inefficiency (see for instance Kay and Thompson [1986] and Hensher 
[1986]). Indeed, two main arguments -namely lack of incentives and lack of competition- have 
been the main support for privatisation in the recent debate, a process which, with different inten­
sities. is present in a large number of countries.
A discussion of the issue of privatisation goes beyond the scope of this thesis.12 It will
IJ For ■ discussion on priv«uttkx i sec Sappington and Stiglitz  |I9«7 |. Rothenbarg [19171. Chamberlin 
and Jackson ( I9t7). Hensher [ I9M ) and Kay and Thompson 119861
suffice to outline the basis on which such a debate has taken place.
First, the debate has concentrated on privatisation as a means of improving the economic 
performance of PEs. The main argument, as has already been noted, is that which refers to the 
absence of proper incentives. Most o f the economic literature in this field has addressed this point 
by crying to evaluate the performance of PEs versus private firms.13 These results, however, are 
not conclusive, because very often the indicators chosen as a measure of relative performance are 
inadequate or incomplete. For instance, it is perfectly possible for a natural monopoly to be 
efficient and yet operate with losses, since pricing a t marginal cost in increasing returns to scale 
industries implies making losses. On the other hand, a PE may be making proflu and still be 
inefficient, which implies that the actual price charged for iu  product is higher than it would have 
been in a competitive environment. Perhaps most important is the fact that very often comparis­
ons between the performances of public and private firms are biased to the extent that such com­
parisons are usually based purely on economic performance grounds, whereas a PE may well 
have been created with a different objective, such as redistribution of income or employment gen­
eration. for instance. Therefore, a comparison only with the criteria o f economic performance 
may be misleading since a PE may still be efficient in terms of the criteria for which it was origi­
nally created. Nonetheless, in general terms one w ould have to recognise that ’in the private sec­
tor objectives are usually better defined (even when there is some room for improvement), incen­
tive mechanisms better articulated, and monitoring performance better tuned’ (Hensher [1986]. p. 
160).
Secondly, some authors have argued that w hen a public monopoly is privadsed without 
creadng competition, the result is a private monopoly in which allocative efficiency is sdii absent 
and hence, privadsadon may be harmful since once an industry has been privatised a change of 
rules may be more difficult (see Kay and Thompson [1986]). Much of the recent debate on priva­
dsadon has centered on that point, suggesting w ays of actually creadng compeddon once an
»  See, for .nuance. Kirkpatrick 11916). Pryto 11912]. Cave, and Chriuenaen | I9S0) and Borcherdin* et 
aL |!9t2|
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industry has been privatised, or simply introducing the threat of competition. The controversial 
point here is whether a private monopoly is less likely to introduce inefficiency than a public 
Aim. In particular, and advocating the theory of contestable markets, it is argued that the possibil­
ity of potential competition may be enough to  induce a private Arm to perform efficiently. 
Indeed, this argument constitutes the theoretical basis of those who sustain that franchising is an 
alternative method for ensuring that private Arms become more efficient than PEs. because it 
preserves the incentives for efficiency created by the profit maximisation motive while, at the 
tame time, ensuring a cheap and self-securing mechanism that Arms would not exploit their 
monopoly position because of the threat of competition. In practice, however, franchising has not 
proved as successful as it initially appeared. Some disadvantages have been pointed out, such as; 
(a) the change in circumstances of the Arm in the market cannot usually be foreseen when setting 
out the contract; (b) when the contract is about to expire the Arm may be tempted to depart from 
its conditions; and (c) once the contract has expired it is likely that the old company would have 
advantages over new proposed entrants and hence the new franchise will not be perfect (see 
OECD [1987]). The debate on privatisation is far from finished and one would expect much 
more literature on the issue, particularly because privatisation is a process which has been imple­
mented in many countries, both industrial and LD C s.14
Taking stock of what has been said so h r . the theoretical elements outlined above are usu­
ally presented as a dilemma between pricing policy and performance of PEs as a means of 
improving the role of PEs in economies. While pricing policy is often used for purposes of elim­
inating public sector deficits, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that this approach dealt 
only with the revenue side but, as long as the economic performance of PEs (cost side) is not 
property tackled, both public deficits and distortions in prices will remain characteristics o f PEs.
»  For a  diK ut.ion on prlvaOsMon in L O O  M  Balsas* 11««71. KJitpamck |IM 6 |.  Shackkion 11««6|. 
and Ajrub and H e|«ad  119871
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3.4 Tariffs
The last potential source of distortions in the price system to be mentioned in this chapter refers 
to the question of tariffs. They will constitute an important ingredient in our empirical assess­
ment o f price distortions. Although a sudden shift from pricing policy to trade taxes may. in prin­
ciple. seem out of place, from the point of view  o f  the theory of domestic distortions tariffs are 
simply another source of distortions which, just like public pricing policy and domestic indirect 
taxes, is considered by the theory of optimal taxation.
We have already mentioned that Ramsey [1927] originally described the more general prin­
ciple o f the theory of optimal taxation, that is. that taxes ought to be inversely related to the elas­
ticity o f demand. It was seen that the underlying idea is that commodities which are relatively 
close substitutes for untaxable goods (such as leisure) should be taxed at a lower rate than those 
which are not. so as to minimise the distorting effects. In its simplest case, when income distribu­
tion considerations are not present, and cross elasticities of demand are assumed to be zero, it was 
seen that this result implies that indirect taxes should be inversely related to the elasticity of 
demand in order to guarantee that distorting effects are minimised, once the inevitability of taxa­
tion has been recognised.
Nevertheless, the original Ramsey rule was applied only to the case of a closed economy. 
Perhaps the first attempt to extend such a rule to  the case of an open economy was made by Pigou 
[1947], According to Pigou. imports should be taxed at a lower rate than domestically produced 
goods. This conclusion derived from the original Ramsey rule because, if  taxes should be propor­
tional to the sum of the inverse of demand and supply elasticities and. in general, the supply elas­
ticity o f foreign goods is supposed to be greater than the domestic supply, it follows that rather 
than taxing foreign goods more heavily, they ought to be taxed at a lower rate. However. Pigou 
did not suggest what would happen when a commodity is produced both at home and abroad. 
Moreover, for imported goods, the resulting producer surplus, which is used for evaluating wel­
fare effects, goes to producers outside the country (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1974]).
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A more formal and coherent exposition of trade taxes was undertaken by Dasgupta and Sti- 
glitz (1974].'15 We will not review here all their results since it goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It will suffice to indicate the two main principles that are derived by the theory of optimal 
taxation in an open economy.
First, taxes on intermediates, including tariffs, ought to be avoided and taxes placed only on 
Anal consumer goods. The argument is intuitively very simple. If taxes on intermediates are 
imposed, a situation of inefficiency will arise because different industries would face different 
relative prices and then marginal rates o f transformation between inputs for the industries would 
differ from one to the other. It follows that one can always And ways of increasing the output of 
one industry without decreasing the outputs o f the remaining ones by a suitable reallocation of 
resources (Diamond and Mirriees [1971]). There is no case then for treating domestic and trade 
taxes differently in the sense that the focus o f attention should be on Anal consumer goods. Such 
a result may look surprising when one looks at the reality, particularly of LDCs. where very often 
infant industries producing intermediates are heavily protected by high tariffs or quantitative res­
trictions on imports.
This point lead us to our second principle, which in its simplest form suggests that, when­
ever possible, any distortion ought to be corrected at the point where it arises, in order to avoid 
secondary distortions. In terms of the classic infant industry argument then, one would have to 
argue that if a growing industry producing intermediates is to be protected, it should be done by 
some instrument other than tariffs, which would directly correct the source o f the distortion or 
disadvantage. More generally, the direct corollary is that trade taxes should not be used for 
correcting distortions unless trade Is in itse lf the source of distortion.
These are. of course, very general principles that should be adjusted or corrected when addi­
tional considerations other than efficiency are present Their validity, however, is general, and is
19 Sm  DUit and Nonnan | I9 K |.  Chapter Six. fo r an cxpotiuon of itetc itiuw.
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equally applicable for quantitative restrictions with the only difference that, in this case, revenues 
go to producers rather than to government
3.5 Empirical Analysis
In the previous sections of this chapter we have attempted to present a short summary of the main 
theoretical points concerned with public sector intervention in economies. Special emphasis was 
put on public sector pricing policy and economic performance of PEs and, in the last pan we 
briefly referred to commercial policy. It was seen that, in practice, a great variety of elements 
have to be considered when designing any particular policy, and very often, in choosing the 
"better" policy, governments face conflicts between goals.
The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to reflect judgements about how a government 
should resolve conflicts between objectives. This is a normative issue which we shall not address 
here. Rather, its purpose is to show the implications of different policies and thereby contribute to 
a rational weighting of different objectives. Essentially then, the nature of the thesis is on the 
positive side. Therefore, before moving on to the next chapter, our present discussion must say 
something about the literature concerned with the empirical analysis of price effects arising from 
public sector intervention.
As noted in the Introduction of this thesis, when compared to the theoretical developments 
in the fleld, the literature on the empirical analysis of price effects from PEs pricing policies is far 
behind. The position taken in this study, however, is that insofar as their effects on the price sys­
tem are concerned, public pricing and inefficiency of PEs can be viewed as a form of indirect tax­
ation. That is, if  a public Arm sets a price above marginal cost the effects on prices are similar to 
a tax. whereas a situation in which price is below marginal cost can be viewed as a subsidy. By 
the same token, when a PE is being inefficient, and hence setting a higher price, the effects on the 
price system are equivalent to a tax. Moreover, we have seen that such an analogy arises very 
neatly in the theory, in the sense that the rules for determining optimal pricing policies and
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optimal indirect taxes are, in fact, the same.
From this perspective, even though empirical analysis on price effects from PEs pricing pol­
icies are scarce, we can nevertheless focus our attention on the existing empirical studies focusing 
on the analysis of tax reform. Instead o f reviewing several existing works on the field, however, 
we have chosen to concentrate on ju st one: T h e  Analysis o f Price Distortions from Commodity 
Taxation. Pricing Policy and Commercial Policy in Mexico”, developed by Seade [1986). Such a 
choice serves three functions.
First, the referred study was developed in a input-output (I-O) framework and hence it is a 
representative example of the way in which 1-0 models tackle the analysis o f the price system. 
By reviewing it then we will be providing an initial background which will be useful for the sub­
sequent development of our own model. Naturally, in a latter stage of the thesis we shall discuss 
in more detail the characteristics and particularly the limitations of the 1-0 approach. Secondly, 
unlike most applied studies on tax reform  issues, the referred study tackles also the question of 
public sector pricing policy, in addition to the analysis o f tax reform. And thirdly, to the extent 
that the study is applied to the Mexican context it can be taken as our starting point.
Within the context of the literature of the analysis o f tax incidence, the referred study 
intends to ascertain the welfare effects arising from reforming the indirect tax system. It was 
developed in two stages. First, using a  1-0  model as a base, the tax component of commodity 
prices were estimated. Second, by simulating changes in the indirect tax system and hence on 
commodity prices, the resulting welfare effects were computed. In doing this last point, o f course, 
it was necessary to establish an appropriate link between commodity prices and the demand sys­
tem. For our purposes, however, only the first stage is relevant since, in our research, the result­
ing price structure will be used to calculate the effects on the production side of the economy, 
namely value added, instead of consumption patterns. Accordingly, we will only comment on the 
methodology followed for evaluating price effects.
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Specifically, the idea was to compute the tax component embodied in commodity prices, for 
two yean. 1978 and 1983.16 As argued by Seade. however, in an economy like the Mexican, 
where publicly produced goods are heavily subsidised, the analysis of tax reform calls for the 
explicit consideration of subsidies channeled through low public prices, if  the government reve­
nue constraint is to be treated in a realistic way. Likewise, commercial policy influences not only 
government revenue through the imposition o f tariffs, but affects also the relative price structure, 
even though the revenues created by non-tariff restrictions accrue to private producers. Accord­
ingly. the study intends to calculate not only the domestic tax component but also price raising 
effects from public sector pricing policy as well as commercial policy.
The analytical framework in which such calculations were carried out can be outlined as 
follows. In line with the conventional treatment of the price system in 1-0 models, if raw materi­
als are assumed to combine in Axed proportions the price structure can be represented as
where p, is the unitary price of commodity J , p, is the unitary price of commodity I . is the 
amount of commodity i required to produce one unit of commodity j ,  and vy represents the pay­
ments to factors of production involved in the production o f one unit of good ). If. in addition, 
imports are explicitly shown and the presence of domestic indirect taxes and tariffs is recognised. 
(3.16) can be reexpressed as
where i, is the tax per unit o f domestically produced good I . p r  is the unitary price o f imported 
commodity i. IT is the tariff per unit o f imported commodity i . and is the amount of imported
1 9 »  and b a r e  the r t.u lu  for I9«3 a n  partaps leaa imere.iin* than tboaa for 197« une* under tha VAT ays-
P i -  % * tP l ♦ (316)
Pi -  ♦ « . ) * / ♦  J fp r  * ,n m <j +  *7 (3.17)
la
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commodity i  required to produce one unit of domestic good j .  To simplify things, (3.17) can 
alternatively be expressed, using matrix notation, as
p ’-</>' + I 'M + 0 » - '+r-')A #+v (3.18)
where prime denotes row vectors. Here, p  i t  a vector of domestic prices. tm is a vector of import 
duties (rates), v a value added price vector, and A and M the domestic and import 1-0 matrices 
whose typical elements are the coefficients and mtj respectively.
Let us also distinguish between consum er prices, q , and producer prices, p . so that
« - * ♦ #  (319)
adding i on both sides of (3.18) we get
p '+1'• (p‘ + i')A  ♦(?■ ' + r*')A# + v' + t‘ (3.20)
and using (3.19)
q '-q 'A  ♦  v ' + l '♦  (p*  ♦»•')*# (3.21)
solving now for« gives
j m v 'u - A r ' + i V - A r l +p * h u - A r '+ t * v - A r '  0 .22)
and finally, rearranging terms
« • - ! » ( / - A r l + p * M U -A r '\ + [ t ‘u - A r '+ f t H v  - d r ' i  0 .23 )
As can be seen, equation (3.23) is made up of two elements. The first term on the r.h.s.
gives the basic price or resource cost o f  commodities whereas the second term shows the total tax 
component or effective tax, r*,
- A ' r '+ r 'm / - d ) - '  (3.24)
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provided we assume no changes in the prices of factors o f production, fixed coefficients in the use 
of raw materials, and that commodity taxes are fully passed on to consumers.
Equation (3.23) is the basic expression Seade used to estimate the price raising effects horn 
changes in commodity taxes (vectors r and/or /« ). Notice that f , unlike the vector of nominal 
taxes, i, contains the total (direct and indirect) tax component originated in the production pro­
cess since it incorporates the indirect effects of tax shifting arising as a result o f the interindustry 
transactions, as described by matrix A . That is, any change in the vector o f nominal taxes r can 
be simulated and the effects on the remaining commodity prices traced.
As far as public pricing is concerned the effects on relative prices were also estimated using 
expression (3.23). In doing that, i  was alternatively interpreted as the rate at which prices deviate 
from marginal costs in those production sectors where the presence o f the public sector is sub­
stantial.
The last set of calculations developed by Seade. as we noted before, were the evaluation of 
price effects created by the presence of non-tariff restrictions in the Mexican economy. We will 
not go into the details o f this last part o f the study since it requires a somewhat modified analysis. 
It will suffice to mention that the general idea was to simulate changes in the prices of some com­
modities brought about by the removal o f their protection level (or the increase of the level of 
protection), and then the effects on the remaining commodity prices in the system were computed 
by a similar process to the one described above.
Finally, to conclude this brief review, it should be pointed out that the study used as a data 
framework two updated versions17 o f the published 1-0 table of 1975, for the years in question. 
1978 and 1983.
The foregoing analysis, in spite o f its simplicity, give us some relevant information not only
17 By i he RAS method
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on the son of empirical analysis o f the price structure existing for Mexico but also on the way in 
which the analysis of the price structure is carried out in an I-O fnuneworic. Many other studies 
can be referred to in the same tradition as described above among which perhaps the most 
relevant is the analysis of tax reform applied to India and Pakistan, and developed by Ahmad and 
Stem (1987) which, essentially, is carried out in the same spirit as Seade's.1*
Indeed, virtually all the empirical literature addressing the analysis of the price system in an 
1-0 framework follow a similar method as the one described above and therefore we will not 
extend the discussion any further in this chapter. In a subsequent chapter, however, the charac­
teristics. and particularly the limitations of the 1-0 approach will be extensively discussed.
Instead, to conclude this chapter a reference ought to be made to the paper written by Pyatt 
[1987] on the analysis of public enterprises in a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) context which, 
even though is not an applied empirical analysis, it nevertheless sets out some general guidelines 
as to how to approach the analysis o f public enterprises in a broader general equilibrium frame­
work. We shall not analyse the referred paper here but it should be mentioned that our research 
follows such guidelines in an attempt to incorporate into the analysis of the price system some 
characteristics in the spirit of general equilibrium but. at the same time, remaining within the 
relative simplicity and transparency of the fix-price approach, to which 1-0 models belong. These 
characteristics will also be extensively discussed in subsequent chapters.
"  See i l »  Melvin far in  application o f  thè 1-0 framework io thè analyii» of corporale tasadon. Set alto 
UN SO ( 1973) far tome addinomi a p p licano»  o f  1-0 modali
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CHAPTER FOUR
TH E DATA FRAMEW ORK
4.1 Introduction
Over the past decade or so there has been an increasing concern in the economic literature 
over the effects that the public sector has in economies. We have seen in the last chapter that, on 
the theoretical side, a good deal o f literature has flourished in an attempt to determine the conse­
quences of growing public intervention in economies. Of no less importance is the concern 
among economists about the possible effects that programmes of structural adjustment exert on 
the overall economic performance o f developing countries. Such programmes usually envisage 
an important reduction of the degree o f  public sector intervention in these economies.
As a consequence of such a theoretical development there has also been an effort to assess 
empirically both the micro and macroeconomic effects o f public intervention not only in develop­
ing economies but also in industrialised countries. Yet. when it comes to assess the impact that 
public enterprises have in the economy, one usually finds that data on public enterprises is not 
exactly abundant and the information available is usually scattered and unorganised (see Floyd 
(1984)).
The purpose of this chapter is to organise and put together some statistical data related to 
the public sector in the Mexican economy. A social accounting matrix (SAM) approach has been 
chosen because it facilitates both the interpretation of the data framework and the modelling. In 
particular, in developing our data framework we intend to show explicitly the input-output (I-O) 
relations as well as the public/private dichotomy of the Mexican economy.
Our ultimate purpose in building a consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis is to evaluate the
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effects on the price system generated by public policy intervention and commercial policy. 
Therefore, it should be clear that, to a great extent, the characteristics of our accounting frame­
work have been very much determined by such a purpose. This chapter, however, intends only to 
look at the consolidated SAM as a data framework, leaving the issues related to modelling of the 
price system to be discussed in the next chapter.
The exposition is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 a schematic framework of a consoli­
dated SAM is presented in an attempt to discuss briefly the main concepts involved as well as 
some general characteristics. Section 4.3 deals with an aggregated version of the consolidated 
SAM for the Mexican economy, without distinguishing between public and private sectors. The 
intention of this first approach is to focus both on the general methodology followed in putting 
the data together as well as on the main sources of information. In Section 4.4 the accounting 
framework is expanded in order to incorporate the public/private dichotomy of the Mexican pro­
duction structure. Since the general procedure is basically the same as the one used in the previ­
ous section, greater emphasis will be put on numbers in the Mexican context. Finally. Section 4.3 
deals with a further expanded version in an attempt to organise the data framework for modelling 
purposes. In the last pan of this section some comments will also be made in relation to our 
accounting frameworks as compared with other data framework used for the purposes of analys­
ing the Mexican price structure.
4.2 A Schematic Framework
Our starting point will be a schematic presentation of our accounting framework. Since our focus 
of attention is ultimately on the production side of the economy, we concentrate our attention on 
a consolidated version of the SAM for 1-0 analysis. Therefore, the accounting framework disag­
gregates extensively the production accounts, while the institutional dimension of the economy is 
aggregated in a single consolidated account
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Table 4.1 sets out such a framework. As in any SAM, rows and columns are identically 
labelled. Columns show expenditures o f the accounts while rows should be read as receipts. Thus, 
any one cell shows the account making the expenditure in the column whereas the account 
receiving the corresponding payment arising form the sale appears in the label of the row.
This arrangement of rows and columns illustrates the fact that for any outlay in the econ­
omy there must exist a corresponding income. It follows that Table 4.1 has to be square and bal­
anced, that is. the total o f any column must be equal to the total o f the corresponding row. In 
other words, expenditures of accounts In the columns must match the incomes of the correspond­
ing rows. It should be also stressed that, although Table 4.1 is a representation of a very aggre­
gated version of the economy, its system of classification is. nevertheless, exhaustive. That is to 
say. every transaction that takes place in the economy in. say. one year, is recorded.
Let us make a start by looking at the main components of Table 4.1 and how they are inter­
related. Six accounts are identified: production activities, commodities, indirect taxes, factors of 
production, rest of the world and other accounts consolidated.
The first column, production activities, describes the cost structure of activities. It is made 
up of three component* -purchases of raw materials, activity taxes and value added. The intersec­
tion of column one with row two constitutes the details o f intermediate purchases of commodities 
by production activities. It is known as the "technology" or "absorption" matrix and its dimension 
depends, obviously, on the number of commodities and activities identified in any particular sys­
tem. The second component of the cost structure of activities is given by a row vector containing 
positive numbers for any activity tax whereas a subsidy to the activity should be recorded as a 
negative number. Finally, the third element in column one records payment* to factors of produc­
tion contributing to the production process -capital, labour and natural resources. By adding 
these three components in column one we obtain the total expenditures incurred by activities in 
the production process, that is. loud cost o f producers.

The receipts of production activities are recorded in row one column two. This cell is in fact 
a matrix, known as "make matrix“, and should be o f the same dimension as the technology matrix 
since its elements describe the sales of goods from activities to commodity markets. It should be 
noted that this matrix records the sales of goods at producer or ex-factory prices, that is. the cost 
to the producer at the factory gate. In other words, the total o f row one is a column vector con­
taining value of gross output o f production activities at producer prices which means that neither 
the cost o f moving commodities from the factory gate to the place o f consumption is included nor 
are the commodity taxes levied in the sale of these goods. We shall come back to this point later 
in more detail.
The total supply of commodities is captured in column two and consists o f three elements: 
domestic output (make matrix), commodity taxes and imports from the rest of the world. This can 
be seen by reading downwards in column two. The make matrix, as we saw above, records along 
iU rows the domestic supply of commodities at producer prices. Total supply, however, is not 
only made up of domestic production. Some commodities need to be imported either because 
they are not produced at home or simply because their counterparts abroad are cheaper and/or of 
better quality. This is recorded in row five, column two. We have now recorded total supply from 
both domestic and foreign origin. If we want to arrive at the concept of total supply of commodi­
ties at market prices, as opposed to producer prices, however, it is still necessary to add commo­
dity taxes, which in Table 4.1 are recorded in row three, column two. We can later see in detail 
that to actually arrive at this concept of market prices a special treatment will have to be given to 
trade and transport margins. By the same token, it will be required to distinguish between domes­
tic commodity taxes and import duties. Meanwhile, let us turn our attention to the demand side of 
our accounting framework.
The demand side, which must match total supply, is displayed along row two. It consists of 
three elements -intermediate demands (row two column one), domestic final demand (row two 
column six) and exports (row two column five). Intermediate demands are shown in the technol­
ogy matrix which, as we mentioned earlier, describes the purchases of raw materials by
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production activities. The second component o f total demand is. o f course, final demand and 
demand from abroad, namely exports. Domestic final demand is represented by a column vector, 
in row two column six.
Traditionally, domestic final demand is split, for analytical purposes, into three main com­
ponents; private consumption, government consumption, and capital formation. However, we 
shall not do so. at least for th e  time being, since we will focus our attention on the supply side of 
the economy, that is why domestic final demand is represented by a single vector. The last com­
ponent of final demand is given by exports o f commodities to the rest o f the world, also 
represented by a column vector (row two column five).
The remaining parts o f  our framework are composed of residuals and the description of the 
direction in which transfers arising in the production process go. Thus, row three records indirect 
taxes both in activities and commodities. Its counterpart in column three shows the payment of 
those taxes to the account labelled "other accounts consolidated", where the government is 
included. The payment to factors of production, in row four, column one. goes to the same 
account (row six. column four), presumably to households and companies. Finally, the difference 
between exports and imports constitute a deficit (surplus) with the rest of the world. It is shown in 
row six. column five.
Having outlined the m ain components of Table 4.1, the next step is to develop an analo­
gous. though more disaggregated, accounting framework. Before that, however, an important 
remark ought to be made regarding ts actual construction. Specifically, the point to make has to 
do with the fact that in Table 4.1 and indeed in our actual accounting framework, commodity 
transactions will be recorded at market prices unlike the SAM in the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) as recommended by the United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO (1968]). where 
commodity balances are recorded at basic prices, that is. without including indirect taxes and 
trade and transport margins. The rationale underlying UNSO recommendations is that indirect 
taxes and margins (trade and transport) differ according to the purchaser and hence, for purposes
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of 1-0 analysis, if taxes and margins are not removed, the price of a commodity will not be 
independent of the purchaser.
However, as has been suggested by Chander et al [1980]) and Pyan and Round [1985], on 
the one hand the use of basic prices poses the problem of estimating the appropriate amounts of 
margins to be removed. In practice they are frequently unknown. On the other hand, market 
prices are the relevant ones when the purpose is the modelling o f economic behaviour, since 
those are the prices economic agents actually face when making decisions. Moreover, UNSO sug­
gests the use of approximate and not basic prices because even though taxes are discounted from 
values at producer prices, the indirect effects spread in all the commodities in the production pro­
cess are not actually removed (see Greenfield and Fell 11979]).
Therefore, in our accounting framework values will be recorded at market prices. It has to 
be mentioned, however, that the adoption of market prices as a basis for valuation has problems 
on its own. not only because more work at the data level is necessary, but also because we shall 
be assuming that there are no differences in the amounts of margins (and indirect taxes) paid by 
different buyers of a commodity. That is. we shall ignore the fact that, in certain circumstances, 
margins vary from buyer to buyer. Moreover, to the extent that we shall build a fix-price model 
(where the demand does not play an active role), the presence of margins may not be very impor­
tant in determining the magnitude of the results.
Nonetheless, we believe that the use of market prices is more accurate for the purpose of 
modelling economic behaviour and indeed, once market prices have been estimated, it is always 
possible to move backwards to obtain producer or basic prices (approximate). Furthermore, since 
market prices are more relevant in a flex-price model, the use of market prices gurantees a more 
accurate framework for future extensions to the present thesis. The precise way in which market 
prices have been estimated can be deferred to a latter stage of the discussion, once we have 
explained how our data framework was constructed. This is the purpose of the next section.
?1
4.3 The Consolidated SAM.
In this section we intend to present and describe the consolidated SAM. constructed for the Mexi­
can economy for the year 1980. Particular emphasis will be given to the methodology followed in 
putting the data together as well as to the main sources of information consulted. For expository 
purposes we will initially present a SAM where no distinction between public and private activi­
ties is made. The idea is to use this first SAM for explaining the general procedure followed in its 
construction. In the next two sections the accounting framework will be expanded in order to 
incorporate the public private dichotomy of the Mexican economy. The reader should be warned 
that in the following two sections very little attention will be given to the actual numbers in the 
Mexican context. In a final version, however, some comments will be made on the characteristics 
of the Mexican economy, as envisaged by our accounting framework.
Two additional points should be made in advance. First, all numbers referred to are in mil­
lion of pesos of 1980. unless otherwise stated. Secondly, in order to have a reference point it will 
be convenient to refer to each component of the Mexican SAM as part o f the schematic frame­
work developed above in Table 4.1. We will refer them as Tt, where i  and J indicate row and 
column respectively.
4 J .1  The Classification of Activities and Commodities
The social accounting approach to any particular issue requires to develop an appropriate set of 
classifications or taxonomies as a basis for analysis. In the present case, in which we attempt to 
examine the role and performance of PEs a crucial point was to capture the public/private dicho­
tomy of the Mexican economy. Accordingly, in determining the level o f disaggregation of com­
modities the key issue was the form of organisation under which commodities are produced i.e. 
public or private. Likewise, since emphasis will be given to specific public sector pricing policies, 
it was also necessary to distinguish between commodities whose pricing setting mechanisms are 
different in nature, as is the case, for instance, of those commodities produced by sectors that
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traditionally have pursued a policy of regulated prices.
As we will also be concerned with commercial policy, an important criterion in defining our 
level of commodity disaggregation was whether commodities are traded or non traded. It will be 
seen, when developing our analysis in a subsequent chapter, that such a distinction will enable us 
to examine the role played by the private sector since commercial policy is directed towards 
industrial activities, which are mainly operated by private agents.
These are all issues of strategic importance for this enquiry and. in in one way or another, 
all of them had to be considered when determining our actual levels of disaggregation.













The main characteristics o f this initial classification in terms of the presence of the public 
vs. the private participation can be described as follows. Agriculture is predominantly operated 
by the private sector, although there is a small public participation on fishing and forestry. In 
mining there is a substantial participation of the public sector. Petroleum and petrochemicals is 
mainly produced by the public sector. It also constitutes the main export o f the economy. 
Manufactures, other than petroleum and petrochemicals, were aggregated in five categories -food
1 The details of the grouping of commodities in each of the aggregala  here identified are  shown la Ap­
pendi. A
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processing, textiles, chemicals, capital goods and other manufactures. With the exception o f capi­
tal goods, in all the commodities produced by the manufacturing industry the public presence is 
not very important In the commodity capital goods, however, there is a substantial participation 
of the public sector.2 Construction is entirely privately produced while electricity is produced by 
a public monopoly. Finally, the area of services consists of trade and transport and other services, 
where the public presence is important














As can be seen, in all cu e s , with the exception of transport and communications, and trade, 
there is one to one correspondence between activities and commodities. That is. in this first 
approach, activities were classified according to the principal product criteria. We will see later, 
however, that, in addition to this criterion, a crucial and necessary distinction we shall adopt is to 
separate activities according to the form of organisation i.e. public or private. Meanwhile, for pur­
poses of explaining our initial aggregated SAM we shall ignore the criterion of ownership in 
favour of the conventional principal product criteria.
It should be mentioned that "communications" u  a commodity is grouped in "other ser­
vices" whereas as an activity it w u  placed in "transport and communications". The purpose of
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that change was to allocate the output of communications to the commodity other services so that 
the remaining gross output of the activity (only transport) may be distributed along the make 
matrix in order to arrive at the concept of market prices, as we will later explain in detail.
4 J J  The C onsolidated SAM • A Basic Framework
Table 4.2 shows our basic accounting framework. It is a representation of the production structure 
of the Mexican economy in million of pesos o f 1980, and has exactly the same structure as that of 
our schematic framework in Table 4.1. For expository purposes we will first explain in some 
detail each one of the main components of Table 4.2, emphasising both the way in which it was 
obtained and the sources of information used. In a second part we will look at Table 4.2 in a 
broader way in order to have a view of the whole picture.
4 J J .1  The Coat S tru c tu re  of Activities
The first component o f  the cost of activities are the purchases of raw materials by the production 
activities, Tu in Table 4.1 and known, as already noted, as the technology or absorption matrix. 
In Table 4.2 the technology matrix is located in rows 14 to 25 and columns 1 to 13. It shows the 
intermediate purchases by each activity, at market prices, inclusive of imports as well as trade 
and transport margins. It was obtained from a reduction to our sectoral-commodity level of 
disaggregation of the published 1-0 tabic for 1980 ’ Two main steps were followed
First we aggregated the domestic version of the 1-0 table to our level o f disaggregation, so 
that columns showed purchases of raw materials at our sectoral level. The same procedure was 
followed with the published 1-0 table of imports. We then added our two 1-0 tables so as to 
obtain the purchases o f  raw materials, both domestic and imported.
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In a second step trade and transport margins were distributed among commodities in order 
to get the purchases of raw materials at market prices. Let us explain this point in more detail. 
Following UN SO recommendations, the published 1-0 table for Mexico shows trade and tran­
spon margins as separate commodities so that among the 72 sectors in the 1-0 originally defined 
there are tw o rows (and columns) called trade and transpon. The purchases of trade and transpon 
by each activity are usually estimated as a certain margin4 and then discounted from the pur­
chases of commodities and allocated to the rows for trade and transpon.3 Therefore, we simply 
distributed backwards those margins to each commodity so that purchases of raw materials are 
now inclusive o f trade and transpon necessary to move them from factory to factory. The pro­
cedure used in making such a redistribution will be explained later in detail.
The last point to note regarding our absorption matrix is that, as can be seen in Table 4.2. 
there are no intermediate purchases o f the commodity construction. The reason is that in the pub­
lished 1-0 table for Mexico all the output of this commodity was allocated to final demand in the 
form of capital formation.
The next component of the cost structure of activities is given by activity taxes, represented 
by the row vector Tu in table 4.1 and located in row 26 columns 1 to 13 in Table 4.2. The fact 
that numbers are negative means, o f course, that rather than being taxed, activities receive subsi­
dies. The total amount of subsidies is 79,581, a figure obtained from national accounts (Secre­
taria de Programación y Presupuesto [1983], vol 0 . and allocated to each sector according to the 
proportions given by Mateo de et al [1984]. This procedure of allocation was necessary since the 
published 1-0  table shows only taxes net of subsidies. In other words, our published 1-0 table 
shows explicitly only the amount o f commodity taxes, net of subsidies. What we did then was to 
separate commodity taxes from production subsidies, following national account figures, 
(ibidem), and then allocated production subsidies to the different production activities. It should
4 Calculated from  a commercial survey.
5 Primary da ta  in the National Accounts is inclusive of margins since producers declare co sa  inclusive of 
trade and transport.
77
be stressed that the total amount o f subsidies appearing in Table 4.2 are those reported in the 
national accounts and hence they refer only to direct transfers, mainly to public enterprises, but 
do not include implicit subsidies to the private sector. W e will come back to this point in the next 
section, w here our framework is expanded to take into consideration the publk/private dicho­
tomy.
The last component of the cost structure of activities corresponds to value added or payment 
to factors o f  production in the production process, namely, capital and labour. Those numbers 
were obtained directly from the published 1-0 table and thus it was only necessary to aggregate 
them according to our own level o f classification. This component is shown in rows 28 and 29, 
and columns 1 to  13. which corresponds to cell r 4i in Table 4.1.
4 J J .2 The S upp ly  of Commodities
The supply o f  commodities is recorded in columns 14 to 23 and consists of three elements 
namely, dom estic supply, imports and commodity taxes. Domestic supply is described in the 
"make matrix", rows 1 to 13 in Table 4.2 and cell T tl in table 4.1. The make matrix, as we have 
already pointed out, records gross output of production activities at producer or ex-factory prices. 
With the exception of activities trade and transport and communications, the make matrix is diag­
onal. since w e are assuming that each activity produces only one (the principal) commodity.6
This, however, is not a necessary restriction. Indeed, a commodity may well be allowed to 
be produced by different activities or an activity may also be allowed to produce several commo­
dities. The latter is precisely the case in Table 4.2 where the activities trade and transport are 
assumed to produce a homogeneous commodity and placed in certain proportions into the dif­
ferent commodity markets. In other words, instead of grouping the output of the activities trade
* Following the  tradition In tits SNA as recommended by UNSO traditionally activities arc classified ec- 
cordtng to the p rincipal product criteria. That, nevertheless, may not be always the best criteria. Pyan ( I9 t3 | 
stresses the neoetaiiy  at breaking away from this criteria, specially In developing countries w hen  many proh 
terns mt typically manifested as s dualism.
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and transport into single commodities, "trade" and "transport”, we distributed their outputs along 
the commodity columns. As suggested earlier, the purpose of giving this treatment to trade and 
transport m argins is to arrive at market prices. That is, in the make matrix gross output is 
recorded at producer prices, which, therefore are not market prices because they do not include 
the cost o f  m oving commodities from the factory gate to the place of consumption. In addition, it 
is also necessary to add commodity taxes. We will come back to the question of taxes in a latter 
stage of the exposition. Let us concentrate for the moment on how those margins were distri­
buted along the commodity columns in our make matrix.
Three stages were followed in this process. First, we made an initial distribution of total 
gross output o f  trade and transport at producer prices among three aggregate commodities -agri­
culture. m ining and manufactures. This first distribution was very straightforward since national 
accounts (Secretaria de Programación y Presupuesto (1983)) provide the required proportions in 
which m argins are distributed among the three aggregates. It should be stressed that for our pur­
poses we subtracted before the gross output of communications (31,827) which was then allo­
cated to the commodity "other services" and (116.083) as purchases of transport by households7 
which leaves us with 1.271.746 to distribute.
Once th is amount was distributed between the three aggregate commodities the second 
stage consisted simply of separating trade and transport as activides. Although in principle it 
would have been convenient to treat both as an aggregate activity, we split them up because tran­
sport is an activity where there is a substantial public participation and. at the same dme, is an 
input heavily demanded by the remaining activities. It is then important, for our purposes, to have 
public transport as an individual activity whose pricing policy would presumably exert far reach­
ing effects on the whole production structure. Finally, the third step was more complicated 
because we needed a criterion for distributing margins within the commodities of the manufactur­
a n  obtained from a special publication of national accounts (sec Secretaria de Programación y Presupuesto 
Estructura Económica Regional (19891. P- 369).
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ing industry. Fortunately it was possible to get such a criterion from the 1976 commercial census 
for Mexico (see Secretaria de Programación y Presupuesto [1980]. VU Censo Comercial. 1976). 
We therefore looked at the difference between sales and costs both at wholesale and retail level 
for all the activities in the manufacturing industry, calculated a margin for each activity, and then 
grouped them according to our own level of classification. This gave us a picture of how trade 
margins were distributed among the different commodities produced by the manufacturing indus­
try in 1976. Finally, we applied the same structure as in 1976 to our base year of 1980.
Unfortunately, for the case o f transport, we were not able to get the same detailed informa­
tion. In this case we distributed the output of transport according to the proportions of each com­
modity within manufacturing industry. At this stage it is important to note that in both cases trade 
and transport margins refer to both domestic supply and imports
Up to  this point we have referred to the make matrix as describing the domestic supply of 
commodities, margins included. To arrive at total supply, however, it is still necessary to add 
imports which, in Table 4.2 are recorded in the row labelled "rest o f the world" (row 30). and 
corresponds to the cell Tu in Table 4.1. Imports are recorded in cif values and were obtained 
directly from the published imports 1-0 table. A minor adjustment was necessary to the import 
figures because of a small number of imports (11,463), comprising transactions at the border, 
which are not classified by sector of destination. Those imports were distributed among total 
imports according to the proportions given by the import structure in the 1-0 table. The final 
amount o f imports, as can be seen in the total o f 'rest of the world' row, is 328,063.
It is important to notice that, in this first approach, imports do not include the trade and 
transport margins necessary to move them from the border to the place of consumption, to be 
consistent with the treatment of domestic production. This point, however, will be dealt with later 
when we expand our accounting framework.
The last component of the supply of commodities is given by commodity taxes recorded in
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rows 26 and 27 and columns 14 to 25 (Tjj in Table 4.1). Two levels are distinguished, taxes on 
domestic production (including taxes on exports) in row 26. and import duties, recorded in row 
27. Although the published 1-0 tables shows taxes on each commodity, they are not disaggre­
gated into domestic taxes and import duties. It was therefore necessary to estimate import duties 
indirectly. In order to do so, we used previous estimations made by Seade [1986]. He estimated a 
tariff vector at a 71 commodity level disaggregation by calculating tariff collections and value of 
imports for more than eight thousand different commodities, as contained in the tariff catalogue 
published by the Ministry of Commerce,8 and then these were allocated to the 71 commodity 
level o f  disaggregation of the 1-0 table. We then took such calculations and applied the same 
structure to the total of import duties as given in national accounts.
As far as domestic taxes are concerned, they were obtained by subtraction, once import 
duties w ere obtained. Again, in the case of domestic taxes, taxes levied on trade and transport 
were distributed among taxes of the remaining commodities assuming, therefore, a vertical 
demand curve. Such an assumption is rather arbitrary since we do not have enough data to pro­
vide empirical support. We should then be careful when reading domestic taxes in row 26 
because they include taxes on the corresponding commodities plus a fraction of taxes levied on 
trade and transport, which are effectively passed on to Anal consumers. This last allocation of 
taxes w as made according to the proportions in which trade and transport margins themselves 
were distributed and naturally, a share of those taxes was retained as paid by households purchas­
ing transport. 8.862 in column 24.
The dem and for commodities is shown in cells f n ,  T a and Tu  in Table 4.1 whereas in Table 4.2 
it is located in rows 14 to 25. Three main components of total demand are identiAed; intermediate 
demands, exports and domestic Anal demand. We have already made reference to intermediate •
• Catalog» d r  Is Tsrlis dal Impuesio General de lm pcnac tones
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demands when talking about the technology matrix. It only remains to add final demand so as to 
arrive at total demand. Column 31 in Table 4.2 records final domestic demand which, although 
not disaggregated at this stage. Is made up of private consumption, government consumption and 
capital formation. Column 32. on the other hand, shows exports of commodities. It is important 
to underline that the three components of total demand referred to above are recorded at market 
prices, that is. inclusive o f indirect taxes and trade and transport margins.
4 J J . 4  O ther Accounts
T he last account to be referred to in Table 4.2 Is labelled "other accounts consolidated". In a more 
disaggregated version o f our framework this account would give the details o f transfers among 
institutions. At our level, however, it only comprises aggregates. Thus, columns 26 and 27 record 
payments of taxes to government; columns 28 and 29 contain the transfers o f income among 
institutions (households, companies and government); and finally, the number 173.917 in column 
"the rest of the world" intersecting with "other accounts consolidated" shows the deficit in the 
transactions with the rest of the world.
4 J J  T he Whole P icture
It is perhaps useful to look at Table 4.2 in a broader, way since we have concentrated very much 
on the details. Let us then, for expository purposes, pick up one sector-commodity and read it 
through. Take chemicals, for instance. The activity producing chemicals is shown in column 6 
which describes its coat structure. It pays 118.572 million of pesos in the form of purchases of 
raw  materials to the different commodity markets, imports included. These intermediate pur­
chases are recorded at market prices. Reading downwards in column 6 it can be seen that activity 
chemicals receives a subsidy of 5.268 million of pesos, recorded as a negative number. Presum­
ably those subsidies are directed to the public production of fertilisers, which constitute the main 
component of public participation in this activity. The next and last component of the cost o f 
producing chemicals in column 6 is given by payments to factors of production. 30,618 to labour
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and 56.199 to capital. Adding all these elements we arrive at the total cost o f production of the 
activity chemicals of 200,121 million of pesos.
Looking now at row 6. column 19, it can be seen that total cost o f production is also 
recorded as the gross output of the acdvity. Since the commodity chemicals is only produced by 
one production activity -chemicals-, then 200,121 constitutes also the domestic supply of chemi­
cals. recorded in Table 4.2 at producer prices. To get total supply it is necessary to add imports of 
chemicals, recorded in column 19 row 30. amounting to 38,744. Hence total supply of chemicals 
is 238,865. We still need to add indirect taxes as well as trade and transport margins in order to 
arrive at total supply of chemicals at market prices. In column 19 those margins are recorded in 
the intersection with rows 11 and 13 while indirect taxes appear in rows 26 and 27. Therefore, 
total supply of chemicals at market prices is 335.151 million of pesos.
Finally, the demand for chemicals is displayed along row 19 and consists of 193,476 as 
intermediate demands (adding row 6 along columns 1 to 13). 133,744 corresponding to domestic 
final demand, while 7,931 is exported. Again, those figures are at market prices.
4.4 The Expanded Consolidated SAM with Pubttc/Private Distinction.
W hen discussing the classification of activities and commodities in a previous section it was said 
that, for purposes of exposition, the first approach for classifying activities would be the conven­
tional principal product criteria. It was also said, however, that if we want to fully capture the 
public/private dichotomy of the Mexican economy a further criteria for the classification of 
activities, based on type of organisation or ownership was needed, namely public and private. 
Therefore, in this section we shall present an expanded version of our accounting framework 
where production activities are further split into their public and private components. Before
constructed following essentially the same methodology as with Table 4.2. and hence, in the
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exposition, more emphasis will be given to the numbers themselves.
The new consolidated SAM is presented in Table 4.3. As mentioned above, its structure is 
basically the same as Table 4.2. The only difference is that now, instead of having thirteen pro­
duction activities we have twenty four, twelve public and twelve private. Accordingly, the cost 
structure of activities is now made of twenty four columns, one for each activity, while in the 
make matrix, two blocks for public and private supply are distinguished, with the already noted 
exceptions of construction which is operated only by private agents, and electricity which is a 
public monopoly. Following the same order as in the earlier section our starting point will be the 
cost structure of activities.
4.4.1 The Coet S tructu re  of Activities
T he cost of production activities is shown in columns 1 to 24. The fla t twelve columns refer to 
public production activities while columns 13 to 24 record the cost structure of private activities. 
Before going in detail into each of the components of the cost structure, however, let us explain 
how  this division o f activities was made.
The main source o f information was provided by a special publication of national accounts 
for the public sector (see Secretaria de Programación y Presupuesto [1983], Cuentas Nacionales 
del Sector Publico, 1975-1983), with aggregated data on production statistics for the public sector 
in Mexico. Specifically, this source provided figures for ten aggregate sec tori, namely, agricul­
ture. mining, petroleum and petrochemicals, manufacturing industry, construction, electricity, 
trade restaurants and hotels, transpon and communications, financial services, and other services.
In particular, the manufacturing industry had to be disaggregated into five categories - food pro­
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major source of information was provided by Delgado et al [1986], which provides more detailed 
information on public sector intervention in the manufacturing industry. It is unfortunate that the 
industrial census for 1980 has not been published, since this would have made the details of the 
industrial structure of public sector activities much richer. The general procedure consisted in cal­
culating data for public sector activities, and then the figures for the private sector were obtained 
by difference against our basic data framework in Table 4.2.
The first component of the cost structure of activities, as before, is the technology matrix 
giving the details o f intermediate purchases made by our twenty four production activities. Thus, 
columns 1 to 12 describe the purchases of raw materials made by public production activities 
whereas the remaining columns (13 to 24) refer to private production activities. For all activities, 
except those in the manufacturing industry, we simply took total intermediate purchases as pub­
lished by national accounts of the Public Sector [op.cit.] and then applied the same commodity 
structure of intermediate purchases as given in the published 1-0 table. For the case of manufac­
turing industry the procedure was essentially the same, except that it was first necessary to disag­
gregate them according to our classification by using the information provided by Delgado et al 
(1986]. Once we estimated the cost structure of public sector activities, the difference with the 
total o f the respective sector was allocated as intermediate purchases made by private activities.
It is important to note that we only had knowledge of the total amount o f intermediate pur­
chases by public production activities but not their structure, which is why the same input struc­
ture as in the 1-0 table was applied. Therefore, in doing that, we are implicitly assuming that 
public and private sectors have a similar structure of intermediate purchases whenever they parti­
cipate in the same activity. It is important to underline that, for the purpose o f modelling the 
efficiency of public vs private sectors, this point will represent a limitation in terms of our results 
since we are assuming, a priori, that both sectors are equally efficient (or inefficient) in the use of 
material inputt. This problem, which arises from the aggregation in the 1-0 table, could have 
been partially overcome by data from the industrial census for 1980 which, as already said, hat 
not been published.
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The second component of the cost structure of activities is of interest because it shows how 
subsidies to the public sector are distributed (row 37, columns 1 to 24). The distribution of subsi­
dies reveals, to some extent, the traditional policy of the Mexican government of subsidising 
economic activity by keeping the prices of several o f its products down. It can be seen that the 
main receivers of subsidies are: electricity, trade (in the commercialisation of staple products), 
transport and communications, food processing, agriculture and chemicals (fertilisers). The 
private sector, on the other hand, receives subsidies only in the activity agriculture.
It should be said that the fact that the public sector is the main receiver of subsidies is 
explained because in the Mexican national accounts the only subsidies that are recorded as such 
are direct transfers, basically directed to public enterprises. Indeed there are other mechanisms of 
implicit subsidies, such as cheap credit, that are directed to the private sector. However, they do 
not appear explicitly in our accounting framework.
The last component in the cost of activities is given by the payments to facton of produc­
tion or value added (rows 39 and 40). Perhaps the most striking point when looking at these 
figures, is the great difference in the ratio of operating surplus/wages between public and private 
sectors. Table 4.4 summarises this point.
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Table 4.4*
Activity Public Private Total
Agriculture 0.04 3.06 2.94
Mining 1.14 1.94 1.83
Petroleum & ptrochem. 388 5.10 390
Food processing 0 60 360 3.10
Textiles 0 60 1.97 1.92
Chemicals 0 60 1.93 1.83
Capital goods 0.60 1.55 1.35
Other manufe. 0.60 1.83 1.81
Electricity 0.82 0.82
Construction . 0.54 0.54
Transp. & communie. 0.47 2.78 1.93
Other services 0.03 4.70 1.22
Trade 2.65 3.14 3.13
• (Source: Table 4.3)
It can be appreciated that, with the exception of mining, petroleum and petrochemicals, and 
trade, the public sector ratios are lower than unity, whereas in all cases, except construction, the 
private sector has high values, all o f them above unity.
4 .4 J  The Supply of Commodities
The supply of commodities from production activities is described in the make matrix in rows 1 
to 24 and columns 23 to 36. in Table 4.3. The first twelve rows describe the supply of commodi­
ties produced by activities in the public sector whereas rows 13 to 24 record supply of commodi­
ties produced by the private sector. Again, these figures are recorded at producer prices and the 
output of trade and transport has been distributed along columns to the different commodities. 
We will come back to the question of margins in this section. Meanwhile it is interesting to note 
the structure of production of both public and private activities.
This is shown in Table 4.3. which shows the supply structure at producer prices, as revealed 
by our make matrix. It can be seen that with exception of petroleum A petrochemicals and capital 
goods, the public sector concentrates on the production of non traded commodities -other
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services, electricity and transport. Private production, on the other hand, is more diversified, spe­
cially in the manufacturing industry, whose production is essentially made up of traded goods.
Table 4.3*
SuPP.!i'.*t Producer.Pricw
Commodities Public * Private %
Agriculture 2469 0.24 503069 9.16
Mining 10015 1.00 84023 1.53
Petrol. & petroch. 175150 17.52 2830 0.05
Food process. 39336 3.94 531513 9.67
Textiles 4027 0.41 127701 2.32
Chemicals 12114 1.22 188007 3.42
Capital goods 105550 10.57 454898 8.29
Other manufc 11047 1.10 739734 13 46
Construction 607069 11.05
Electricity 58388 5.84
Trade & transp. 60057 6.01 1327772 24.17
Other services 521141 52.15 927248 16.88
TOTAL 999294 100.00 5493864 100.00
•(Source Table 4.3)
An important point to note regarding the make matrix in Table 4.3 is in relation to the treat­
ment given to trade and transport margins. As before, they have been distributed along the com­
modity columns and. as we did previously with the remaining activities, margins (trade and tran­
sport) have also been split into public and private. The criteria for distributing margins for public 
and private sectors were the same as the criteria used with total margins, with the exception of 
public trade which was allocated to only two commodities, food processing and other manufac­
tures. The reason for that is that the intervention of the public sector in the commercialisation 
process is concentrated in staple producá10 and some other commodities of basic use. all belong­
ing to our category of food processing or other manufactures. The precise proportion in which 
public trade was allocated to these two commodities was taken from a published document on the 
role of the public sector in the Mexican economy by the Ministry of Planning (see Secretaria de 
Programación y Presupuesto [1980], El Papel del Sector Publico en la Economía Mexicana, p.
10 Through ■ big public enterprise called CONASUPO.
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40).
Finally. adding downwards, in columns 25 to 36, domestic taxes, import duties and imports, 
we arrive at the total supply of commodities at market prices.
4 .4 J  The Demand F or Commodities
The demand side in Table 4.3 is not very different from the demand side in Table 4.2, except for 
the fact that intermediate purchases are now split into public and private. Domestic final demand 
and exports are not disaggregated at this stage, although it appears clearly that the main export is 
by and large made up o f the commodity petroleum and petrochemicals. In the next section, we 
will look at the performance of both public and private activities in more detail.
4.5 T he Fram ew ork fo r Modelling
4.5.1 A F urther Expansion
In this section we expand further our accounting framework. The purpose is to obtain a consoli­
dated SAM with enough information to model accurately the effects on the price system of dif­
ferent public pricing policies. It should be said, however, that in this section we will limit our 
exposition to the consolidated SAM as a data framework while the theoretical issues related to 
the modelling of the price system will be dealt with in the next chapter. The final accounting 
framework, which will serve as a basis for modelling purposes, is presented in Table 4.6. The 
general structure of Table 4.6 is the same as Table 4.3. Nevertheless, for constructing Table 4.6 
more information relative to Table 4.3 was needed. In particular, two major changes have been 
made in Table 4.6 in relation to Table 4.3.
On the activity side, the sector transport was split in two in order to capture transport used 










from the border to the place of consumption, on the other hand.11 The purpose of allocating tran­
sport to domestic production and imports separately is to arrive at market prices of both, and then 
in modelling the price system, to allow for substitution between imports and domestic produc­
tion, both at market prices. Therefore, two new activities appear in Table 4.6. public and private 
transport in imports. In order to split transport in this way we used the proportions between value 
of imports and value of domestic production for each commodity.
W e must note that trade margins on imports are not specified. The assumption here is that 
they do not exist In other words, it is assumed that no intermediary process between the border 
and the place of consumption exists. Moreover, since a high proportion of imports are used by 
activities in the form of raw materials.12 we assumed that imports are directly ordered by domes­
tic producers, without going through the hands of intermediaries, other than transporten. It is 
very likely, however, that, in reality, a large number of small firms have to pay commerce cost 
Our assumption, therefore, is imposed by the lack of statistical information.
The second major change was made in the details of commodities. As can be appreciated in 
Table 4.6, for each one of the original commodities in Table 4.3 we are now distinguishing 
between domestic, exports, imports, and an additional account, composite, made of domestic and 
imported commodities. An important consequence of this four account classification for each 
commodity, in terms of margins, is that we now also have to separate margins, depending on 
whether the commodity goes to domestic markets, exported or imported. Margins on exports, 
however, do no need to be distinguished as an activity. It is only necessary to estimate a fraction 
of total margins once margins on imports have been previously deducted. That is. from total mar­
gins in domestic production we estimated a fraction of transport margins and allocated them to 
the column of export for each commodity. Such fractions were estimated according to the propor­
tion actually exported. We must mention that we are also assuming that there are no trade mar­
gins on exports. That is. it was assumed that exporters sell commodities direct to the rest of the
11 Retail thai im pura m r  valued at ctf price*.
»  O í m a l im pera 53.63 percent i t  made by production a c tm oc t
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world so that they pay only for transportation costs, not commerce costs.
Perhaps the best way to explain how Table 4.6 is to be interpreted is to choose one activity- 
commodity and. by example, explain the mechanism. Take the commodity petroleum and petro­
chemicals. The cost structure of public and private activities petroleum and petrochemicals are 
shown in columns 6 and 32. They are exactly the same as in Table 4.3. The supply at producer 
prices of domestic origin is shown in columns 61 and 62. We recall from Table 4.3 that o f total 
supply of petroleum and petrochemicals 173,130 is supplied by the public sector while the private 
sector supplies only 2,830. The same remains true in Table 4.6 although now it shows how much 
of the gross output goes abroad in the form of expons: 40,297 as exports of petroleum and petro­
chemicals from the public sector and 407 exported by the private activity (column 62).
Thus column 61 describes the supply devoted to domestic markets whereas column 62 
denotes exports. Reading downwards in column 61 if we add margins and commodity taxes, we 
arrive at the supply from domestic origin to the domestic market at market prices. As we men­
tioned. public and private exports of petroleum and petrochemicals at producer prices are 40.704. 
as recorded in column 62 and made up of 40,297 of expons of the public sector plus 407 coming 
from private producers. They are not yet, however, ready to be exported because it is still neces­
sary to add transport margins and taxes on exports in order to arrive at the figure at market prices. 
This figure is 181,478, which is the tout! In column 62 and recorded in row 62 intersecting with 
column (103) (rest of the world), as exports at market prices ready to be exported.
Imports of petroleum and petrochemicals are recorded in the intersection of column 63 with 
row 103. amounting to 23.538 at cif values. In order to get market prices of imports we should 
add transport margins which in our example are 1,743 (343 o f public transport and 1.402 of 
private transport) so that imports at market prices are 26,433 as total of column 63. which is also 
recorded in the intersection with column 64 and row 63. Thus, we have in column 64 domestic 
supply and imports, both at market prices, recorded as total supply (217,690). It is important to 
note that it was also necessary to separate taxes on production to the domestic markets from
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export taxes, for each commodity in which export taxes existed.
As can be seen, in expanding our accounting framework additional information was needed. 
First, it was necessary to determine, for each commodity, the proportions of public and private 
exports. Such proportions were obtained from a publication of the Foreign Trade Bank (see Insti­
tuto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior [1982]), which shows in great detail the relative proportions 
of exports by public and private sectors at fob prices. We applied these proportions to our data at 
producer prices. Table 4.7 shows exports of both public and private sectors as contained in our
Table 4.7*
E xport, »1 ProJ u c r  PrlcCT
Commodity Public * Private % Total
Agriculture 65 0.50 13180 99.50 13245
Mining 2222 10.65 18645 8935 20867
Petrol. & petroch. 40297 99 00 407 1.00 40704
Food process. 4925 21.47 18023 78.53 22948
Textiles 1581 1784 7284 82.16 8865
Chemicals 2105 28.82 5199 71.18 7304
Capital goods 1621 7.68 19508 92.32 21129
Other manufc. 1953 7.54 23949 92 46 25902
Construction . . . . .
Electricity 2044 100 00 • - 2044
Trade & transp. . . 9267 100.00 9267
Other services . . 35131 100 00 35131
TOTAL 56813 . 150593 . 207406
(Source: Table 4.6)
It is clear that the main exports o f the public sector are petroleum and petrochemicals, 
which account for 70.9 percent of total exports from public activities. Taxes are not added in 
Table 4.7 and that is why exports of petroleum appear to be relatively low, but if  we add taxes we 
can see that petroleum and petrochemicals are the main export o f the economy as a whole. It also 
ought to be noticed that the public sector devotes its production mainly to the domestic markets. 
Indeed, if  we ignore petroleum it turns out that the public sector exports only 9 percent o f its pro­
duction. It should then be clear that the private sector is the main exporter of the economy, con-
9Í,
centra ting in manufactures.
Finally, the second type of information needed was related to taxes, in order to fit our four 
type disaggregation for commodities as between domestic, exports, impora and composite. In 
particular, it was necessary to distinguish between export taxes and taxes on output going to the 
domestic market. The figures for export taxes were obtained from a publication of the Ministry of 
Finance (see Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico [1986], Estadísticas Hacendarías del Sec­
tor Publico. 1963-1982). and allocated to the commodities agriculture and petroleum and petro­
chemicals.
4.6 Summary and Conclusions
The SAM set out in the previous sections of this chapter puts together very important aspects of 
the Mexican economy; the interindustry relations and the public/private dichotomy. In the Ant 
instance, it enables us to obtain a general view of the structure of the production side of the Mexi­
can economy. While we emphasised the methodology for putting the data together there still 
remains much descriptive analysis to be done, and further extensions can easily be made in order 
to get a higher level of disaggregation. However, our concern in this study is to go beyond the 
descriptive analysis and to trace the potential impact on the price system arising from policy 
changes, notably pricing policies and economic performance of PEs. but also commercial policy. 
It is in this dimension where the advantages of our accounting framework acquire full meaning, 
particularly when compared with 1-0 tables Several aspects ought to be noted.
First, we incorporate into the analysis the public/private dichotomy of the economy thus 
introducing one of the multiple forms o f dualism that characterise many developing countries. In 
particular, for modelling the price system, this characteristic becomes relevant when the public 
sector pricing policy is substantially different from the private sector.
Second, in constructing our SAM we recognise that distribution plays an important role in
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determining the prices that consumers pay for goods. Such recognition encouraged us to value 
commodity balances at market prices which, as we have seen, are the relevant prices for model­
ling the behaviour of economic agents. Most studies based on traditional 1-0 models simply do 
not deal with this problem. And third, our data framework, because of its SAM approach, con­
tains most of the relevant information that can influence the price formation process. From this 
perspective, when it comes to modelling, the analysis is enhanced since several elements can be 
brought into the picture at the same time.
There are less obvious advantages of our accounting framework which will become evident 
once we discuss the modelling of the price system. We shall defer the discussion of these charac­
teristics to the next chapter. Meanwhile, to conclude this chapter it will be convenient to under­
line the novelty of our SAM when compared to previous data bases used for the analysis of the 
price system in the Mexican economy.
First, even though our base year is 1980. it is nevertheless the only SAM built with informa­
tion of this year, since the latest 1-0 table published is precisely 1980. Indeed, even though Seade 
[1986], for instance, makes his analysis for 1983. he actually uses an updated version of the pub­
lished 1-0 table for 1975. Second, no SAM constructed for Mexico has so far dealt fully, as we 
do, with the treatment of trade and transport margins. And, thirdly, with the exception of the 
SAM constructed by Pleskovic and Trevino [1985] no SAM constructed for Mexico has properly 
dealt with the public/private dichotomy, which indeed has a great relevance in view o f the 
significant intervention of the public sector in the Mexican economy.
Perhaps our great limitation is that we do not address the institutional dimension of the
one can, relatively easily, disaggregate the Institutional side of the economy and address many 
different issues among which, perhaps the most relevant, would be the evaluation of the 




TH E PRICE SYSTEM. ANALYTICAL FRAMEW ORK
5.1 Introduction
In the past chapter we went into the details o f the Mexican production structure by looking 
at the consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis for Mexico. While we focused on the methodology and 
the sources of information very little was said about modelling of economic behaviour. This 
chapter focuses primarily on issues related to the modelling of the price system. Since the empiri­
cal analysis of the price structure has traditionally been addressed on a fix-price fashion by using 
1-0 models, we shall therefore review the general characteristics of 1-0 models, and then present 
our own model. It will be seen that while our model remains within the fix-price approach it 
nevertheless incorporates some characteristics in the spirit o f general equilibrium which, so far. 
have not usually been dealt with by others.
For presentation purposes the exposition o f the chapter is organised as follows. In Section
5.2 we make some general comments on the main recommendations given by the theory of 
optimal taxation regarding its effects in terms of domestic distortions. It will be suggested that 
public pricing policy and inefficiency of public production generate similar distorting effects in 
the price structure as indirect taxes and hence, for purposes of evaluating their effects on relative 
prices, they can be treated as a form of indirect taxation. Section 5.3 concentrates on the general 
characteristics of Ax-price type models stressing both their limitations and advantages. In particu­
lar. we also discuss the framework in which price formation has traditionally been addressed 
when it comes to empirical analysis, namely the 1-0 approach. Here special emphasis will be put 
on the main limitations of this approach. In Section 5.4 we set out our own model in its Ax-price 
version which, in the subsequent two chapters, will be applied in the context of the Mexican
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economy. We shall see that compared to 1-0 models, our approach incorporates some additional 
characteristics in the spirit o f general equilibrium while retaining the appeal of the fix-price 
approach. Finally, Section S.S contains a summary o f the chapter and some concluding remarks.
5.2 Price Distortions. Some Comm ents
In addition to revenue collection, indirect taxes exert important effects upon the behaviour of 
economic agents by affecting both production and consumption decisions and hence, through the 
consequent reallocation of resources, they ultimately affect social welfare. In a world where 
lump-sum taxation is either limited or impossible, it is inevitable that the presence of taxes gen­
erate distorting effects in an economy. The theory of optimal taxation, having recognised the 
necessity of taxation, has concentrated on establishing rules under which a maximum revenue can 
be raised while minimising the distorting effects.
The general principle of the theory o f optimal taxation stresses the need to tax those goods 
whose elasticity of demand with respect to their own price is lower so that the resulting realloca­
tion of resources is minimal.1 This is indeed the message of the very well known Ramsey rule 
(Ramsey [I927]).2 Likewise, when the presence of public production is recognised it is argued 
that, as a general principle, it is desirable that public production ought to be efficient and taxes on 
intermediates should be avoided. The argument is that, if PEs do not operate on their production 
possibility frontier and/or intermediates are taxed, then different industries would face different 
relative prices and hence marginal rates o f transformation between inputs for the industries would 
differ. It follows such a situation is inefficient since a suitable reallocation of resources will 
always make it possible to increase the output of one industry without decreasing the outputs of 
the remainder (see Diamond and Mirrlees [1971]). Like indirect taxes, public pricing policy pro­
duces similar distorting effects whenever prices of goods produced by the public sector differ 
from their corresponding marginal costs. Thus, as a general rule the theory of optimal taxation
1 Under the simplifying «sum ption that ctom elasticities o f demand am sen)
* See also Chapter Three.
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suggests that indirect taxes (deviations of price from marginal cost) should be placed on Anal 
consumer goods and not intermediates unless, for whatever reason, taxing a particular good is not 
possible, in which case one would want to tax its intermediates.
The argument is equally valid when applied to imports. As suggested in Chapter Three, the 
theory of domestic distortions recommends that tariffs on intermediates should be avoided and 
that only imports of Anal consumer goods ought to be taxed, if one wants to minimise the distort­
ing effects. The classical exception to this rule in the case of an open economy comes from the 
traditional infant industry argument by which tariffs on intermediates are justiAed when a particu­
lar new industry needs temporary protection to fully develop and reach a competitive level. But. 
even then, the theory of optimal taxation has demonstrated that it is possible to obtain a "less- 
worse'* outcome if such an industry is protected by intervening directly in the source of the disad­
vantage of the industry in question, so that secondary distortions are avoided (see Corden [1984]).
While the theory may have clear results one Ands that, in reality, countries do impose tariffs 
on intermediates and PEs very frequently set prices away from marginal costs. Whether, for 
instance, the rationale for imposing tariffs ultimately obeys historical reasons3 and/or govern­
ments do have objectives other than efAciency when setting prices is a normative question for 
which no definite answer exists. We have seen in Chapter Three, for instance, that many cir­
cumstances may exist under which PEs would price away from marginal costs. However, our 
interest lies in the positive side of the issue. That is, having recognised that there are a wide 
variety of reasons -justiAed or not- why prices deviate from marginal costs and tariffs are placed 
on intermediates, we are concerned with the fact that relative prices and consequently the alloca­
tion of resources in the economy would be affected, hence creating room for inefficiency
The empirical evaluation of such effects has traditionally been addressed with the use of 1-0 
models. Thus, for instance, during the seventies trade theory focused heavily on the estimation of 1
1 Favouring privileged group* (ter Bliss ( IM7)).
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ERP in an attempt to evaluate the effects on the pull o f resources created by a particular protec­
tion structure. Such estimations, as it is well known, are traditionally carried out in a 1-0 frame­
work.4 5More recently, a second body of literature concerned with tax reform issues has used 1-0 
models extensively to develop an analysis of indirect tax incidence by tracing the effects that 
indirect tax changes have in the structure of relative prices. Ahmad and Stem [1987], for instance, 
developed such an analysis to evaluate the price effects resulting from tax reforms in India and 
Pakistan, and went on to evaluate the effects in terms of social welfare. Likewise, we have seen in 
Chapter Three that Seade [1986] used the 1-0 framework to trace the effects on the relative price 
structure of the Mexican economy arising from reforms on the indirect tax system as well as from 
public pnces '
Following similar lines, our model attempts to evaluate the effects on the price structure 
generated by public pricing policy and performance as well as by commercial policy, and then to 
analyse the effects that changes in relative prices have on the reallocation of resources by looking 
at the changes that take place on value added in the different production activities. In doing so. 
we shall treat deviations of prices from marginal costs and inefficiency of PEs as indirect taxes, 
as far as their effects on the price system are concerned.
Before going into the details o f our model, however, it is convenient to put our approach in 
perspective. Therefore, in what follows we will discuss the general characteristics of fix-price 
models, emphasising both their limitations as well as their advantages, and then examine in more 
detail the way in which 1-0 models address the analysis of the price structure. We will then be in 
a position to set out our model and explain in detail how it goes beyond the traditional 1-0 
models retaining, nonetheless, the appeal of the fix-price approach.
4 Their it an cue naive lurratuir upon chit topic For an empirical turvey *m  Cardan (19791-
5 Sac alao Melvin 11979] for another application
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5.3 The Price System
5.3.1 G eneral Characteristics of Fix-Price Models
In the previous chapter we went into the details o f how our consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis 
was built. It was said that, as a data framework, it describes every transaction that took place in 
the Mexican economy during 1980. So far, however, nothing has been mentioned about the 
behaviour of the economic agents that led to such a state of the economy. Doing so requires us to 
model the economy, that is, it is necessary to make some theoretical postulates about how 
economic agents behave. In terms of our SAM, as represented in Table 4.6, we need a second 
SAM, which instead of being Ailed with numbers, should be Ailed with functional relations or 
algebraic expressions describing how each transaction is determined.
Following Drud et al [198S]6 let us represent our SAM as a transaction matrix. T , whose 
elements in its non-zero cells are represented as fy, where / refers to the row and j  indicates the 
column. In the last chapter it was also said that our SAM is square and balanced. That is. for each 
row there is a corresponding column, and the total o f each column (total expenditure) must neces­
sarily match the total of the corresponding row (total income). Thus, if we add rows across T  we 
get a column vector, Y, of total income which, in effect, contains the total income received by 
each account in our SAM. By the same token, adding columns generates a row vector, Ÿ, of total 
expenditures.
If  in addition we define P as a vector of prices of commodities and outputs of activities. W 
as a vector of factor prices (labour and capital), and 0 as a set o f parameters defining indirect tax 
rates and the exchange rate, we can then specify that for each i,j . element of T ,  it holds that
<v - * y  O ' : * . * • • >  (3 1 )
•  T hal U. the »-called (ranuenon value approKb (TV). Saa a lio  Pyan |I 9 U |.
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that is. each element of T  is expressed as a function of income and prices.
Equation (5.1) is a very general representation of our model. To develop it we can note that 
the modelling of our data framework requires three main sets of equations: (a) those referring to 
the demand side, (b) those describing the supply side and (c) a third set o f equations known as 
closure rules.
The demand side is described by the vector Y which, as we saw. is obtained by row summa­
tion across T. Such a vector can be expressed as
r - n i r  .r .w fi)+ x (r ,w ,9 )  (5.2)
where n is the column vector of row sums o f all hj which depend on Y, that is, endogenous vari­
ables. whereas x is the column vector of row sums of all itJ which are independent of Y, that is, 
these last t,j are treated as exogenous. This set o f equations constitute the demand side since they 
describe sources o f income and how they are determined. Thinking in terms of Table 4.6. Y 
would describe inter alia incomes arising from the demand for commodities.
Turning now to the column summation in our data framework leads to more interesting 
results as far as price formation is concerned. In so doing, let us think of the column elements of 
our SAM as components of the total cost o f activities. Let us also recall that the total of each 
column must match the total o f each row, the latter being total revenue. In other words, total cost 
must equal total revenue. Now, since total revenue is equal to price multiplied by quantity it fol­
lows that average cost (total cost divided by quantity) must equal price (total revenue divided by 
quantity).
r m n r - . r .w f i )  (5.3)
Thus, equation (5.3) represents our second set of equations describing the supply side of our 
economy. As can be seen, prices depend on each other, on the prices of factors or production, on 
income levels, and on the value of the set of parameters defining exchange rate and indirect taxes.
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The way in which price formation ought to be modelled depends ultimately on the purposes 
of the modeller. Equation (S.3), however, offers two broad possibilities. First, if prices are 
affected by the scale of production, that is. Y. then we have a flex-price model where commodity 
prices depend not only on each other but also on the prices of factors of production, W. on the 
exchange rate and indirect taxes. 6. and in the most general case, on the scale of output and. 
therefore, on the income levels o f particular activities.
Alternatively, a special case arises if  we postulate that our economy shows constant returns 
to scale and then assume that factor prices. W, and the value of the exchange rate and indirect 
taxes. 0. are given. In this event the price level is independent of the scale o f production so that 
commodity prices would only be determined by the prices of other commodities. This special 
case defines our second type of models namely, fix-price models. The simplifications that follow 
from the adoption of a fix as opposed to a flex price model will be discussed below. Before that, 
however, and for the sake of completeness, it ought to be noted that equations (3.2) and (3.3) are 
not sufficient to close our model.
To see this point more clearly, it should be remembered that equations (3.2) and (3.3) yield 
[F) + i r ] - l  independent equations7 whereas the number of variables is (F) + {r] ♦ [« ')♦  1. 
(/* .r.W  .and 6). A third set of equations is therefore necessary to dose the system. This last set of 
equations are known as closure rules, and basically their purpose is to specify how each factor 
market and the capital account of the economy is closed. The issue o f closure rules in a flex-price 
model will not be discussed here, since it goes beyond the scope of this thesis.* It will suffice to 
point out the simplifications that follow from the use o f a Ax-price model.
Firstly, the assumption that prices are invariant to the scale of activity has to rely on the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. Secondly, as it was explained above, if commodity 
prices are to be independent of the level of activity, it is necessary to assume that factor prices are 
1 The total number of equation* u 11 ]  ♦ | Y ) but one of them la (32 )  Is linearly dependent of the remain 
1 Par a discuukxi of cloture rulatlnt SAM contest tee Dmd at al [ IMS). See alio Robinson | IM6).
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fixed. That is, we need to interpret results as conditional on given values of W and, as will be 
seen below, of 6. Alternatively, we can postulate that there exists excess capacity in all sectors. In 
particular, it is necessary to assume permanent unemployment in the labour market so that wages, 
and hence unitary costs, are unaffected by the level o f  activity. In this event, wages should move 
only in response to the average product of labour i.e. productivity, and not marginal costs. In any 
event, the important thing is to ensure that net output prices are independent of the scale o f pro­
duction. Thirdly, a  fix-price model assumes that the exchange rate is fixed so that any change in 
the economic activity level will adjust through changes in the deficit (surplus) of the balance of 
payments. Otherwise, if the exchange rate is variable, an increase in the level of production, say, 
would lead to an increase in the demand for imports, pushing up costs, therefore violating the 
assumption that prices do not vary with the activity level. Accordingly, the use of a fix-price 
model implies a fix exchange rate. Thus, again, we should interpret results as conditional on an 
assumed value of 6 (and W). Alternatively, it can be assumed that foreign borrowing is always 
available to cover any resulting deficit in the balance o f payments so that a fixed exchange rate 
can be sustained.
The points mentioned above constitute the simplifications that follow from the use of a fix- 
price model. Whether or not they represent severe limitations would most certainly depend on the 
particular context to which the model is applied. The benefits, and indeed the power of the fix- 
price approach, however, are considerable.
On the one hand, to the extent that prices are determined without reference to the demand 
side, the analysis of the price system can be explored in greater detail, focusing on the main vari­
ables that play a determinant role. It U true to say that, ultimately, the price system is also 
influenced by demand considerations and. from that point of view, the analysis calls for a flex- 
price model. Yet. flex-price models require far more behavioural assumptions as well as the esti­
mation of more parameters, for which the lack of information usually leads to the imposition of 
strong exogenous specifications, leading sometimes to loaing the grasp as to what actually deter­
mine results. From this perspective, then, fix-price models are indeed a very valuable tool of
m
analysis which, rather than being seen as an alternative to flex-price models should be seen as the 
first step in trying to understand how the economy works.
On the other hand, equation (5.3) in its fix-price version is capable of addressing a great 
variety o f issues related to the price system, going beyond the traditional 1-0 models but. at the 
same time, keeping within the relative simplicity of a fix-price approach, namely, that prices are 
determined without reference to the demand side.
Indeed, equation (5.3) offers a wide range of possible specifications. It can. for instance, be 
reduced to the Leontief version in which case all intermediates are assumed to combine in fixed 
proportions. At the other extreme, instead of being considered perfect complement*, inputs can be 
allowed to be perfect substitutes. More realistically, however, it can be postulated that inputs 
combine with some limited degree of substitution. In particular, it can be postulated -and we shall 
do so- that for some of the so-called traded commodities there exist two possible sources of sup­
ply. domestic production and imports, and then specify some degree of substitution between these 
two sources, thus recognising the fact that, in reality, producers usually do have such a possibility 
when making their cost minimising decision.9
The efficiency in the use of resources is. for instance, one of the several possible issues to 
be explored. In particular, an interesting point is to look at the effects that improving efficiency 
levels within the public sector has on the price system. By the same token, alternative public 
pricing policy scenarios can be simulated allowing, for instance, for the prices of some commodi­
ties produced by the public sector to have a fix or regulated price.
Another issue that can be addressed by equation (5.3). and we will do so. concerns the 
evaluation of protection levels arising from a particular commercial policy.
A third set of possibilities offered by equation (5.3) is the analysis of tax reform. Indeed, the 
* Of count, inti» absence ora^ebvrten.
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effects that reforming the indirect tax system has on the price structure can be dealt with perfectly 
with our analytical framework.
All in all, a fix-price approach for the analysis of the price system offers a wide range of 
possible issues to be addressed which, so far, have not been fully explored by the traditional 1-0 
framework. We have pointed out some of them so as to get a flavour of the direction we shall fol­
low. We need, however, to be more specific. Therefore, in what follows we will briefly review the 
way in which the standard 1-0 approach has dealt with some of these issues and how some of its 
limitations can be overcome.
5 J J  The Price System in the 1-0 Fram ew ork.
We saw in Chapter Three that the empirical analysis of the price system has traditionally been 
addressed with the use of 1-0 models. By reviewing the study developed by Seade [1986] the 
general methodology was explained. In this section, therefore, we shall restrict ourselves to the 
most relevant points of such a methodology and then move on to discuss some of the limitations 
of the 1-0 models which, as will be seen, can actually be overcome with our own model.
Equation (S.3) is a very general representation of the price system. A more specific form 
can be obtained if  we postulate that raw materials combine in fixed proportions, which, in turn, 
also combine in fixed proportions with value added or net output. Equation (3.3) can then be 
expressed as
Pj -  TfitPi + V; (5.4)
for a l l /
where pj is the unitary price of commodity j .  p, is the unitary price of commodity t. ay is the 
amount of commodity I required to produce one unit of commodity j ,  and v, represents the pay- 
menu to factors of production involved in one unit of good / ,  i.e. the net output price of J.
106
Equation (S.4) is then a particular representation of the price system, which is conditional on 
assumed levels for the net output prices, vj.
We saw in Chapter Two when reviewing the empirical literature on the analysis of the price 
system that if  we make explicit the presence of imports, as an additional raw material, and also 
recognise the presence in the system of domestic indirect taxes and tariffs, then, using matrix 
notation and representing row vectors with a prime, the price system can be represented in the 
following manner
/ - ( / ♦ I ’M  (3.S)
where p is a vector of domestic prices, r and ta vectors o f domestic indirect taxes and import 
duties (rates) respectively, and A  and M  the domestic and import 1 - 0  matrices whose typical ele­
ments are the coefficients a,, and respectively.
Now, if  we distinguish between consumer prices, q . and producer prices, p . so that
q mp *1 (3-6)
then, as we saw in Chapter Three, our price equation can be expressed as
- A r '+ p * u  u - A r ' ) + n V - A r ' + i * *  v - A r ' )  (3.7)
where two main components are distinguished: (a) the first element on the r.h.s. showing the 
basic price or resource cost of commodities, and (b) the second term showing the total indirect 
tax embodied per unit of domestically produced commodities.
Equation (5.7) has been extensively used to calculate price raising effects from commodity 
taxation10 and indeed, as we taw in Chapter Two. it can be extended to analyse price raising 
effects from public sector pricing policy provided r is interpreted as the deviation of price from
10 Ser Ahmad and Stern (1917) for so application to India and Pakistan.
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marginal cost in public firms.
We have focused here mainly on the analysis of tax incidence by explicitly recognising the 
presence of indirect taxes as part o f the cost o f production activities. The same approach as 
described above, however, has often been used to evaluate price effects arising from other sources 
such as changes in prices of factors of production, or indeed, as will be seen later in Chapter 
Seven, the 1-0 approach has extensively been used for evaluating ERP.11
The assumptions underlying these calculations may not hold rigidly in practice but, 
nevertheless, this type of analysis is useful in that it indicates where pressure on costs leading to 
price increases is likely to be fe lt Yet. not all the limitations imposed by the 1-0 approach are 
inevitable. Some of them can in fact be overcome and still the advantages of the fix-price 
approach to modeling can be retained. Let us comment on some of these limitations.
First, as noted above, the assumption that raw materials combine in fixed proportions 
implies that producers are unable to shift towards cheaper sources when relative prices change. 
The argument, although intuitively obvious, can be illustrated with the help of Figure 3.1
Consider a good j  which is produced by a Leontief combination of value added and two 
raw materials, x, and x 2. JT in Figure 3.1 describes different combinations of x, and x j. which 
combined in fixed coefficients with value added, v . yields one unit of j . The original or base price 
ratio is given by the slope of the line AB. Thus, the initial equilibrium is given by the point t 
where OH units of s i  and OC units o f x a are used. In terms o f x 2 the input cost per unit o f output 
is measured by the distance OB.
Now. assume that a tax magnitude BD/OB is imposed on x x. The new price ratio is now 
given by the slope of the line AD. If substitution between i |  and x 2 does not exist (that is. if  they 
are assumed to be perfect complements) the final equilibrium point will be given by t where the









same quantities of x x and x2. as before, are used to produce one unit o f j .  As a consequence of the 
tax. the cost will rise to OE . so that the cost (price) raising effect of the tax is BE/OB.
Assume now that it is possible for the producer to substitute, by some limited degree, 
between xi and xj. In this case the Anal equilibrium point is given by x' where the new price ratio 
line is tangent to the isoquant I I . It can be seen that now the cost has risen only to OE'. Therefore, 
the cost increase in the case of flexible coefficients is BE'/OB, which is lower than the cost 
increase in the case of fixed coefficients. BE/OB . ,2
Note that although we used as an example a domestic indirect tax. the argument is equally 
valid for tariffs, provided x x or x2 is an importable, or. an exportable, or it can also be assumed 
that the changes in relative costs are originated by an adjustment on the relative prices of publicly 
produced commodities. Whatever the source of change in input prices, the important point for 
our purposes is that as long as some degree of substitution in the use o f raw materials is present, 
production cost would change less and so would commodity prices. In particular, as will be 
explained in the next section, we shall postulate that, for the group o f traded commodities, two 
possible sources of supply exist -domestic production and imports. In this event, in the absence of 
trade restrictions, one would expect that producers would have the possibility of substituting 
between these two sources when making their cost minimising decision.
A second and no less important limitation of the 1-0 approach, as described above, arises 
horn the fact that commodity transactions in 1-0 tables are usually valued at producer prices, that 
Is. without incorporating trade and transport margins. We have already made reference to this 
point in the previous chapter, and indeed, the argument in favour of building 1-0 tables valued at 
market prices has been explored in depth elsewhere.13 We need only to point out that the valua­
tion of commodity transactions at market prices is necessary if  one wants to model accurately 
economic behaviour since it is market prices that economic agents respond to. It is this point
11 Adapted from Carden (1971). See alto  Arniinjion (1969].
>’ Saa Pyan M9S3|.
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which dicutes the use of market prices for the present purposes.
Thirdly, and similarly related to 1-0 ubles as a dau  base for modelling purposes, the stan­
dard convention in building 1-0 ubles is to classify production activities according to the princi­
pal product criteria. As such then, the 1-0 structure of an economy can be viewed as an inter­
dependence between demand for different commodities. This approach to grouping activities, 
although useful for several purposes, neglects several forms of dualism commonly present in 
developing economies, such as the formal and informal sectors, or indeed, as we do here, the pub­
lic /  private dichotomy o f the economy.
As we saw in the previous chapter, our SAM. while still retaining the principal product cri­
teria, it nevertheless incorporates a second criterion based on the from of organisation of produc­
tion activities, namely, public or private. The 1-0 structure of the economy must now be con­
ceived not only as an interdependence of commodity demands as before, but also as an inter­
dependence of public and private activities.
These three poinu constitute our main extensions to the traditional 1-0 approach in our 
attempt to analyse the relative price structure. In addition, it it will be seen in subsequent chapters 
that some additional characteristics can be modelled, notably the fact that some commodity prices 
can be allowed to be regulated. It is therefore not necessary in our approach to assume that all 
production sectors follow the cost-plus pricing rule, which assumes that changes in activity costs 
are fully transferred forward to the corresponding commodity price. This assumption is typical in 
1-0 models (except Hughes [1986]).
5.4 Modeling The Price System
In the past section we outlined the main characteristics of fix-price models emphasising both their 
limitations and advantages. In particular, it was said that the traditional 1-0 models have been 
extensively used for analysing issues related to the price system. It was also mentioned that even
i n
though I-O models may be useful for the analysis of the price system, they can-y some limitations 
in addition to those imposed by the fix-price nature of the approach, namely (a) the fixed 
coefficients assumption, (b) the estimation of price effects at producer and not at market prices, 
and (c) the fact that production activities are classified exclusively according to the principal pro­
duct criteria.
The aim of this section is. therefore, to present a different formulation of the modelling of 
the price system such that, whilst the Ax-price approach is maintained, the points mentioned 
above will be incorporated into the analysis. Hence, we will model a more flexible scenario, in 
which substitution possibilities are introduced at several stages. Similarly, alternative pricing 
scenarios are allowed for different production activities, thus allowing for the prices of some pub­
licly produced commodities to be Axed. Finally, to the extent that commodity balances are valued 
at market prices in our data framework, the results of our model will be more realistic since we 
will obtain a picture of price effects at market prices.
As pointed out before, our model beneflts considerably from the SAM approach, which not 
only enhances the modelling capabilities but. more specifically, allows us to consider explicitly 
the public/private dichotomy of the Mexican economy which would have otherwise been ignored 
by the 1-0 approach.
Finally, it should be said that in this section the emphasis is upon the modelling o f public 
sector pricing policy and performance. The idea is to explain in detail how we have speciAed the 
structure of the price system. However, many more issues can be addressed, some of which have 
already been outlined, in particular, as will be seen in Chapter Seven, a slightly different 
approach of the model is used to evaluate effective protection levels.
5.4.1 T he Model
In setting up the modeling of the price system for the Mexican economy we used as a data frame-
work our consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis as represented in Table 4.6 in the past chapter. 
Rather than explaining again the details of how the SAM is structured, we will only describe the 
main characteristics that are relevant for the purposes of setting out the model.
We should recall that, in our SAM, twelve commodities were identified. With the exception 
of construction which is only produced by the private sector, and electricity which is a public 
monopoly, all the commodities in the system have two domestic sources o f supply -public and 
private. Also, for the purpose of dealing properly with margins, the activities public and private 
transport were further split up into transport for goods o f domestic origin and transport for 
imported commodities. Accordingly, we ended up with twenty six production activities, thirteen 
of which were public and thirteen private.14
Thus, since our framework distinguishes between activities and commodities, the model is 
divided into two main components, namely, activity costs and supply of commodities. In terms of 
our data framework in Table 4.6 these two components correspond to absorption and make 
matrices respectively. Accordingly, the model will be presented in two main blocks. The first 
block refers to the modeling of activity costs, both public and private, whereas the second block 
refers to the modeling of supply of commodities.
Table 5.1 sets out the model. To make the exposition clearer let us also use Figure 5.2, 
which shows diagrammatically how the price system is being structured.
The first block is given by equations (l.a) and (l.b ). showing how the cost structure of 
activities is formed. Gross output price of public and private activities, c, and c, are formed by a 
Leontief combination of net output prices, v, and v, . and intermediates, which we assume to com­
bine in Axed proportions.13 It can be seen that production activities buy raw materials from com-
14 See Appendix A for the detail! of activity and commodity disaggregation.
*» It will be ieen in Chapter Seven that for p u rp o rt of c  sum s ting ERP allowing for substitutability in the 
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where k denotes public activities, and j  refers to private activities, and the remaining notation is 
as follows
ct -  Gross output price of public activity k . 
cj = Gross output price of private activity j .  
v* -  Net output price of public activity k. 
vy ■ Net output price of private activity j .  
ati -  Input-output coefficients for public activities. 
aij ■ Input output coefficients for private activities. 
cf m Producer price of publicly produced commodities. 
ci -  Producer price of privately produced commodities.
PDf m Cost price (inclusive of margins) of publicly produced commodity i 
PDi ■ Cost price (inclusive of margins) of privately produced commodity i .
PDJ- ■ Cost price of the share o f the production of public trade and transport allocated to 
domestic commodity I.
PDr -  Cost price of the share of the production of private trade and transport allocated to 
domestic commodity i.
Pb, -  Domestic price of the composite public/private. / ,  inclusive of trade and transport 
margins.
it -  Domestic indirect tax on commodity i (rate).
Pbt -  Domestic market price of commodity i (after taxes), 
i r  -  Import duty on commodity i (rate).
P* ■ World price of commodity I .
PM, -  Landed price of imports of commodity i .
PMJ • Cost price of the share o f the production of transport allocated to imports of commo-
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modity markets at market prices, that is. inclusive of indirect taxes as well as of trade and tran­
sport margins. Also, it is important to stress that value added or net output prices. v» and v,, will 
be exogenous to our model, since prices of factors of production (labour and capital) are assumed 
to be given. Hence prices are determined only by the supply side of the economy.
In terms of Figure 3.2. this first block o f equations is represented by the first and second lev­
els. reading downwards, where v» and v, combine with h  (market prices o f intermediates) to gen­
erate domestic gross output prices, c, and c,. of public and private activities, respectively. This 
first set o f equations, then, describe the cost structure o f production activities which, as previ­
ously noted, correspond to the combination of value added with the elements of the absorption 
matrix in our SAM. We shall come back to this first Mock of equations in more detail below, 
when outlining the sort o f policy experiments we intend to carry ou t In the meantime let us move 
on and explain the next pan of the model, which refers to the modeling of supply of commodities. 
Two sources of supply are identified -domestic production and imports. Let us start with domestic 
production.
The first thing to notice is that in our framework domestic production of traded goods can 
have two possible destinations -domestic or international markets. It is important therefore to 
assume that domestic and exported commodities are the same so that the price of commodity i is 
the same irrespective of whether it is exported or sold in the domestic markets. This assumption 
is necessary if we want to ensure that prices do not depend upon the allocation of output between 
domestic or export markets, but only upon activity costs. Notice that despite this assumption, for 
the sake of completeness. Figure 5.2 shows domestic and export prices of commodity « 
separately.
We can now concentrate on the price formation process of commodities sold in the domes­
tic markets The description of this process starts with equations (2.a) and (2.b). These equations 
describe how factor cost prices of public and private supply of commodity I. PDf and PD/ are 
determined by the the combination of the corresponding prices (producer) of domestic supply {cf
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and <y) and the cost o f trade and transport margins allocated to each commodity. PDF-
The nature of equations (2.a) and (2.b) can be better understood if we recall from Table 4.6 
that the outputs of the sectors trade and transport were distributed along the make matrix. That is, 
we shall assume that the activities trade and transport produce a homogeneous commodity which 
is placed into the different commodity markets. Formally, it can be assumed that the supply of 
trade and transport. Qt . is placed into the different commodity markets, I ,  according to a constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function
(3 J )
where $ is a share parameter. Qt, represents the amounts of margins (trade and transport) allo­
cated to market i . and the elasticity of transformation, y , is given by l/(l-+ r). Then, if  P j is the 
price of output o f trade and transport it can be shown that maximising the revenue o f the activi­
ties trade and transport. Qr, , yields the following result (see Appendix B for the derivation 
process)
p p -+ m y j'p p -+  (3.9)
We shall therefore assume an infinite elasticity of transformation so that the output of trade 
and transport and hence its price, is the same irrespective of the commodity market in which it is 
placed. In Figure 3.2 this process is described in the second and third levels.
Equation (3) combines publicly and privately produced commodities at factor cost prices by 
means of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, thus forming a composite commo­
dity whose price is Pb,. As can be seen, it is formed by a combination of public and private sup­
ply of commodity i . with the elasticity of substitution given by the value of X, whereas 0 and p 
are share and scale parameters, respectively.
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It should perhaps be mentioned in advance that, with the exception of the commodity capi­
tal goods, no degree of substitutability between public and private supply was allowed. The rea­
son Is that, as suggested in Chapter Two. the public sector in Mexico has performed as a comple­
mentary sector to private activities. We will explain this point in more detail in the next chapter. 
However, and more generally, if ooe has the belief or evidence that public and private supply of 
commodities are made up of similar commodities, then this can be modeled by giving some posi­
tive values to the parameter X. thus allowing for substitutability to take place.
Domestic indirect taxes u (rate) are added in equation (4). which describes market prices of 
domestic supply of commodity i . Pb, . The importance of adding indirect taxes (and trade and 
transport margins as suggested by equations [2.a] and [2.b]) so as to arrive at market prices has 
been stressed before. As already noted, market prices are the relevant ones when it comes to 
modeling economic behaviour. In Figure 3.2. market prices of domestic supply. Pb, . appear in 
the fifth level, once the tax component has been added.
Thus far we have described the price formation process regarding domestic supply. How­
ever. total supply is also made up of imports. Equations (3) and (6) describe the treatment given 
to imports
Equation (3) describes landed prices of imports of commodity l ,  PM,, once import duties, 
IT. (rate) have been added to the world price of the commodity. P*. Equation (6). in the same 
manner as with domestic production, shows how margins on imports. PMl, are added to landed 
prices of imports. PM, . in order to obtain imports valued at market prices. Pit, This process of 
import price formation is described in the right hand side of Figure 3.2, beginning with cif prices 
o f imports given by the world price of the commodity I,  P ‘ , at the third level. The addition of 
duties leads to landed prices of imports. PM, . In the fourth level, whereas in the fifth level mar­
gins have been added to arrive at domestic market prices of goods of foreign origin. P it,.
We are now in a position to bring together as a composite commodity domestic supply and
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imports, both t t  market prices. This is described by equation (7) where these two sources com­
bine in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)16 form, where the elasticity of substitution is 
given by the value of o. and 5 and y denote share and scale parameters respectively. Depending 
on the value of o. imports and domestic supply will combine in different ways. If a is close to 
aero, there is almost no scope for substitution between these two sources when relative prices 
change. In the extreme case, when a equals aero, we are in the Leoodef world where imports are 
perfect complements to domestic production, and hence changes in relative prices will not affect 
the proportions in which the two sources combine. Alternatively, the greater a the more substitut­
able domestic production and imports will be. At the opposite extreme, when a tends to infinity 
there is perfect substitutability. The actual values o f a  in any particular context will depend on 
how homogeneous domestic production and imports are as well as on quality differences, thus 
varying from country to country. We will discuss this point for the Mexican context in the next 
chapter.
The process of composite price formation just described above is shown in the last level, at 
the bottom of Figure 5.2, where F, is made by the combination of Fb, and F it, . The circular flow 
of the system is indicated by the continuous lines which describe how the price of the composite 
commodity, F,. feeds back into the cost of production activities, while the discontinuous lines 
show how margins affect prices, both domestic and foreign.
S .4 J  Policy Experiments
It has been mentioned before that as far as the effects on the price system are concerned, devia­
tions of price from marginal cost in public Arms can be viewed as a form of indirect taxation; if 
price is above marginal cost, the effects are similar to that of an indirect tax. whereas if price is 
below marginal cost, the effects on prices are equivalent to a subsidy.
M As originally suggested by Arming«» I IM 9|.
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Accordingly, for purposes of simulating changes in public prices all we need is to simulate 
a tax (or a subsidy) on the part o f the domestic commodity produced by the public sector, cf in 
equation (2.a). As will be seen, it turns out that, in the Mexican economy, public prices are in fact 
heavily subsidised so that, in most cases, the price-cost margin will be negative. Naturally, it is 
necessary to know the direction and magnitude of the price cost margin. This point will be 
explained in the next chapter.
Meanwhile it should be noted that we are not changing the rate o f indirect taxes t, , but 
instead, imposing a tax 6 on the supply of public activities, cf. The reason for that, as can be seen 
from Figure 5.2, is that domestic indirect taxes are levied as a proportion of the aggregate of the 
commodity, that is. including both public and private supply, and not as a tax on the publicly pro­
duced commodity.17
As far as changes in efficiency levels in public production activities are concerned, we have 
followed the same principle as described above, that is. inefficiency in the public sector is viewed 
as a form of indirect taxation to the extent that the prices faced by consumers are higher than the 
prices that would prevail i f  the public firm were more efficient. To obtain some insight into this 
point, it will be useful to show in a more explicit way the value added or net output component of 
the cost structure of activities.
We have expressed equations (l.a) and (l.b ) in a rather compact way. trying to emphasise 
that, for the present purposes, net output prices, v/ and v*. are assumed to be exogenous. 
Nevertheless, v ,, for the public sector, can be expressed in a more explicit way as
“NWh  <5,o)
17 So far we have assumed in our model that all M elon follow the u k  ailed cost plus pricing m is. which 
mean» (hat any change in activity ooau are fully nan if  erred forward to commodity prices. In the n e u  chapter, 
however, we will Me that it can also be assumed that the prices o f some coramodinei a n  regulated or Ased 
to  that any increase in activity costs would now be transferred backwards, affecting factor rewards instead. In 
terms of our equations, we tball be assuming that the prices o f  soma publicly produced commodities, cf are 
regulated by the government, and hence increases in activity costs would only creata a negative rent but 
would not affect the price of the corresponding commodity (see Chapter Sis).
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where 6 is a tax rate. 6d is the same tax at time zero, p is a scale parameter, and v* is the 
coefficient for the use of factors of production. / .  (labour and capital), whose prices, w,. are 
assumed to be fixed.
Parameter p in equation (S.10) is usually interpreted as an efficiency index. An increase in p 
leads to an increase of net output for given amounts of factors of production. Also, since 6 is a tax 
rate, it can therefore be interpreted as a value added tax. Now. an increase in the level of the tax 
(6 > 60) can be offset by an appropriate increase in production efficiency (p > po) From this per­
spective. any avoidable inefficiency in public Arms can be conceptualised as a form of indirect 
tax. as far as its effects on the price system are concerned.
Keeping in mind this analogy, in order to simulate increases in efficiency levels (or reduc­
tion in levels of inefficiency) in our framework, it was only necessary to impose an appropriate 
subsidy (or tax) on the price of the publicly produced commodities in question. As can be seen, 
the procedure was essentially the same as for changes in public prices.
The framework as described above will be used in the next chapter to analyse public sector 
pricing policy and performance. Nonetheless, because of the Ax-price nature of the model, net 
output prices are assumed to be Axed. Accordingly, in order to evaluate effective rates of protec­
tion in Chapter Seven, we will make use of an slightly modified version of the same model. For 
exposition purposes, however, we will explain such an approach in the corresponding chapter.
The last point to mention is that for purposes of implementing our policy experiments we 
used a software package known as HERCULES. This software package has been created to solve 
computable general equilibrium (COE) models. For our purposes, however, the model was run as 
Ax-price, that is. Axing the prices of factors of production, hence making price determination 
independent of the demand side.
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5.S Summary and Conclusions
It has been argued that fix-price models, despite their inherent limitations, constitute a good 
framework for a partial analysis of the price system. Specifically, it has been seen that tradition­
ally issues related to the analysis of the price structure have been analysed in a 1-0 framework. 
Y et it has also been pointed out that 1-0 models do entail some limitations which may have some 
implications when estimating price effects. Three points were suggested : (a) the fixed 
coefficients assumptions (b) the fact that price effects are evaluated based on producer prices as 
opposed to market prices, which are the relevant ones when modeling economic behaviour, and 
(c) the use of only one criterion for the classification o f activities in 1-0 tables.
The ultimate aim of this chapter has been, therefore, to present an alternative model for the 
analysis of the price system, which, while remaining in the Ax-price fashion, nevertheless intro­
duces some characteristics in the spirit of general equilibrium. SpeciAcally our model introduces 
substitution possibilities in the use of raw materials. While we allowed for substitution between 
domestic production and imports, the generality of the model, however, permits us the 
specification of substitutability with more inputs, if required. Since our data framework values 
commodity balances at market prices, our model benefits considerably as it estimates price 
effects at market prices.
We have put special emphasis on public pricing policy and performance. Nonetheless, the 
model can deal perfectly with other issues, such as the analysis of tax reform, thus offering a 
richer and more Aexible analysis of the price system, since it tackles some aspects which the trad­
itional 1-0 model has. thus far. not dealt with.
Also, as noted before, the model benefits from our SAM approach in that it enables us to 
carry out the analysis incorporating the public/private dichotomy, and more generally, in that it 
enhances the modeling capabilities at various points These points will become evident in the 
course of the exposition of the following two

CHAPTER SIX
PUBLIC SECTO R PRICING POLICY AND PERFORMANCE. ANALYSIS OF 
RESULTS
(.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter the framework for the analyst* o f the price system was set up. 
Using our model, this chapter analyses in detail the effects that public sector pricing policy and 
performance have on the relative price structure of the Mexican economy. Several policy experi­
ments are carried out simulating different pricing policy scenarios as well as changes in the 
efficiency levels o f public sector activities. In a second stage, the resulting price structure is used 
to evaluate the effects on the reallocation of resources within the production structure by looking 
at the changes that take place in the value added of the production activities.
All the policy experiments developed here are carried out assuming various values of elasti­
cities of substitution between domestic production and imports Similarly, as will be explained in 
detail later, two alternative models have been built In the first model it is assumed that all sectors 
follow the cost-plus pricing rule so that any change in the coat o f activities is fully passed on to 
commodity prices. In the second model the prices of some publicly-produced commodities are 
assumed to be regulated, and hence changes in activity costs o f the Melon whose commodity 
prices are Axed are pushed backwards, thus affecting factor rewards, instead of commodity prices.
The exposition is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we present and make some comments 
on the values of trade elasticities used in carrying out the policy experiments. Some comments 
will also be made in relation to the degree of substitutability between public and private domestic 
supply in the Mexican context In Section 6.3 some brief comment* are made regarding the way
1 2 6
in which policy experiments are to be conducted and how the effects on value added are to be cal­
culated. Section 6.4 explains how we approximate the necessary changes in public prices so as to 
simulate a non-distorted scenario. Section 6.3 is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the 
main results. It should be mentioned that given the importance of the energy sectors in the results 
-petroleum and electricity-, the analysis is split into two pans in order to asses the influence of the 
energy sectors on their own. Changes in efficiency levels and tariffs are also incorporated into 
the analysis. Finally. Section 6.6 summarises the main findings of the chapter and also contains 
some concluding remarks.
6.2 Elasticities of Substitution
6.2.1 Trade Elasticities
It is unfortunate that one very often has to make use of "educated guesses" when it comes to 
finding values of elasticities of substitution between domestic production and imports for a partic­
ular commodity The reason, as is widely known, is the lack of sufficient data to obtain appropri­
ate econometric estimations. Instead, one has usually to choose some boundary values based on 
some previous knowledge of the main characteristics of the economy in question In addition to 
that, aggregation levels make such a task more difficult because, the more aggregated the 
definition of a commodity, the more likely it is that very different commodities are aggregated 
into a single "commodity". Since trade elasticity values are determined by the degree of homo­
geneity between domestic production and Imports, it follows that high levels of aggregation 
would lead to loss o f details as to how homogeneous domestic production and imports are. and 
hence, the choice of a particular value of elasticity of substitution becomes even more difficult
Nonetheless, if one manages to capture adequately the main characteristics of the economy 
in question by choosing an appropriate structure of trade elasticities, such problems may not be 
very serious or. at lea st their influence in the outcome can be minimised. Furthermore, it Is 
always possible to modify values so as to get an idea of the degree of senaitivity of the results.
1 2 ?
The actual values used for carrying out our policy experiments are presented in Table 6.1. 
Two seu  of values are shown, low and high, the high values being three times greater than the 
low values. The aim of choosing these two seu  of values is twofold. First, to check how sensitive 
the resulu are to the value of the parameters and. secondly, to see how they compare with the 
traditional case in which all trade elasticities are zero when assuming that imports are perfect 
complements to domestic production.
A first glance at Table 6.1 suggesu an upper income developing economy where the consu­
mer goods industry is relatively well advanced, the production of intermediates is fairly important 
and. although there exisu some domestic production of capital goods, it is still heavily dependent 
from abroad, particularly in the use of sophisticated machinery and equipment
Table 6.1




Petroleum A petrochemicals 1.0 3.0
Food processing 1.5 4.5
Textiles 1.5 4.5
Chemicals 0.5 13
Capital goods 0.33 1.0
Other manufactures . 1.0 3 0
To have a clearer idea in that respect it might be useful to look at some figures related to 
imports of commodities in Mexico. Table 6.2 shows the composition of import» according to the 
type of commodities and the proportion o f import» to total supply, for each ooe of the commodi­





OF IMPORTS (« ) IMPORTED (VALUE)
Agriculture 9.8 7.4
Mining 1.9 10.3
Petroleum & petrochemicals 4.9 12.1
Food processing 6.3 4.4
Textiles 0.8 3.0
Chemicals 8.2 14.0
Capital goods 33.3 24.9
Other m wufacture. 14.4 6.7
* Source: Table 4.6 in Chapter Four.
Note: Column one does not add up to a hundred because there is a small fraction of non traded 
commodities that are not included.
As can be seen from column one. more than 50 percent of total imports consist o f capital 
goods, followed by other manufactures, agriculture, and chemicals. It should be said that the fact 
that agriculture shows a relatively high share (9.8 percent) is due to temporary conditions rather 
than to the lack of domestic productive capacity. It can also be appreciated from column one. that 
most imports consist of manufactured products, especially capital goods, other manufactures, and 
chemicals, that is. capital goods and intermediates. Column two. on the other hand, shows 
imports as a proportion of total supply for each commodity. Again, capital goods and intermedi­
ates are the most import dependent sectors in the sense that a relatively large proportion of total 
supply has to be imported.
It should be noted that the trade elasticity value of the commodity petroleum and petro­
chemicals is not as high as one would expect from an oil producer country. The reason is that the 
imports of this commodity are made up of refined and petrochemical products, rather that crude 
oil and. although the domestic production o f oil derivatives has steadily been growing over the
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past decade, there are still several products that have to be imported. Perhaps it would have been 
more appropriate to separate crude oil from refined products in our data framework. However, 
since we have a single activity comprising both crude oil and refined products, it was decided to 
choose a relatively low trade elasticity value for this commodity.
Thus, as can be appreciated, the structure o f trade elasticities in Table 6.1 portrays a 
developing country with some industrial base. That is. high values are assigned to agriculture, 
mining, and petroleum & petrochemicals, which tend to be more homogeneous products and for 
which the proportion of domestic production is fairly important. As far as manufactures is con­
cerned. consumer goods do have relatively high values, particularly food processing and textiles, 
whose production is well advanced in Mexico. The lowest values, as already mentioned, 
correspond to intermediates and capital goods. This is shown by the trade elasticity values given 
to the commodities chemicals and capital goods, as well as to other manufactures, which include 
some intermediates.
6 J J  Substitutability Between Public and Private Domestic Supply
A second set of parameters required by the model are the elasticities of substitution between pub­
lic and private supply, since they form a composite commodity, constituting domestic supply. 
Such values ought to be determined by the degree of competition between the two sectors, if any. 
Thus, a high value would suggest that both sectors are involved in the production of very similar 
commodities whereas a low value would indicate a complementarity between the two sources of 
supply, public and private.
Insofar as the Mexican economy is concerned, it has been suggested in Chapter Two that 
the public sector has specialised in the provision of some essential raw materials, particularly in 
areas in which private investors have found the undertaking of the huge investments to be 
unprofitable with the uncertain returns that the provision of these raw materials sometimes 
require In other cases, some activities are reserved by legislation to public exploitation because
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they are considered "strategic" for the economy. Indeed, in Mexico, as in many developing coun­
tries, the state was given the role o f promoting industrial growth, especially in the early stages of 
the industrialisation process.
In the light o f these considerations and our more detailed discussion in Chapter Two. it can 
be postulated that public and private sectors have performed more as complementary rather than 
competing activities. We have therefore tried to capture this fact by assigning a value of zero to 
all the elasticities o f substitution between public and private supply, with the exception of the 
commodity capital goods to which a value of 0.5 was assigned, thereby trying to reflect some low 
degree of competition in the production of iron A  steel, as well as in the production of motor 
vehicles, and transport machinery A  equipment.
6.3 Policy Experiments and Value A dded Effects
As stated in the last chapter, deviations of prices from marginal costs and inefficiency of PEs are 
to be treated as implicit forms of indirect taxation, insofar as their effects on the price system are 
concerned. Thus, in order to simulate changes in public prices we simply imposed a tax on the 
public supply of the commodity in question if price was below marginal cost whereas if price was 
above marginal cost we simulated a subsidy (negative tax).
The details of how the actual price-cost margins were estimated in the context of the Mexi­
can economy will be presented in the next section. Meanwhile it should be noted that, thus far, 
we have assumed that all production activities follow the so-called cost-plus pricing rule, which 
means that changes in activity costs are fully passed on to commodity prices.
If. however, the price of a particular commodity in the system is fixed, then changes in 
activity costs would not be transferred forward but backwards, hence affecting instead factor 
rewards. That is. if  we assume, for instance, that the price of a publicly produced commodity is 
regulated then an increase in costs would not change the price of the commodity but. instead, the
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the level of profits (or losses) would be affected, and. therefore, there would not be secondary 
effects in the price system.
For presentation purposes then, two models will be shown. In model 1 it will be assumed 
that all activities (public and private) follow the cost-plus pricing rule. A second model, which we 
shall call model 2. will be run under the assumption that the prices of electricity1 and public sup­
ply of petroleum and petrochemicals are regulated, whereas the remaining activities will follow 
the cost-plus pricing rule.
The fact that these two commodity prices are assumed to be regulated satisfies the reality in 
Mexico, and some evidence in that respect has been provided in Chapter Two. More generally, 
however, one can postulate that other publicly produced commodities, although not fixed for long 
periods, may still be subject to regulation. That is mostly an empirical question which we shall 
not pursue further here since we only want to bring into the picture the main forces that influence 
the price system. Nonetheless, for sake of completeness, alongside with our two main models we 
develop a third model (model 3) in which it will be assumed that all public commodity prices are 
regulated. The results of this model will not be subject to detailed analysis, but are reported in
Notice that even if we assume that some publicly produced commodities face a controlled 
price it is still possible to simulate an increase in their prices. In this case, however, the change in 
the price of the commodity in question ought to be taken as an exogenous and once and for all 
change so that there would not be additional feedback effects, other than the original change. In 
other words, when a particular price is assumed to be regulated we can still simulate an adjust­
ment in iu  price. In this case, however, the change in the price would be exogenously imposed 
(as a policy variable) and would not be affected by changes in the prices of other commodities in 
the system.
1 Which )• only produced by the public «actor.
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The remaining experiments should not pose any problem. As explained in the past chapter, 
changes in efficiency levels arc to be treated as a form of indirect taxation, in exactly the same 
manner as we did with changes in public prices. Finally, we will also include in our package of 
experiments the effects that changes in tariffs have on the price structure. As will be seen, 
changes in tariffs and efficiency levels, in the Mexican context, will act in the opposite direction 
to the effects of public pricing policy.
So far we have outlined the main set o f policy experiments to be conducted and how they 
will be carried ou t We will obtain a very rich picture of how relative prices react to different 
forces, under a variety of scenarios. The resulting price structure, naturally, will influence the 
allocation of resources. The natural question is then how resources are expected to be reallo­
cated. We will therefore present a further estimation of the effects on the pull of resources within 
the production structure by looking at the effects on value added for the different production 
activities. In calculating these effects, in each case, we took the resulting price solution vector 
and multiplied it by the cost o f the twenty six production activities identified in our SAM. that is. 
the absorption matrix. In this manner we obtained a matrix of revalued activity costs. The next 
step was simply to calculate the differences between new and old costs for every production 
activity, both, public and private. As will be seen later, it turns out that in the Mexican economy 
all public activities set prices below marginal costs, hence subsidising the remaining production 
activities by providing them with cheap inputs. In this eventuality, the difference between new 
and old cosu will provide a picture o f the extent to which activities are being subsidised.
Since we want to have an insight as to how the system of subsidies inflates value added 
(presumably profits), we expressed the differences in cosu as a proportion of value added. For 
private activities, then, we shall assume that such a difference represents the subsidy which, 
instead of leading to a reduction in commodity prices, leads to increases in value added. For pub­
lic activities a similar reasoning applies except that, in this case, an adjustment had to be made 
since the initial increase in public prices (from the expert menu) reduced the original deficit of 
PEs which, to some extent, compensates the increase in input cosu. For public activities.
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therefore, the net effects from changes in revenues and costs will represent the change in value
added.
Notice that we are assuming that revenue of public activities is affected only by the increase 
in the price of domestic supply, not exporu. That is. we shall assume that the public sector subsi­
dises only domestic consumption, and therefore it Is also necessary to assume that exporu o f pub­
lic activities were subject to a tax (or subsidy if prices were above marginal costs) which is 
removed when public prices are raised.2
The resulting picture is interesting because it provides a mapping of where subsidies pro­
vided by PEs' low prices actually end up. Indeed, when PEs are producing consumer goods, it is 
straightforward to And out who benefits from such a policy of low public prices. However, when 
PEs are involved in the production of intermediates, the picture becomes obscure because distor­
tions (and hence subsidies) are transmitted throughout the production structure.
6.4 Calculation o f Public Prices Increases
It it unfortunate that very little and scattered information on PEs' performance is available, par­
ticularly when their presence plays an important role on the performance of many economies (see 
Floyd (1984]). Although to some extent our consolidated SAM for 1-0 analysis represents a step 
forward in that direction, there are still a whole range of aspects that deserve and require a more 
systematic approach. One of these aspects is. undoubtedly, more information on the structure of 
cosu and revenues which will shed some light upon how "production function" elements within a 
PE are conformed.
In our particular case, in which we attempt to estimate the extent to which prices diverge 
from marginal cosu. the task appears enormous in view of the meagre published date.
* Strictly >peaking, when public price* are railed and capon taxes removed, the revenue of the govern
PE*.
1 3k
Nevertheless, such difficulties may to some extent be overcome if we try to get a rough approxi­
mation of the direction and magnitude of the price-cost margin of public entities (usually nega­
tive for the case of Mexico) by looking at some financial figures such as subsidy receipts, total 
revenues and total costs.
It is most fortunate that this sort o f financial information for public firms in Mexico does 
exist for several years, among which is 1980, our base year (see Secretaria de Programación y 
Presupuesto [1987], Finanzas Publicas. 1977-1983, Tomo IV. Situación Financiera del Sector 
Paraestatal). Although not all PEs in Mexico are included in this publication, the so-called 
"budgetary controlled” are. These are the most important ones.
A first approximation to estimate this price-cost margin could have been simply to look at 
the subsidy receipts for each public firm, as a measure of their deficit. We did not do so. however, 
because it is quite a common practice for PEs to cover their deficits through borrowing and 
hence, looking at any one year figure, may not reveal their real subsidy requirements. Instead, 
following Seade (1986). we replaced the concept of subsidy by a more appropriate notion of 
’implicit rate*, which was estimated, for each public firm, as the difference between revenues (net 
of subsidies) and costs (net of tax payments), divided by net revenues.
This is not the ideal measure because it still fails to take into account flow cost elements 
that, while fixed in the short run. will change from time to time and will be reflected in subsidy 
requirements even though the price-cost margin remains unchanged. To take account of this 
would have required us to separate fixed from operational costs, for several years, and carry out a 
time series analysis. Unfortunately such detailed information is not available. Moreover, it is hard 
to believe it exists at all. Nonetheless, in view of the available information, our concept of an 
implicit subsidy rate seems a satisfactory approximation of the price-cost margin.
Notice also that the fact that the 1980 is taken as year of analysis introduces a potential 
problem since one would expect that, because of the overvaluation of the Mexican peso in this
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year, imports were cheaper and. therefore, one would expect that for more recent years, the values 
of these indicator may have changed after the adjustments of the exchange rate in the eighties. 
This point is important in terms of the robustness o f our results in time.
Therefore, for calculation purposes, we grouped each PE reported in our information source 
according to our own classification of activities and then estimated an implicit subsidy rate for 
each one of the public activities, as described above, with the exception of public petroleum and 
petrochemicals.
The activity petroleum and petrochemicals Is operated by a single public monopoly 
(PEMEX),3 and it would have been quite straightforward to estimate an implicit subsidy rate for 
the whole activity. However, that would have been unrepresentative since most of the revenues of 
PEMEX come from the exports of crude oil. whereas it is the domestic price-cost margin we are 
interested in. That is to say. looking at subsidy receipts for this public firm may be misleading 
because, due to the export revenues, no subsidies may show up. even though the domestic price is 
kept down aniflcially. Instead, we used as an indicator of the price cost-margin the nominal 
implicit level of protection as used in the next chapter. Such a nominal level of protection was 
estimated as the difference between domestic and foreign prices for a large group of commodi­
ties. including oil products, and then grouped according to the 1-0 classification (see Chapter 
Seven).
Indeed, this nominal level of protection is the most appropriate measure of the degree of 
subsidy given to this particular commodity because the main input cost to the activity -crude oil- 
is practically zero, and hence the true opportunity cost is represented by the world price of the 
commodity. Moreover, to the extent that the participation of the private sector in the activity is 
very small and the whole of the production of the sector is carried out by a single public Arm. 
then there are no problems in using our measure o f nominal level of protection as an indicator of *
* PEMEX. Spam lb acronym for the government oil monopoly Starxli for Mtucan PMroteum
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the price cost-margin of the public activity as a whole. The final figures obtained from the estima­



























Before going into the analysis of results, however, let us make some comments on the value 
of these implicit subsidy rates, since they will serve as a basis for several o f the policy simula­
tions carried out.
As can be seen from Table 6.3, in some cases the cost-price margin is very high, particu­
larly for the energy sectors -petroleum and electricity. This is important because, as it will be 
seen, the results of our policy experiments will be determined, to a great extent, by the perfor­
mance of these two sectors. Indeed, although our estimates of the price-cost margin may appear 
excessively high, particularly for electricity (-1.63), it should be said that the number we obtained 
looks sensible when compared with previous estimations. Oil [1983], for instance, estimated the 
price differential between marginal social opportunity costs and domestic prices for several user 
types of electricity. They range from: -83.6 percent for industrial electricity; -161.0 percent for 
commercial electricity; -273.7 percent for residential electricity; to -906.3 percent for rural elec­
tricity (estimates for 1980).
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It should also be stressed that our two energy sectors -petroleum and electricity- are among 
the most heavily subsidised. Indeed, the prices o f publicly supplied energy products underwent 
very few price adjustments during the seventies (see Philip [1984], see also Chapter Two). That 
is. in fact, the reason why in Model 2 we assume that these two energy sectors face a regulated 
price.
Other commodities such as agriculture and trade show also a very high price-cost margin. 
Nevertheless, their influence in the results is expected to be limited, given the small fraction by 
which they participate in the total level of production of the respective sectors, in which the 
private sector dominates by far. Perhaps more relevant are chemicals and transport whose price- 
cost margins are still high and hence we should expect some effects of importance, particularly as 
far as transport is concerned, given its influence in the distribution process. Food processing, 
although it shows a high price-cost margin would, not influence the results very significantly, 
since most of its production is composed of consumer goods.
Finally, the less subsidised commodities are textiles, capital goods, and other manufactures 
in the manufacturing area, as well as mining and other services. Here it is important to point out 
that capital goods and mining are relevant in the sense that the size of the public presence on the 
activities is significant; 12.S and 10.2 respectively percent as a proportion of total domestic sup­
ply. In particular, it is interesting to notice that the lowest price-cost margin corresponds to the 
activity public capital goods, which looks sensible in view of our remarks in Section 6.2 regard­
ing the presence of some degree of competition with the private sector.
Having made the comments above let us move on to the next section and have a look at the 
resuIls of some policy simulations.
6.5 Analysis of Results
For presentation purposes we shall start from the more general set o f policy experiments and then
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break down the analysis to see separately the effects o f the energy sectors on their own. In a 
second part we introduce the effects of changes in efficiency levels as well as tariffs. It should be 
said that we have tried to be very selective and comment only on the most representative set of 
policy experiments so as not to get lost in the details. Nevertheless, several related policy experi­
ments. although not presented in this chapter, are referred to in Appendix C. where a  wider 
variety of results are reported. We will make reference to them when appropriate during the 
course of the exposition.
* J . l  Changes in all Public Prices
The first policy experiment consisted of simulating an increase in all public prices in such a way 
that in all public activities the price-cost margin disappears. The precise amount in which public 
prices were raised are given by the implicit subsidy rates, as presented in Table 6.3 in the last sec­
tion. The results of this experiment are presented in Table 6.4 under the label of Model 1 which, 
as we explained, refers to a scenario where all sectors (public and private) are assumed to follow 
the cost-plus pricing rule.
The results of each policy experiment are presented under three different sets of trade elasti­
city values; all imports complementary to domestic production, low trade elasticities, and high 
trade elasticities. Columns one. two and three show how value added for public and private 
activities are affected by the new price structure. We also show the effects on value added o f the 
aggregate (between public and private) of each production activity. Columns four, five and six 
show the price effects for the different commodities (market prices).
Let us begin by making some comments on the resulting structure of relative prices. The 
first point to notice is the sensitivity of prices to the value of trade elasticities. This is particularly 
true for commodities such as petroleum A  petrochemicals and chemicals and. although less 
accentuated, the remaining commodity prices are also sensitive to changes in trade elasticity 
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substantial (67 percent). It will be seen below that most of the variability of price changes to trade 
elasticity values is in fact attributed to the commodity petroleum. Obviously, the variability of 
value added to trade elasticity values also shows a high response. It is interesting to note the 
strong variation in the value added of the activity petroleum A  petrochemicals, which moves 
from 3.4 percent in the Leontief scenario to 27.9 percent in the case of high trade elasticities. 
This is also explained by the stronger impact in input prices when the scope for substitution 
reduces as trade elasticity values diminish. We shall return to this point later when discussing 
price effects under the assumption that changes in energy prices are not present
Turning now to the price increases themselves, it can be appreciated that there are large 
effects in all the commodities. In looking at the increases in prices we ought to  remember that 
two main forces are at work; on the one hand, the original increase in commodity prices which 
varies across commodities and. on the other hand, the subsequent increase in input prices. Let us 
choose the set of low trade elasticities for the purpose of making some comments.
The two most remarkable effects are in the energy commodities, petroleum and electricity, 
whose prices go up by a very large proportion; 106 percent for petroleum and 400.1 percent in the 
case of electricity. While these results are explained in part by the strong original increases in 
their price (see Table 6.3). the effects are very much reinforced by the close linkage between the 
two industries in terms of use of inputs, especially electricity which is a very intensive user of 
petroleum, and. to a less extent, the increases in other commodity prices.
Although not as sharp as in the energy sectors, the remaining commodity prices are also 
affected in a very significant way. Indeed, with the exception of agriculture and construction 
whose price raising effects are 7.4 and 9.8 respectively, the rest o f the commodity prices go up by 
figures of two digits. Chemicals and transport are the highest, after the energy sectors, with 
increases of 27.7 and 20.4 percent This is explained to some extent by the increase in the price of 
petroleum.
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In general, it can be said that the price raising effects of increasing public prices to the point 
where prices equal average costs are very large. It seems then that the public sector pricing policy 
has led to a very distorted scenario where prices do not fully reflect opportunity costs. Naturally, 
such a situation has affected the allocation o f resources in the economy. In particular, if one 
focuses on the allocation of resources within the production structure, one should expect that, 
given the magnitude of our price effects, large subsidies are actually channelled to the production 
activities by the provision of cheap publicly-produced commodities.
The actual way in which subsidies are distributed within the production sector is shown in 
columns one. two. and three (in Table 6.4). where the effects on value added axe presented. 
Perhaps the most remarkable element to note in the picture of value added effects is the relatively 
favourable position of the manufacturing industry. It is more or less clear that the system of sub­
sidies through the provision of cheap public products concentrates in manufacturing activities; 
other manufactures, capital goods and chemicals. Concentrating for the purpose o f analysis on 
the set of low trade elasticity values, it can be seen, for instance, that increasing all public prices 
would reduce value added in other manufactures by 33.3 percent while chemicals would experi­
ence a reduction o f 79.8 percent.
At the opposite extreme, it can be appreciated from Table 6.4 that agriculture, trade, and 
other services are the activities which benefit less from the policy of public prices. This point is 
important because it suggests that even though the main beneficiaries are manufacturing activi­
ties. they are not the most efficient industries in terms of their comparative advantage. Yet the 
public sector pricing policy has encouraged and promoted their growth through the system of 
subsidies at the expense of other activities, such as agriculture.
Indeed, given the magnitude in which value added is affected, one would tend to conclude 
that public price policy has created room for growing inefficiency. Moreover, given the fact that 
several of the most distorted prices in the system are prices of intermediates, it is hard to believe 
that the government is fully aware of where these subsidies end up. since distortions are
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transmitted all over the production structure.
Table 6.4. as already mentioned, refers to a situation where all sectors follow the cost-plus 
pricing rule, that is, it is assumed cost changes are are transferred forward to the commodity 
price. As has already been argued, however, that may not be a very realistic assumption, particu­
larly for some public activities such as electricity and petroleum in Mexico whose prices, even 
though they have been increased in recent years, usually remain regulated for certain periods, so 
that their price increases occur only as a once and for all rise. We have tried to capture this more 
realistic case in Model 2 in which it is assumed that all sectors follow the cost-plus pricing rule, 
except electricity and petroleum whose prices are assumed to be regulated. Table 6.5 shows the 
results of increasing all public prices in the same proportion as in our previous experiment.
Before moving on to the analysis of Table 6.5. however, it should be stressed that the reason 
why only petroleum and electricity prices are assumed to be regulated has to do with the Mexican 
reality where, on the one hand, these activities are among the most heavily subsidised, and. on the 
other hand, their prices have remained fixed for long periods, compared to other public produced 
commodities. The same assumption, nevertheless, can be imposed for the remaining public prices 
in the system. We therefore run then a third model, which we shall call Model 3 in which all pub­
lic prices are assumed to be regulated. We shall not report the results of this third model in this 
chapter, so as not to get lost in the details, but in Appendix C the results of the same policy exper­
iments are presented under this extreme assumption. Table C .l in Appendix C shows the effects 
of increasing all public prices. It should be recalled that in Models 2 and 3 when we assume 
increases in the regulated prices, we are actually imposing these price changes exogenously, that 
is. as a policy variable, and therefore, when the regulated prices are adjusted, we are assuming 
that the price changes of the commodities subject to regulation are determined exclusively by the 
adjustment exogenously imposed. Hence, changes in costs of these activities would be transferred 




















































































































































































Coming back to Table 6.5 and following the same order as with Table 6.4, let us begin by 
calling attention to the sensitivity of the results to the values o f trade elasticities. As can be seen, 
even though all public prices are originally increased by the same proportion, the sensitivity of 
price variations to the values of trade elasticities becomes unim portant Indeed, the changes in 
price-raising effects is negligible when one moves from one set o f  trade elasticity values to 
another. It seems then that most of the variability o f prices with respect to the value of trade elas­
ticities ought to be attributed to the commodity petroleum alone. The reason, of course, is that 
although the price of petroleum & petrochemicals goes up initially by the same proportion (67 
percent) in both scenarios, in Model 2 there are no subsequent feedback processes through the 
industrial structure, since subsequent increases in the activity cost o f petroleum are not transmit­
ted to the commodity price.
The second notable feature of Table 6.5 compared with Table 6.4 is the sharp reduction in 
price-raising effects. In Model 2. although all public prices are initially raised by the same pro­
portion as before, the final market price raising effects are reduced, roughly speaking by more 
than a half. Naturally, since the prices of electricity and petroleum are increased only once, the 
cost effects in the remaining production activities are not affected as sharply as in the case where 
the energy sectors also follow the cost plus pricing rule.
Accordingly, the effects on value added of the production activities are also reduced since 
activity costs are now less severely affected by the increases in public prices. Yet. in relative 
terms, it still remains true that the same industrial activities continue to be the main beneficiaries 
from the public pricing subsidy structure. Notice also that, in contrast to Model 1. in this second 
model the effects on value added for public activities becomes stronger because, even though 
revenues increase by the same proportion, costs are now affected on a smaller proportion. By the 
same token, value added of private activities is also lets severely affected. In particular, the 
overall effects on value added of transport and other services become positive. The methodologi­
cal consequences of this alternative model in an empirical evaluation o f the effects of relative 
prices upon certain variables may be considerable.
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Indeed, it is not only that the magnitudes of price effects change when all sectors follow the 
cost-plus pricing rule but. equally important, the ranking is affected. In order to gain some insight 
into this point we present Figure 6.1 in which commodities are ordered according to the magni­
tude by which their corresponding prices were affected, for the tw o alternative models.
Figure 6.1
Ranking of Price Rising Effects
Low Trade Elasticities
Model 1 Model 2
1.- Electricity-------------- —  1.. Electricity
1 -  Petroleum-------------- -----2.- Petroleum
3.- Chemicals ^ ___ ,3.- Transport
4.- Transport " ^ 4 . -  Chemicals
3.- Mining . 5.- Food processing
6.- Food processing><C ^ _^6.- Other services
7.- Other Services 7 Mining
1. Textiles.______ 8.- Other manufactures
9.- Other manufactures ' 9  - Textiles
11.-Construction ---------- ------ 11.- Construction
As can be seen, while for some commodities such as petroleum, electricity, capital goods, 
construction, and agriculture, the ranking of price effects is the same in the two models, the 
remaining price raising effects are changed in reladve terms.
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The consequences of these two effects are important to the extent that price effects are used 
as a basis for evaluating certain policy changes. Indeed, if. for instance, we used our price struc­
ture to evaluate the welfare effects by focusing on the consumption side as Ahmad and Stem 
[1987] and Seade [1986] did. for instance, we may well obtain quite different results when using 
Model 2, not only because of the reduction in the absolute value of price rising effects, but also 
because the relative changes described above would certainly lead to different consumption pat­
terns which would be reflected in different welfare effects. Whether or not some prices are fixed 
is mainly an empirical question that has to be resolved on the basis o f  the particular context to 
which the framework is applied. But. to the extent that the empirical evidence suggests so one 
should be careful when using the traditional 1-0 approach.
So far we have concentrated upon the examination of price effects when all public prices 
are increased. It seems however that to a great extent our results are being determined by the two 
energy sectors, petroleum and electricity. It is interesting then, for analytical purposes, to see 
their effects separately so that we can assess with more certainty the influence of public activities, 
other than the energy sectors, and. by the same token, the degree of influence of the two energy 
sectors on their own.
f i J  Changes in All Public Prices, Separating Energy Price Effects, 
f i l l  Effects o f  Increasing Only the Prices in the Energy Sectors
The effects of isolating the energy price increases from increases in the remaining public activi­
ties are shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. which correspond to our two m odels One and Two, respec­
tively. (The tam e effects for Model 3 are shown in Table C.2 in Appendix O .
Let us concentrate for the moment on Table 6.6. that is, when all sectors follow the cost- 
plus pricing rule. As can be seen, increasing energy prices account for a  very important propor­
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In particular, there is very little difference in the price raising effects of electricity and petroleum; 
both go up almost by the same proportion (see Tables 6.6 and 6.4) as in the case where all public 
prices are modified. Roughly speaking, by comparing Tables 6.6 and 6.4, one can say that energy 
prices account for around two-thirds o f the total price raising effects. That point, however, should 
be regarded with caution because, the less energy intensive the sectors are, the less important 
energy prices are in explaining commodity price increases. This is corroborated if one looks, for 
instance, at the price raising effects for other services and food processing, whose prices rise by 
14 percent and 15.4 percent respectively, when all public prices are increased (low trade elastici­
ties) (see Table 6.4) whereas the the increases are only 4.3 percent and 6.4 percent when only 
energy commodity prices are modified (see Table 6.6).
As far as the effects on value added are concerned we should remember that two opposite 
forces would be acting now. On the one hand, the effect on activity costs are going to be lower, 
since prices did not rise as much as when all public prices were increased, and hence value added 
would not fall that much. On the other hand, however, public value added would not rise as much 
as before because public commodity prices, other than energy, did not rise. Although there is no 
definite pattern to suggest in what direction value added moved in relation to the case when all 
public prices are raised, it remains true that the manufacturing sectors are still the main 
beneficiaries. Perhaps the only significant difference is that sectors producing non-traded commo­
dities are now hit harder, particularly transport and other services, whose public participation it 
significant and hence, since their public prices share did not rise, value added goes down by a 
larger proportion.
For the sake of completeness we present the tame experiment o f  increasing energy prices in 
Model 2 in Table 6.7. Apart from the comments made in the past sub-section there is not much to 
add; price effects are reduced and so are the effects on value added. Finally, to avoid getting lost 
in many tables, we report in Appendix C  the efTecU of increasing only the price of petroleum (see 
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Ó.5.2.2 Effects of Increasing All Public P rices , Except Petroleum and Electricity
The other side of the coin is revealed in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 in which we present the results of 
increasing all public prices, except petroleum and electricity, again for our two different models. 
(Table C.3 shows the result for Model 3 in Appendix C).
Looking at Table 6.8 some interesting comments can be made. First of all. it calls attention 
to the sharp reduction in price raising effects compared to our previous experiment in which the 
prices of energy commodities are increased. Yet, price raising effects are significant for some 
commodities such as other services, transport, food processing and. to a lesser degree, chemicals. 
Obviously, since prices of intermediates are now  not strongly affected, the original increase in 
public prices becomes the most important effect, rather than the subsequent increases brought 
about by changes in activity costs, as is the case where the prices of energy sectors are raised. 
This point is important because it suggests that the bulk of the distorting effects are created 
mostly by the energy sectors, whereas the remaining public activities may be affecting mainly 
prices of consumer goods directly, hence not transmitting distortions to the remaining activities.
Obviously, the effects on value added, for the reasons given above, are also not very 
significant, with the exception of the commodities whose prices are more affected. Indeed, ruling 
out energy price increases leads to a situation where the system of subsidies provided by cheap 
public prices becomes direct in the sense that there is no transmission to be traced so that subsi­
dies are now "easy" to follow. In other words, it seems that the main beneficiaries of subsidising 
public prices, other than energy sectors, are final consumers
Table 6.9 shows the results of the same experiment, that is. increasing all public prices, 
except petroleum and electricity, but under the assumption that the prices of these two commodi­
ties are regulated. It is interesting to note that in both models the values of trade elasticities are, 
for most commodities, irrelevant since price raising effects remain invariant. Clearly, the reason 
is that the public sector concentrates on the production of non traded commodities, mainly final
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consumer goods and. therefore, the effects on the costs of activities producing traded goods are 
on a very low scale. Moreover, it can be seen that there are no significant differences between 
Model 1 and Model 2. That is. the fact that energy commodity prices are regulated becomes 
irrelevant This point corroborates our previous remarks in the sense that transmissions 
throughout the system do not play an im portant role any more. In other words, to the extent that 
the most affected prices are those of final consum er goods, the fact that prices of intermediates 
such as energy are regulated becomes irrelevant because the main force affecting commodity 
prices is now the original increase in the commodity price itself.
Taking stock of the discussion so far. it ca n  be said that the main source of distortions in the 
price system comes from the subsidies granted by keeping down energy prices, mainly petroleum 
and electricity. In particular, the commodity petroleum plays an additional important role to the 
extent that it makes trade elasticity values become relevant. Likewise, the assumption of regu­
lated prices in the system has shown to be important in the Mexican context. It wax seen that 
when the prices of petroleum and electricity are regulated, the ranking of price effects is affected 
when compared to the price effects arising from  the traditional scenario in which all production 
activities are assumed to follow the cost-plus pricing rule.
Thus far we have concentrated on the effects created by the modification of public prices. 
However, the picture is still incomplete. O ther forces may well play an important role in 
influencing the price structure. We shall focus in the next part on the effects of changes in the 
efficiency levels of PEs as well as the effects o f  tariffs and how these forces modify, to some 
extent, not only the structure of prices but also the distribution of subsidies within the production 
structure.
It should be noticed that we have left out o f  the picture changes in the domestic indirect tax 
system. We did so because our focus of attention is on public pricing policy and performance. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of tax reform can be easily introduced into our framework of analysis, 
as will be seen in the next chapter.
1 6 6
6.5.3 Changes in Efficiency Levels
It is often argued that, in addition to pricing policies. PEs frequently introduce another source of 
distortion, namely inefficiency. Indeed, as w e saw in Chapter Three, the theoretical work 
developed during the eighties has perhaps put more emphasis on the issue of performance, rather 
than on the normative question of pricing policies. It has also been argued that, as far as its effects 
on the price system are concerned, inefficiency o f PEs is equivalent to indirect taxation: consu­
mers have to pay a higher price and. naturally, when PEs are producing intermediates, distortions 
are transmitted to the remaining commodities in  the system.
In view of the importance of this issue we have attempted to introduce the effects that 
changes in the efficiency (inefficiency) levels o f  PEs have on relative prices. Unfortunately, no 
details are available for the Mexican economy to  indicate the extent to which PEs are performing 
inefficiently, if they are at all. The common view , however, is that some PEs in Mexico have a 
very bad record as far as their economic performance is concerned, which is not only explained 
by the deliberate policy of keeping public prices down, but also by inefficiency (see Rey [1987]). 
This is particularly true for public activities that are. in one way or another, producing commodi­
ties which are commonly marketed and. to som e extent, more exposed to external competition, 
such as airlines, steel companies, telephones, etc ., since these public firms usually keep prices 
more in line with the prevailing price in the market. Therefore, to some extent, it is more reason­
able to postulate that their bad economic performance is due to inefficiency. Yet. as pointed out 
in Chapter Three, one has to bear in mind that direct comparisons of economic performance 
between public and private firms may not be very revealing of the degree of inefficiency when 
objectives are different
Keeping in mind these considerations, and in view of the lack of information, we have 
attempted to simulate an imaginary change in the efficiency parameter of all public activities. 
While such simulation is arbitrary since It has no empirical support, it nevertheless will show the 
direction and magnitude that real changes may have on the relative prices.4
* It should be recalled that in aider to simulate changes in  the efficiency parameter we simply imposed an
16 7
Table 6.10 shows the results of simulating an increase in the efficiency parameter in all pub­
lic activities by 20 percent To avoid repetition we will only comment on the results of Model 1. 
since the results of Model 2, with the differences already established, are similar. Nonetheless, we 
report in Appendix C the results for Model 2 (see Tables C.7 and C.8).
Looking at Table 6.10, it can be appreciated that while for some commodities the 
effects are very low. for some other commodities such as petroleum, electricity, chemicals, 
services, and transport the reduction in prices are of some significance. Obviously, wit 
exception of chemicals whose price is affected mainly by the reduction in the price of petroleum, 
the determinant element here is the proportion with which the public sector participates in the 
aggregate of the activity. This explains w hy the moat significant reductions in prices occur in 
those activities where the public presence is important.
On the other hand, it is interesting to see the effects on value added of the production activi­
ties. No doubt they are of some significance for sectors such as petroleum, electricity, chemicals 
and. to a lesser degree, capital goods, other manufactures, construction, transport, and mining. In 
all the referred cases the results suggest that value added of the activities is being implicitly taxed 
as a result of inefficiency levels in the public sector.
The picture offered in Table 6.10 la. however, partial. If we want to know the net effects of 
increasing both public prices and efficiency levels, we have to simulate a new policy experiment 
where both effects are brought jointly, since their separate effects are not additive.
The results of this experiments appear in Table 6 .11 where the joint effects of Increasing all 
public prices by their equivalent price coat-margin and increasing the efficiency parameter in all 
public activities are presented. In general, since the dominant effect is given by the increase in 
public prices, the results are very similar to  our previous experiment in which all public prices 
were increased. Therefore, we shall only comment on the additional effects originated by the 
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introduction of changes in efficiency levels.
In comparing Tables 6.11 with Table 6.4 it can be appreciated that the price raising effects 
are mitigated when changes in efficiency levels are considered. Indeed, for some commodities 
such as petroleum, electricity, other services, and even agriculture, prices do rise significantly less 
as a result o f improvements in the economic performance of public activities. Accordingly, the 
effects on value added are also of some significance. In particular, it should be seen that the 
activities which are hit hardest from inefficiency in public activities are the manufacturing sectors 
which, as we remember, are also the activities that benefit more from the system of subsidies.
The interesting feature of our results in Table 6.11 is that they provide a picture o f  the net 
effects that a system of subsidies (pricing below marginal costs) and a system of implicit taxation 
(inefficiency) have on the allocation of resources within the production structure. This appears 
neatly when comparing the effects on value added of the different production activities. It can be 
seen that the manufacturing activities (mainly capital goods, chemicals and other manufactures) 
still seem to be the main beneficiaries.
It is indeed unfortunate that no data exists to suggest the degree of inefficiency -if  any- 
within public activities because, otherwise, it would have been possible to consider real levels of 
inefficiency -just as we did for public price-cost margins- and then to obtain a more realistic pic­
ture of the net effects of both elements. We have then, for the time being, to be content w ith our 
own simulation experiment
6.5.4 The Additional Effects of Tariffs
We will talk in the next chapter about the effects that trade policy exert on the allocation of 
resources. We will do so by estimating effective rates of protection. In this chapter, instead, we 
have focused on the domestic side by analysing public pricing policy and performance. While 
that form of separation is convenient for the purpose of analysis, it is more likely that, in reality, a
175
policy package such as the ones aiming at structural changes would implement the tw o set of pol­
icies together. This has in fact been the case for the Mexican economy where, during the eighties, 
an important programme o f structural adjustment has been taking place, both at the domestic 
level by correcting public prices, as well as in changes in trade policy, in an ultimate attempt to 
liberalise the economy from the distortion accumulated in the past two decades.
In this last part o f the chapter we have tried, therefore, to present a Anal result where the 
three main set of policies are put together, correction of public prices, increase in efficiency lev­
els. and the removal of tariffs. Table 6.12 shows the results of removing tariffs. As can  be appre­
ciated, price and value added effects are very low. with the exception of capital goods, whose 
price goes down by 2.5 percent for the case of low trade elasticities, and to a lesser degree, chem­
icals and other manufactures. The relatively low effects of removing tariffs should not come as a 
surprise in view of the remarks made in Chapter Two. in which it was argued that tariffs have not 
been the main instrument o f trade policy.
Despite the small impact created by the removal of tariffs, we present in Table 6.13 the 
compound effects of increasing all public prices, increasing the efficiency parameter in all public 
activities by 20 percent, and removing tariffs. As suggested, the additional effects brought about 
by the removal of tariffs are not very significant, with the exception of other manufactures, capi­
tal goods, and chemicals for which, although not very sharp, a greater response in term s of price 
effects is observed. This is obviously because these commodities have the highest levels of tar­
iffs.
Thus, while public prices ought to be seen as a system of subsidies to the production activi­
ties, their effects are counterbalanced or mitigated by an alternative system of taxation arising 
from public sector inefficiency and tariffs. As a result of the removal of tariffs, the net effects on 
prices and value added are reduced. In particular, since the highest level of tariffs is concentrated 
on chemicals, capital goods, and other manufactures, these activities are the most affected by the 
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6.6 Summ ary and Conclusions
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis developed in this chapter. The 
most remarkable point is perhaps the large extent to which production activities are being subsi­
dised by the system of artificially low public prices. Indeed, our policy experiments suggest a 
very distorted price scenario where the elimination of the price-cost margin of public firms leads 
to huge increases in commodity prices. It follows that a correction of public prices as 
endeavoured in the structural adjustment programmes will have strong implications for both 
micro and macroeconomic resource allocation which ought to be carefully addressed.
We focused on the effects that such measures would have on the value added o f production 
activities. The results provide an interesting picture of how subsidies through low public prices 
are actually distributed within the production structure. In particular, it was suggested that such a 
system of subsidies benefits mainly the manufacturing industry, and more specifically, those 
industries producing intermediates and capital goods which, paradoxically, are not those indus­
tries where the comparative advantage is higher.
An interesting finding is that the bulk of the distortions are explained by the two energy sec­
tors alone (petroleum and electricity), whereas the remaining public price increases affect mostly 
the price of the commodity produced by the activity itself and hence there are not m any distor­
tions transmitted throughout the interindustry linkages. For policy implementation purposes this
extent, two single monopolies are causing most of the distortions in relative prices. That is not to 
say that other public Aims necessarily price at marginal costs but. in this case, it is relatively clear 
who benefits from such policy of low prices. In terms of the privatisation programme that has 
been taking place in Mexico in recent yean , this result suggests that it should not be difficult to
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assess who will benefit and who will lose.
Another important conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that inefficiency within the 
public sector and the structure of tariffs represent forces that affect the system of im plicit subsi­
dies provided by PEs, in the opposite direction. While a measure of the degree of inefficiency of 
PEs in Mexico is not available, empirical evidence suggests the presence of poor economic per­
formance of several PEs. This surely acts in the opposite direction, thus performing as a  system 
of implicit taxation. Ultimately, o f course, the net effects of all these forces should also incor­
porate the effects of reforms in the indirect tax system. We have not attempted to do so because it 
goes beyond our purposes, but the analysis of tax reform can be perfectly carried out within our 
analytical framework.
Of no less importance are the methodological changes introduced in our analytical frame­
work, particularly when compared with the traditional 1-0 approach. Three points deserve to be 
mentioned. First, to the extent that substitutability between domestic production and imports has 
been introduced into our analysis, the results are richer than the traditional analysis carried out in 
the 1-0 framework, in which all inputs, including imports, are assumed to combine in fixed pro­
portions. Whilst no econometric estimations of elasticities of substitution are available, it is 
always possible to estimate different results under alternative scenarios. Second, it has been sug­
gested and shown for the case of Mexico that price effects may be overestimated whenever a 
commodity is regulated, because in that case activity cost changes would not be transmitted to the 
commodity price, hence stopping the process that feeds the interindustry structure. Indeed, the 
extent of the overestimation may be substantial when such a commodity is an intermediate of 
very generalised use as an input in other production activities. And third, to the extent that we 
have used a SAM approach for putting our database together, the analysis facilitates a great deal 
since it enable us to consider several forces acting together, such as public pricing policy, 
efficiency issues and commodity taxation. Specifically, our model benefits from the 
public/private distinction introduced in our data framework, which permit us to model more accu­
rately the behaviour o f the public sector.
1 8 * .
Last but not least, and at the risk of being repetitive, to the extent that we valued commo­
dity balances at market prices, the results of our model are richer. This is because we are over­
coming one of the limitations of 1-0 models, namely, that price effects are underestimated since 
such models take producer prices as a basis for valuation, even though market prices are the 
relevant ones when it comes to the modeling of economic behaviour.
We have tried to outline the menu of possibilities to be explored by carrying out some 
representative policy experiments. A far more detailed analysis can be developed at a more 
detailed sectoral level which, no doubt, would produce a richer picture of the m ain forces that 
affect the relative price structure.
It ought to be also stressed that the extent to which the 1-0 approach may generate biased 
results should not be discarded lightly, especially because their results are widely used for policy 
purposes. We have seen, for instance, that the failure to recognise both substitutability and regu­
lated prices may lead to very different results in terms of value added effects. For the same rea­
son. if one used the results of price effects on the consumption tide, one may also reach different 
conclusions.
Obviously, our analysis has in itself several limitations that arise both from data limitations 
as well as from the Ox-price nature of the model. We shall comment on these limitations in the 
conclusions of the thesis. Here it will suffice to point out that, to the extent that w e introduce a 
more plausible set of assumptions when modeling the price system, a more reliable baais for pol­





In the previous chapter we focused our attention on the effects that public sector pricing 
policy and performance have on relative prices and the consequent reallocation o f  resources. It 
was suggested that, to a great extent, the distortions in prices from public sector intervention 
came from the energy sectors, namely petroleum and electricity. As pointed out in chapter two. 
however, commercial policy has similarly played a very important role in the conformation of the 
relative price structure and hence in the allocation of resources in the Mexican economy.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to investigate the effects that commercial policy has 
had on the allocation of resources. In doing so. the role of the private sector o f the economy will 
also be incorporated into the analysis since, as will be seen, the main objective o f commercial 
policy has been to protect and encourage the growth of the industrial sector, which has been pri­
marily operated by private agents The discussion on commercial policy will be based on the esti­
mation and analysis of effective rates of protection (ERP), as an indicator of the pull o f resources.
The presentation will be developed in two pans. Fuat, by making use of the same version of 
the model as in the previous chapter, we will look at the effects that removing the protection 
structure has on relative prices. It will be explained in a second pan. however, that in order to 
obtain an insight as to how resources are reallocated we need to estimate the asaociated changes 
in value added or net output prices, if something is to be said about the way in which the system 
of protection influences the allocation of resources within the production structure of the econ­
omy. Accordingly, the second pan is devoted to the estimation and analysis of ERP derived from 
our model.
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It will be seen that our approach generalises the analysis of ERP in the sense that the tradi­
tional estimates build on a particular version of our model, viz the case in which market shares 
between domestic production and imports are constant, and inputs combine in Axed proportions. 
The formulation of ERP to be proposed here generalises the traditional one by moving away from 
the extreme assumption that imported and domestic goods are perfect substitutes and must there­
fore necessarily have the same price. It will be also seen that our SAM approach enables us to 
estimate ERP not only taking into account protection accorded through commercial policy, i.t. 
tariff and non tariff restrictions, but also the effects of domestic indirect taxes.
For presentation purposes the discussion is organised as follows. Section 7.2 explains how 
our SAM was modified in order to take into account the presence of non tariff instruments Sec­
tion 7.3 comments on the effects on relative prices arising from a removal of the protection struc­
ture. In Section 7.4 the concept of ERP is briefly reviewed and then we explain how the concept 
is derived from our model. Section 7.S presents the estimations of ERP both when only tariffs and 
export subsidies are removed and when, in addition, the effects of removing indirect taxes are 
incorporated. We will also present in this section the estimation of the bias against expons 
created by the prevailing protection structure. Finally, Section 7.6 summarises the main findings 
of the chapter and offers some concluding remarks.
7 J  Non Tariff Restrictions
In the final pan of the previous chapter the effects of removing tariffs on relative prices were 
analysed. It was argued there that, just as an additional form of indirect taxation, tariffs represent 
also a source of distortions in the price structure. We saw, however, that the actual distorting 
effects resulting from the removal of tariffs in the Mexican economy were on a very small scale.
Such a result should not come as a surprise in the light o f our previous remarks in Chapter 
Two regarding the importance of non tariff instruments as a means of protection in the Mexican 
economy. We saw there that comnu.clal policy has heavily relied on import permits, rather than
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tariffs, hence making the latter instrument superfluous to a great extent, insofar as the effects on 
protection are concerned. It seems inevitable then that a realistic analysis of commercial policy 
in Mexico calls for non-tariff instruments to be incorporated, since tariffs alone are a poor indica­
tor of the real levels of protection. Therefore, before entering into the discussion of commercial 
policy, it will be convenient to give a brief explanation of the modifications carried out in our 
SAM in order to incorporate the effects on the price system brought about by the existence of 
quantity controls on imports.
As we recall from Chapter Four, our SAM shows tariff collections as a proportion of 
imports, for each traded commodity identified in our accounting framework. Therefore, to include 
the presence of non-tariff instruments in our data framework we raised the original levels o f  tariff 
collections in order to make them equivalent to the effects on import prices created by both tariffs 
and quantity controls. This task was greatly simplified by the availability of estimates of "nomi­
nal implicit protection rates", which were obtained by actually comparing domestic and foreign 
prices1 for a large group of commodities and then grouped according to the 1-0 table 
classification, for several years, among which is 1980, our year of analysis (see Comercio Exte­
rior [1987]). Thus, these rates of nominal implicit protection indicate the differential in prices 
between domestically produced and foreign commodities.2
Our only task was therefore to regroup these levels of protection according to the level of 
aggregation of our own classification once, of course, they were previously weighted by their 
share in production, and then the original levels of tariff collections in our SAM were raised so as 
to make them equivalent to the levels of nominal implicit protection. For our SAM to remain bal-
' h  w u  mostly a comparison between domestic and USA prices, since the bulk of Mexico's foreign trade 
is made with this country
1 Formally. If p, is the internal price in pesos of commodity I. pi is Ihe external price in dollars of a simi­
lar commodity abroad, and r is the exchange rate, then the nominal impUcit protect™  NIP. Is
NIP -  A ~ / f r
where the asternal price, pi is adjusted by transport costs so that domestic consumers compare prices at home, and p, 
does not include domestic indirect taxes (see Kete and Mateo 11919). p  313).
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anted, however, it was necessary to carry out two changes. First we had to raise the levels of tax 
collections since the revenues of the government are now higher. And secondly, since the value 
of composite (traded) commodities was raised, it was also necessary to raise, by the same propor­
tion, the value of Anal demand for these commodities. Notice that this amounts to assuming that 
the final consumption of these commodities is being subsidised.
Table 7.1 presents in column one these nominal levels of protection, which are those we 
will be using in our calculations. Column two shows the levels of nominal tarifT protection, as 
given in our data framework. As can be appreciated, the comparison of the two columns shows 
how important non tariff instruments are as a means of protection in Mexico.
Table 7.1
— L Ë ( ! ! I U r * t
Agriculture 12.0 1.4
Mining -22.0 1.6
Petroleum A  petrochemicals -67.0 4.8
Food processing 10.0 11J
Textiles 9.0 14.6
Chemicals 22.0 9.2
Capital goods 27.0 1.8
O ita, m tauftatum _______ « 0 h i
Note that for two commodities, mining, and petroleum and petrochemicals, the nominal 
protection levels are negative, reflecting the fact that those commodities, particularly petroleum 
and petrochemicals, face a regulated domestic price, far below the corresponding world price. It 
is Indeed most fortunate that these estimations of nominal levels of protection are available 
because in using them we are not only considering protection provided by tariffs, but also by 
quantitative restrictions. Moreover, this measure of nominal protection actually takes into
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account all forms of domestic protection, including subsidies.
The theoretical justification for undertaking the referred change to our accounting frame­
work is to be found in the Marshallian equivalence proposition, which asserts that tariffs and quo­
tas are basically equivalent in their real effects. That is, if  a quota were to be replaced by a tariff 
the "real effects" on the economy would be the same and the government would now pick up the 
import premium as a tariff revenue (see Bhagwati [1978]). For our purposes, therefore, import 
quotas can be thought of as an implicit form of indirect taxation. It has to be said, however, that 
this analysis is valid only provided that competition prevails before and after the imposition of 
the quota. In fact, it assumes that import licences are transferable between Arms and that there is a 
market in licences. Beyond this point, the analogy can no longer be sustained. If. for instance, the 
imposition of quotas leads to the formation of a monopolistic market structure in the way licences 
are assigned, then it is likely that imports will fall below the quota level imposed and hence 
profits would rise above what they would have been if only tariffs existed (see Dervis et. al.
11982]).'3 T o take these elements into account it would have been required to explicitly recognise 
rent seeking behaviour in our model, which goes far beyond the scope of this thesis. For the 
present purposes in which we restrict our analysis to the price system, however, the analogy 
between quantity controls on imports and tariffs is not a very restrictive assumption. We shall 
therefore retain this assumption throughout this chapter.
7 J  Removal of Protection Levels
We arc now in a better position to assess with more accuracy the effects of removing protection. 
Thus, using the same version of the model as presented in the previous chapter (model 1). in 
which all sectors follow the cost-plus pricing rule, our starting point will be the evaluation of 
price effects resulting from the removal of nominal levels of implicit protection
* To see the I equivalence proposition holds see Bhagwad 11 * 7 i|.
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Following the same order as in the past chapter, two sets of results are presented. The first 
set, in Table 7.2. shows the price effects brought about by removing protection levels for all 
traded commodities, with the exception of mining and petroleum A  petrochemicals. The second 
set of results, presented in Table 7.3. shows price effects when protection levels arc removed for 
all traded commodities, which, in the case of mining and petroleum A  petrochemicals, means that 
their prices went up (subsidies were removed) by the proportion given by the price differential, as 
given by our nominal implicit rates of protection. Let us begin with Table 7.2.
T abk  7 J
Price Effects of Removing Protection Levels 
(Subsidies to Petroleum and Mining Not Removed)
Commodity All Imports Low Trade High Trade
Agriculture •1.3 •1.4 •1.6
Mining -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Petroleum & petrochemicals -1.0 -1.0 -1.1
Food processing •1.2 -1.2 •1.4
Textiles -1.4 -1.4 •1.6
Chemicals -3.3 -3.6 -3.8
Capital goods -7.1 •7.3 -7.6
Other manufactures •2.1 •2.3 -2.7
Construction -2.2 -2.3 -2.4
Electricity •0.6 ■0.6 -0.6
Trade and transport* -0.6 -0.6 -0.7
Olher Krvice. -03 -0.4 -0.4
• It only refers to transport for passengers.
See Table 6.1 for the values of trade elasticities.
As can be seen, compared to the experiment carried out in the previous chapter in which 
only tariff collections were removed, price effects are more pronounced in this new scenario. If 
we focus on the set of low trade elasticities for the purpose of making some comments, it can be 
appreciated that the commodity prices most affected are those of capital goods and chemicals, 
whose prices fall by 7.3 and 3.6 percent respectively These are followed, in order of magnitude, 
by other manufactures (-2.3 %). construction (-2.3 %). textiles (-1.4 %). and agriculture (-1.4 %).
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With the exception o f construction whose price is affected by the reduction in the price of 
capital goods, the most affected commodity prices are naturally those of traded commodities and. 
within this group, it is clear that the most affected prices correspond to intermediates and capital 
goods, whereas consumer goods, such as textiles and food processing, show very little variation. 
Although this result is expected because of the structure of nominal implicit protection levels, it 
is important to note that it contrasts sharply with the recommendations of the theory o f domestic 
distortions in the sense that tariffs (and for that matter, quandtadve restrictions on imports) 
should not be placed on intermediates, if distorting effects are to be minimised. As far as the 
responsiveness of price effects to trade elasticity values is concerned, the results show very little 
degree o f variation. In part, this is explained by the fact that the most protected commodities, 
such as capital goods, have also the lowest degrees of trade substitutability. Additionally, it seems 
that tariffs (explicit and implicit) do not represent a very important share in production activity 
costs, and hence, in some cases, there is little variation in relative prices.
Turning to our second experiment, where subsidies to petroleum and mining were also 




Price Effects of Removing Protection Levels 
(Subsidies to Petroleum and Mining Removed)






Agriculture 0.8 0.5 -0.3
Mining 27.2 26 1 23.3
Petroleum A petrochemicals 9 50 864 65 2
Food processing 0.9 0.6 -0.1
Texules 2.3 1.8 0.7
Chemicals 8.7 7.2 4.1
Capital goods -4.8 -5.2 -6.0
Other manufactures 0 8 0.4 -0.7
Construction 1.5 1.2 0.3
Electricity 30.7 27.9 21.0
Trade and transport* 5.7 5.1 3.7
Other service. 08 0.7 0.4
* It only refers to transport for passengers
Perhaps the most remarkable point is that, with the exception of capital goods, whose price 
falls by 4.8 percent, all the remaining commodity prices go up. This is clearly due to the fact that 
the increase in domestic prices of mining, and petroleum A petrochemicals outweighs the reduc­
tion in activity costs brought about by the abolition of the protection levels. In particular, the 
price of petroleum A petrochemicals increases substantially (86.4 percent for the set of low trade 
elasticities), which generates cost increases in the remaining production activities. It ought to be 
noted that, for the same reason, in this new scenario the prices of non traded commodities such as 
electricity and transport (energy intensive) are severely affected.
Finally, as in the previous chapter, when the price of petroleum A petrochemicals changes 
substantially the sensitivity of price effects to trade elasticity values becomes relevant It can be 
appreciated, for instance, that price raising effects are considerably lower in the case of high trade 
elasticities than in the scenario in which imports and domestic production combine in Axed pro­
portions.
The results presented thus far are interesting since they suggest how cost and hence prices 
are likely to react if the protection structure were abolished. Yet, nothing has been said about the
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way in which the structure of protection influences the allocation of resources in the economy.
Given the fix-price nature of our model, we are not in a position to get an insight into this 
matter since, by assumption, we are ruling out changes in net output or value added prices. We 
therefore need a measure to determine the extent to which profitability in the domestic production 
activities is affected by the prevailing structure of protection. One such measure is the effective 
rate of protection (ERP) which, essentially, is an indicator of the way in which value added of 
production activities is influenced by the protection structure. In terms o f  our model, if we want 
to estimate ERP we will have to formulate a different question. That ia. instead of asking what 
prices would be if  protection were abolished, we now have to ask how net output prices would 
change as a result o f the abolition of protection. The traditional answer to this question assumes 
that domestically produced traded goods are perfect substitutes for international goods, which is a 
special case of our more general model.
In what follows, we will briefly review the concept of ERP and its underlying assumptions, 
and then we shall move on to explain how the concept can be reconciled with our model.
7.4 The Concept o i E R P and its Derivation 
7.4.1 The Concept of ERP
The ERP measures the extent to which domestic sectors producing traded commodities benefit 
from a particular protection structure, expressed in terms of tariffs. It focuses on how value added 
in domestic production activities is affected by a prevailing tariff structure by trying to measure 
what value added would be if tariffs were abolished.
The concept of ERP derives from the fact that a tariff on imports o f a particular commodity 
represents a subsidy to a domestic activity because it allows domestic producers to charge more
the net effect tells us whether or not an activity has benefited from a particular tariff structure; a 
positive ERP should accordingly indicate that the tariff system allows value added to be greater 
than it would be in a free trade situation, whereas a negative ERP would suggest that a system of 
protection penalises the activity by reducing its value added. Likewise, a ranking of ERP would 
be an indicator of which activities would be hardest hit if  a movement occurred towards free 
trade. Thus, as opposed to nominal tariffs which only focus on output prices and government 
revenue, effective rates have a direct bearing on the allocation o f resources.
In a more formal way. assume for the moment that only traded goods exist in our economy 
(we shall later relax this assumption). Assume also constant returns to scale and that import prices 
are not influenced by the amount of imports the economy demands. If raw materials combine in 
fixed proportions, which, in mm also combine in fixed proportions with value added, then we can 
express world value added or net output price. V/. as
where P, and P, refer to the prices of commodities J  and i . respectively.
Now. if tm is the percentage excess of domestic over world prices, then domestic net output 
pries. V/, Is
(7.1)
V ^ - P / d + r f i - ^ P ,  ( I *  «ft (7.2)
Thus, the ERP for activity j ,  t , is defined as
*<■ (7.3)
and. from (7.1). (7.2). and (7.3)
(7.4)
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That is. the ERP is defined as the rate at which value added obtainable at free trade prices 
diverges from the existing value added under protection, for activities producing traded commo­
dities.
Expression (7.4) constitutes the traditional definition of ERP. For calculation purposes, 
however, the denominator of (7.4) is not easily observable and has therefore to be estimated 
indirectly, usually with the help of an 1-0 table. The standard procedure is to assume that domes­
tic prices are equal to foreign prices plus the tariff component (and equivalent effect o f quantita­
tive restrictions sometimes), and hence world values are estimated by deflating domestic values 
by the relevant price ratios. In this event. (7.4) can be re-expressed as
H > , - t y k jF D ,
1 (7.3)
where r "  indicates the corresponding tariff rate, a,, is the 1-0  coefficient indicating the amount of 
commodity i spent on one unit of commodity j .  and the observed domestic prices in the 1-0 
table. P 0 . are assumed to be
pd , - p ,o + i h  (7.6)
where P, now represents landed prices of imports
Expression (7.3) has been widely used to calculate ERP when the commodity j  is an 
importable. If such a commodity is an exportable the conventional analysis of ERP assumes that 
a tariff on commodity j  must be accompanied by a equivalent subsidy on the export side so as to 
ensure that domestic producers do not shift towards domestic markets when the tariff is imposed. 
Therefore, a movement towards free trade in this context assumes the abolition of both tariffs on 
importables as well as subsidies to exportables and, vice-versa. If the imports of J are being subsi­
dised. the corresponding exports have to be taxed so as to maintain parity of prices between 
domestic and export markets (see Corden (1971)). It follows that equation (7.3) can now be
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extended to exportables, also, provided i, is interpreted as a subsidy (or tax) on exports of com­
modity j .
An important point to notice is that, for this analysis to be valid, it is necessary to adopt the 
small country assumption on the export side. This is because a removal of tariffs would have the 
effect o f increasing domestic demand since domestic prices are now lower, and hence the supply 
devoted to exports would have fallen. It is therefore necessary to ensure that changes in the 
volume of exports would not affect the world price of the commodity in question, if we still want 
to remain within the fix-price approach. Accordingly, exports will be assumed to face an infinite 
elasticity of demand i.e. international prices are exogenous.
Finally, there is a third group of commodities for which a price behaviour assumption is 
necessary, namely, non traded goods. It is clear that equation (7.6) is no longer useful, for these 
commodities are not subject to tariffs since, by definition, they are not traded in international 
markets Nevertheless, their prices are also expected to vary when the protection system is 
removed. In this respect there exist several assumptions in the literature of ERP as to how their 
prices would react For exposition purposes, however, we prefer to postpone the explanation of 
these assumptions to the next sub-section, in which we derive the concept of ERP from our own 
model.
Meanwhile, to conclude this part of the exposition it is perhaps useful, in order to clarify 
fully the concept of ERP. to make explicit mention of its underlying assumptions, some of which 
have already been noted.
F irst as suggested by equation (7.6). it is assumed that tariffs represent the difference 
between domestic and foreign prices. That is. domestic producers are allowed to charge a higher 
price than the commodity world price in a proportion equivalent to the tariff component. This 
assumption permits us to interpret ERP as the increase in value added associated with the tariff. 
Notice that for this assumption to be valid it is necessary to rely on the assumption that imported
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and domestic traded goods are prefect substitutes.
Secondly, production functions are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale so that value 
added per unit of output is invariant to the scale of production.
Thirdly, it is necessary to assume that production and trade take place both before and after 
tariffs are removed. The purpose of this assumption is to guarantee that the calculated rates meas­
ure the increase in value added due to the tariff. Imagine for a moment that, in the absence of tar­
iffs. a particular commodity is not produced at home due. for instance, to excessive costs. Now, If 
tariffs are imposed the production of this commodity may eventually become profitable but, 
surely, part o f the increase in value added would only play the role of making the industry com­
petitive. Beyond this point, the increase in value added is the one associated with the tariff. It fol­
lows that if this assumption is not sustained for an industry, then the estimated ERP would be an 
overestimation of the real increase in value added associated with the tariff.
The fourth assumption concerns the elasticities of foreign demand for exports, supply of 
Imports, and supply of non traded commodities, all o f which are assumed to be infinite so that 
any source of change in prices, other than tariffs, are eliminated.
The Anal assumption is that production coefficients are Axed, which means that substitution 
between inputs is ruled ou t4 Here it should be noted that, as opposed to our Aral assumption, 
when commodities are revalued imports are assumed to be perfect complements to domestic pro­
duction. This is because, by assumption, those potential imports which are perfect substitutes for 
domestic goods never enter the domestic market.
4 For ■ discussion of 't e s t  ttsum poons tm Markussn sod M .lvin | I9gg| Also, th a n  has baas s tong and 
protracted debate on the problems associated with the estimations o f  BJU* Some classical rsfsraoosi sis 
Finger |IM » |. Anderson and Nays (1969). Cardan (19711. Jones 11971). and Ombel and Johnson (19971. 
among others.
198
7.4.2 ERP In The Model
In order to derive the concept of ERP from our model it will be convenient, for expository 
purposes, to present t  simplified version of our model so as to focus on the essential elements In 
particular, the public/private dichotomy of our accounting framework and the presence of mar­
gins and domestic indirect taxes will be ignored. Nevertheless, it will be seen later that the intro­
duction of these elements poses no major problems. Instead of the public private dichotomy, we 
shall make explicit the distinction between traded and non traded commodities, since it becomes 
an important characteristic when deriving the concept of ERP.
Such a simplified version of our model can be set out in the following manner. Let. for 
traded commodities J,
PDj ■ price o f composite (domestic-imported) commodity j  sold on the domestic market 
Vt m net output price of activity j
P M j -  import prices after tax (inclusive of tariffs) of commodity J  
Cj ■ gross output price of activity j
The domestic price of commodity j  can be expressed as a function o f the price of imports as well 
as gross output price.
ro,-tint,*,) (7.7)
Let also for non traded goods, *
r .  ■ price of non traded commodity a 
V. •  net output price of activity a 
c , ■ gross output price of activity a
where ra is proportional to P.
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Then, our price system can be expressed as
C) mVj + h,(Pi) 
e„ -V .  ♦A.C fl)
(7.8.a)
(7.8.b)
where P, ■ (FD, / , )
Now. in order to derive the ERP it is necessary to define how PD, and F, react when the 
protection structure is abolished. Some assumptions are therefore required.
The first assumption will be that market shares between domestic production and imports 
remain unchanged so that PD, and c, must change proportional to PM,. Hence, when import 
prices change as a result o f the removal of the protection structure, domestic prices will fall by 
the same proportion as import prices, so as to maintain fixed market shares.
Second, in order to avoid producers shifting output towards export markets (or vice versa) 
when a commodity is exportable, we shall assume that an export subsidy (or tax if domestic 
prices went up) is removed, then the selling price on the domestic market is reduced proportion­
ally so that there is no change in the share of output which is exported. Thus, the argument is 
parallel to that above for imports
Thirdly, it is also necessary to define how prices of non traded goods react as a result o f the 
removal of protection levels. Here we can adopt any of the existing methods in the literature of 
ERP. They are. briefly, the following
a) Balassa's original method, which assumes that value added in activities producing non 
traded commodities changes in such a way that the prices of non tradables remain 
unchanged, in terms of our system of price equations it means that r ,  (and hence P„) does 
not change, since V, accommodates
b) Balassa's modified method. It assumes that V, are Axed so that cost increases are fully
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forward transferred to commodity prices, Pm (see Balassu (1971]).
c) Corden method. The argument here is that the effects on non traded inputs (of removing 
tariffs) are basically the same as the effects on value added so that there is a good reason for 
treating them in the same way (see Corden [1971]). In terms o f our price equation system 
this means that we ought to amend our original data base so that it includes non traded 
inputs in Vj.
d) Scott method, which assumes that nominal protection of non traded goods is equivalent 
to the mean nominal protection of traded commodities.
With these three assumptions an ERP can be calculated in a very straightforward way. 
Essentially, three steps are necessary. First it is necessary to simulate a removal of tariffs, keeping 
market shares between domestic production and imports constant so that the decline in the 
domestic prices of traded commodities is proportional to the fall in import prices. Second, it is 
necessary to adopt one of the existing methods for the treatment of non traded goods. Our choice 
will be the Balassa's modified method which, as we saw. assumes that net output prices of activi­
ties producing non traded goods are fixed so that cost increases (arising from the change in the 
prices of tradables) are fully passed on to the corresponding commodity prices. The justification 
for our adoption of this method will be given in the next sub-section. Here it should be noted that, 
given this choice, and given that in our accounting framework activities buy from commodity 
markets at market prices and not producer prices, it was necessary for us to calculate the resulting 
market prices of traded commodities. These are determined not only by the reduction in domestic 
prices brought about by the removal of tariffs, but also by the subsequent changes in the prices of 
trade and transport. The third step consisted simply of (evaluating figures in our SAM. Domestic 
gross output of production activities are to be revalued by the proportions in which import prices 
decreased. Note that we have to revalue both domestic supply and exports since we are also 
assuming that export subsidies (and taxes) were removed. Raw materials, on the other hand, will 
be revalued by multiplying our solution vector of prices by the absorption matrix of the SAM.
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regardless of whether they end up either as domestic or exported commodities. Finally, "free 
trade" value added is obtained as a residual between new gross output and new raw material
costs.
Notice that in our model the notion of ERP has been generalised since we have moved away 
from the assumption that domestic and international goods are perfect substitutes which, as we 
saw, is the assumption underlying the estimates of ERP in the 1 -0  framework. Indeed, in our 
model, given our Armington specification, these two alternative sources of supply can be allowed 
to combine with whatever degree of substitutability we postulate, provided we keep our assump­
tion that market shares are fixed so as to ensure that relative prices remain unchanged. It has 
therefore been necessary for us to generalise the notion of ERP so  that it remains meaningful as a 
concept when we move beyond the traditional model where input substitutability is ruled out to 
the more general case where substitutability is allowed for.
To conclude this section, it should be noted that our model enables us to estimate ERP 
incorporating substitutability in the use of raw materials, other than domestic production and 
imports (i.e. in our absorption matrix). To see this let us express the change in value added asso­
ciated with the removal of tariffs, for activities producing traded goods, as
since, in this case, A,(P,) is linear and therefore changes in input prices are additive. More gen­
erally. however, It can be assumed that raw materials combine in a  constant elasticity of substitu­
tion (CES) form, hence allowing for the possibility of substitutability in the use of raw materials.
< & j (7.9)
Now, if we assume that inputs combine in fixed proportions, then (7.9) reduces to
dV, -  d r, - £ * d P , (7.10)
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(7.11)
where o  defines the elasticity of substitution. Then, the change in value added takes the following 
form
dv, dr, (7.11)
where dcj, dP, , and P, are the same as before but. because o f the possibility of substitutability, the 
change in the composite price of aggregated raw materials is now smaller and therefore the 
change in net output price dVj, is greater than in the fixed coefficients case. Obviously, when no 
input substitutability is present ( o ■0), (7.12) collapses into (7.10) which, as we have seen, 
correspond to the traditional estimations of ERP.
7 .4 J  Implementation
The simplification of our model as described above was useful because it enabled us to explain in 
a very simple framework how ERP are to be derived. In carrying out our actual calculations of 
ERP, however, we made use of our more complex model as specified in the last chapter. There­
fore. before moving on to the analysis of results, it is convenient to make some comments regard­
ing the details of the implementation, which arise from the use o f our more complex specification 
o f the price system. Several points should be made.
The first point is concerned with the identification o f traded and non traded commodities, 
and their corresponding activities. As we remember from our data framework in Chapter Four, 
our SAM identifies twelve commodities. We therefore identified four non traded commodities, 
namely electricity, construction, trade and transport, and other services. The remaining commo­
dities in the system were therefore classified as traded.
The corresponding classification of activities was therefore made on the basis of the com-
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modity classification. Accordingly, sixteen activities producing traded goods were identified; two 
sources of supply, public and private, for each traded produced commodity, and hence the 
remaining ten activities were classified as producing non traded commodities (see Chapter Four). 
(See also Appendix A for the details referring to the aggregation levels).
The second point refers to the method followed for the treatment of prices of non traded 
commodities. As suggested before, we have chosen the modified Balassa's method whereby net 
output prices of activities producing non traded commodities are fixed so that cost changes in 
these activities are forward transferred to commodity prices. Such a choice was made on the 
grounds that the method may be more appropriate for a developing economy to the extent that it 
assumes unemployment of factors of production in the sectors o f the economy producing non 
traded goods. Yet, it has to be recognised that there is no theoretical justification for not making 
the same assumption for activities producing traded goods (see Balassa [1971]). Nonetheless, as 
mentioned before, any of the alternative methods could have been used. Moreover, it has been 
shown that, for ERP calculated for the Mexican economy for the years 1960 and 1970, the differ­
ences between the Balassa's modified method and the Corden method were not very significant 
(see Kate and Wallace (1980]).
The last point to mention is related to the way in which values in our SAM were deflated in 
the presence of trade and transport margins, domestic indirect taxes, and the public/private dicho­
tomy. Here, as already noted, it was necessary to distinguish between producer and market prices. 
Thus, gross output of production activities, both public and private, were revalued using our 
implicit nominal rates of protection. Raw materials, on the other hand were revaluated by the 
appropriate vector of market prices which incorporates not only changes in the prices of non 
traded commodities including trade and transport but also domestic indirect taxes.3 Notice here 
that our framework enables us to flilly incorporate the effects of trade and transport margins on 
the calculations of ERP. Indeed, in the traditional esti-nates. because commodity transactions are
5 li will be wen later that our frame wort enablet ui to estimate ERP removing. to addition to trade resertc- 
ttons, domestic indirect taxes (tee Sub-Section 7.3.2).
2 0 *.
valued at producer prices or basic prices, a potential source 
of bias arises when there are differences in transport costs between domestic and imported goods 
(see Balassa (1971]).
7.5 Analysis of Results
7.5.1 Removing Tariffs and Export Subsidies
The results of our first set o f calculations are presented in Table 7.4. which shows ERP and the 
associated vector of market price effects. We present ERP for both, public and private activities, 
as well as for the aggregate. Two set of results are in fact shown in Table 7.4. The first set in the 
first two columns shows ERP and price effects for the case in which subsidies to imports of min­
ing and petroleum A  petrochemicals were removed. It should be noted that in this first scenario 
tariffs and expon subsidies were removed for all traded commodities, except for mining and 
petroleum A  petrochemicals for which we removed subsidies to imports and taxes on exports. 
The second set o f results in columns three and four shows ERP and price effects for the case in 
which subsidies to the two referred commodities were not removed but instead, only removed the 
original levels of tariff collections as shown in our non-modified SAM were removed.
While the first experiment is more complete in that it incorporates the effects o f subsidising 
mining and petroleum, the second set of results is also interesting since it enable us to determine 
the extent to which our estimates of ERP are Influenced by these subsidies, especially to 
petroleum. Let us start with the first set o f results in columns one and two of Table 7.4.
As can be appreciated form the first column, there is a wide variation in the values of ERP. 
Beginning with the most unprotected sectors, and focusing on the ERP for the aggregate of the 
activities, it can be seen that two activities, petroleum A  petrochemicals and mining, show nega­
tive values of -0.4491 and -0.2120 respectively, suggesting that if the economy moved towards 
free trade these two activities would see their value added increased by the referred proportions.
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Tabi* 7.4
Effective Rates of Protection
___________ K em ovIm T .
Activity
riffs on Imports
Subsidies to Pe 










Pubilc agriculture 0.2087 0.1526 -
Private agriculture 0 1599 - 0.1418 -
Agriculture 0.1604 -9.6 0.1419 -9.9
Public mining -0.2180 . -0.0029 .
Private mining •0.2114 - 0.0004 -
Mining -0.2120 21.4 0.00008 -1.6
Public petrol. & petroch. -0.4496 . -0.0453 .
Private petrol. & petroch. -0.4271 - 00462 •
Petroleum & petrochemicals -0.4491 65.4 0.0453 -4.4
Public food processing 0.2768 . 0.2272 .
Private food processing 0.2194 - 0.1913 -
Food processing 0.2229 -8.6 0.1935 -9.0
Public textiles 0.2838 . 0.2272 .
Private textiles 0.2231 . 0 2036 -
Textiles 0.2243 -12.4 0.2042 -12.8
Public chemicals . . 1.8194 .
Private chemicals 1.6277 . 0.5612 -
Chemicals 1.8831 -16.0 0.5906 •16.4
Public capital goods 1.8131 . 1.2683 .
Private capital goods 0.9650 - 0 7888 -
Capital goods 1.0530 -17.8 0.8442 -18.2
Public other manufactures 1.6355 . 1.1883 .
Private other manufactures 0.7293 • 0.6293 -
Other manufactures 0.7348 16.3 0.6332 •16.9
Electricity • 20.3 • -2.4
Construction • «S.7 -7.7
Trade and Transpon • 2.3 •2.1
Other Services . -0.» •L2-.
• Refers to the market price of the corresponding commodity
2 0 6
One ought to be cautious, however, when interpreting these results. Indeed, while these two sec­
tors may show a negative ERP, it should be noted that this result has perhaps more to do with the 
fact that these two commodities face a controlled price by the government than with actually low 
prices generated by the efficiency of the sectors. This is particularly true for the case of 
petroleum, whose price, as we saw in Chapter Two. has been kept fixed for long periods, in an 
attempt to provide cheap energy for the remaining production activities of the economy.
Agriculture is next in order, with an ERP of 0.1604. Given the fact that Mexico is an impor­
tant producer of primary goods, the fact that this activity is less protected in the ranking is not a 
surprising result Yet. at the same time this is an unexpected result since one would tend to think 
tha t given the comparative advantage of the country, the level o f protection ought to be lower, if 
not negative. It should be mentioned, however, that whilst this activity was characterised by 
negative levels of protection throughout the sixties and mid-seventies, from the end of the seven­
ties and onwards, it started to enjoy some positive levels of protection, particularly because of the 
so-called "guarantee prices", in order to provide farmers with incentives (see Mateo e t  al. 
[1984]). If we turn now to manufactures, it can be seen that the next two sectors whose levels of 
protection are relatively low are food processing and textiles, with ERP of 0.2229 and 0.2243, 
respectively. This result is expected since these two industries, being among the first to develop 
when the industrialisation process began in the forties, are relatively well developed, and indeed, 
it can be argued that they are no longer important targets for protection.
Finally, the most protected sectors are chemicals (1.8831),6 capital goods (1.0330), and 
other manufactures (0.7348). These values are indeed extremely high and reveal the importance 
that has been attached to the promotion of growing industries producing intermediates and capital 
goods. *
* The value of ERP for public chemicals is not reported because the resulting value added at world prices 
turns out to be negative, which is explained by the fact that the rise in the price o f  petroleum leads to a very 
strong increase in coats which outweighs the increase in the revenue of the activity. C levty. the reason is that 
public chemicals is mainly composed of fertilisers, which is a very petroleum intensive commodity
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Insofar as price effects are concerned, it can be seen from column two that the change in the 
price of petroleum induces a strong change in the price of electricity (20.3 %). This point illus­
trates the necessity of incorporating the changes in the prices o f non traded commodities, which 
in cases such as present one. may have strong secondary effects in the system and should there­
fore not be neglected, as it would have been if we had made use o f the original Balaisa's method, 
for instance.
It is interesting to look now at the ERP calculated when subsidies to mining and petroleum 
A  petrochemicals are not removed, as shown in columns three and four of Table 7.4. Several 
important points deserve comment.
First, the obvious and immediate difference with respect to the previous experiment is that 
in this second scenario the levels of protection accorded to mining and petroleum A  petrochemi­
cals are very small (0.00006 and 0.0433 respectively).
The second and perhaps more interesting result comes from the analysis of the levels of pro­
tection of the remaining production activities. As can be seen, the ranking of ERP is not affected, 
with the exception of the activity chemicals whose ERP falls from 1.8831 to 0.3906. The impor­
tant point, however, is that the protection granted by the provision of cheap energy works in the 
same direction as the protection accorded by commercial policy. That is. agriculture, food pro­
petroleum A  petrochemicals are not removed the main beneficiaries from commercial policy con­
tinue to be the referred sectors.
Another important feature arises from the comparison o f price effects between the two 
scenarios. It can be appreciated that price reductions are stronger in the case when subsidies are 
removed than when they are not. This is obviously due to the fact that the elimination of subsi­
dies to petroleum induces a raise in the price of transport which, in turn, is reflected in higher
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market prices throughout the system. This point serves to illustrate the importance of calculating 
market prices, as opposed to producer prices. Indeed, even though producer prices are affected by 
a similar proportion in our two set o f calculations (with the obvious exception of mining and 
petroleum A  petrochemicals), nevertheless market prices vary between the two scenarios.
Finally, it is important to notice that the weight of the E R P accorded to public activities in 
the value of ERP of the aggregate of each activity is in m ost cases negligible, with the clear 
exception of petroleum A  petrochemicals and, to a lesser degree, capital goods. In other words, 
one can get a very accurate picture of the structure of ERP o f the whole economy simply by look­
ing at the values of ERP of private activities. The clear implication of this point is that commer­
cial policy has been directed towards the private sector of the economy since public production, 
with the exception of petroleum, as we have seen in the past chapter, has concentrated in the pro­
duction of non traded commodities.
In summary of the discussion so far. it can be said that the structure of protection has clearly 
favoured the industrial sector, particularly capital goods and intermediates, and such a structure 
of protection has been reinforced by the provision o f cheap energy, which acts in the same direc­
tion in the sense that capital goods and intermediates are also the main beneficiaries. Once again, 
it should be emphasised that this structure of protection, while understandable from the point of 
view of the protectionist policy followed in the previous decades, contrasts very much with the 
recommendations of the theory of domestic distortions, which suggests that tariffs (and for that 
matter quantitative restrictions) on imports ought to be avoided in order to minimise the spread of 
distorting effects.
Before moving on to the next part an important remark is in order. It has been mentioned in 
the past section that our framework enables us to estimate ERP incorporating substitutability in 
the use of raw materials (in the absorption matrix). For presentation purposes, however, we pre­
ferred to show our numerical estimates of this particular case in Appendix D since the estimates 
of ERP are hardly affected, and therefore the analysis of results remains essentially the same.
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7.5.2 Domestic Indirect Taxes and Production Subsidies
We have presented above estimates of ERP arising from the removal of tariffs and export subsi­
dies. Although this is the standard approach in most calculations, the concept can indeed be 
extended to include the effects of domestic indirect taxes and production subsidies (see Corden 
[1971]). The rationale for extending the concept of E R P in this manner is that, even though 
domestic indirect taxes fall on consumption, not production, and. as such, they do not affect pro­
ducer prices, nevertheless, to the extent that they affect the cost o f inputs to domestic producers, 
they certainly affect the calculated ERP. In other words, the calculations of ERP as carried out 
above guarantee that domestic and imported products carry  the same excise-tax burden at the 
border. However, since domestic indirect taxes raise the costs of inputs to domestic producers 
but not free market producers, it follows that the former are put at a competitive disadvantage 
(see Grube I and Johnson [1967]). Production subsidies on  the Anal good, on the other hand, 
would have the same effect on production as a nominal tariff at the tame rate.
While the issue is not recent in the literature of ERP7 m ost calculations do not in fact incor­
porate this point since it requires more information than the one in 1-0 tables. Our SAM. how­
ever, enables us to calculate ERP in this way. All we need is to compute the new vector of prices 
arising from the removal, not only of tariffs and export subsidies, but also from removing domes­
tic indirect taxes and production subsidies, keeping, of course, our assumption that market share 
between domestic production and imports are constant.
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 7.5. To avoid repetition we only 
present estimations of ERP for the c u e  when subsidies to mining and petroleum A  petrochemi­
cals are removed since, as suggested before, these are "the correct" estimates of ERP.
As expected, the values of ERP are in all cases low er than our previous estimates when 
domestic indirect taxes were not removed. While the structure remains the same in the sense that
7 It goal beck to 1967. Sea Omhtl and Johnaon (1967).
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Table 7.5
Effective Rates o f Protection
Removing Trade Taxes, Domeitic Indirect Taxe« and Production








Private mining -0 2404
Mining -0.2415 15.8
Public petroleum A  petrochemicals -0.5083
Private petroleum & petrochemicals -0.4601
Petroleum A  petrochemicals -0.5074 32.1
Public food processing .
Private food processing 0.1422







Public capital goods 1.2458
Private capital goods 0.7729
Capital goods 0.8276 -19.9
Public other manufactures 1.1026
Private other manufactures 0 5640
Other manufactures 0.5678 •21.5
Electricity - -21.1
Construction - -8.2
Trade and Transpon • -64
Other Services A 9
* Refers to the market price of the corresponding commodity
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the most protected activities continue to be chemicals, capital goods and other manufactures, the 
ranking has nevertheless been afTected because now the activity textiles shows lower ERP than 
agriculture.
Notice that although revenues of producers were unaffected by the removal of domestic 
indirect taxes they were nevertheless modified by the removal of production subsidies. Nonethe­
less. since our SAM identifies production subsidies mainly to public activities (with the exception 
of private agriculture (see Table 4.7 in Chapter Four]), the effects of removing production subsi­
dies were in aggregate almost negligible, not only because the amount of production subsidies are 
not very high but also because the weights of public ERP on the ERP of the aggregate activity are 
very low. Therefore, although ERP of public activities were substantially affected by the removal 
of production subsidies the effects on the aggregate of the activity were in all cases very low.
Turning now to market price effects, it can be seen that the results are as the expected in the 
sense that the reduction in prices from removing domestic distortions are now mote accentuated. 
An interesting finding is that the price of petroleum increases now by 32.1 percent whereas in our 
previous estimates it rose by 63.4 percent Obviously, to some extent this helps to explain our 
remark above in the sense that the most overestimated ERP were those of chemicals, capital 
goods and other manufactures. More importantly, however, it shows that the effects of subsidis­
ing petroleum prices on the calculated ERP are not as high as initially suggested. Nevertheless, 
subsidies channelled through a low price of petroleum are still substantial
All in all. It can be said that the estimates of ERP based exclusively on removing tariffs and 
export subsidies may lead to a substantial degree of overestimation of the "true" ERP obtained by 
the additional removal of indirect taxes and production subsidies. While we do not claim ori­
ginality in carrying out these estimations, we nevertheless benefit very much from the SAM 
approach which permitted us to analyse in a single framework several sources of distortions of 
the price system.
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7.5.3 Bias Against Exporta
It has been argued that a protection ayatem generates distortions in relative pricea which ulti­
mately affect the allocation of resource» in the economy. One particular and common evaluation 
of auch distorting efTecta ia the ao-called biaa against exporta, which triea to measure the incentive 
given by the protection structure to a particular industry to produce for domestic markets instead 
o f exporting. To conclude this chapter, therefore, we present in what follows our estimation o f 
this indicator.
The bias against expons is defined as the percentage difference between value added under 
protection and value added obtainable if output were exported. That is, if V is value added under 
protection, and V* is value added obtainable if output were exported, then the bias against 
exports, X. is
where cj refers to total grots output price if total output of the activity J were exported, net of 
subsidies
The calculation procedure simply consists of estimating the denominator of (7.14) by 
revaluing gross output using our nominal implicit levels of protection and obtaining value added 
as a residual from raw material costs under protection.
The estimations are presented in Table 7.6. As can be seen, the bias against exports is con­
siderable for most of the production activities. In particular, the activities capital goods and other
(7.13)
and. more explicitly, in terms of our price equations
(7.14)
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Table 7.6
loainst Exports__________
Value Added Value Added Bias Against
Activity Under Obtained Exports
(%)
Public agriculture 3.746 2.801 33.73
Private agriculture 367.522 306.817 19.78
Agriculture 371.268 309.618 19.91
Public mining 5.793 7.996 •27.53
Private mining 52.651 71.136 -23.98
Mining 58.444 79.132 -26.14
Public petroleum & petrochemicals 97.902 215.252 -54.31
Private petroleum A  petrochemicals 2.037 3.933 -48.20
Petroleum A  petrochemicals 99.939 219.185 -54.40
Public food processing 11.663 5.640 106.79
Private food processing 169.645 106.926 58.65
Food processing 181.308 112.566 61.06
Public textiles 1.194 606 97.02
Private textiles 58.174 39.529 47.16
Textiles 59.368 40.135 47.92
Public chemicals 3.592 -233 .
Private chemicals 83.225 41.863 98 80
Chemicals 86.817 41,630 108.54
Public capital goods 31,296 2.765 1031.86
Private capital goods 188.956 66.133 183.72
Capital goods 220.252 68.898 219.67
Public other manufactures 3.276 483 378.26
Private other manufactures 349.506 164.572 112.37
Other manufactures ____331282____ ___ 1Í1233___ ____ I I?  2?
211.
manufactures show the highest values. 195.10 and 105.63 percent, respectively. This is obviously 
explained by the high levels of protection that the outputs of these two activities enjoy. T o  a 
lesser degree, the same story applies in the case o f chemicals. Next in order are the activities 
food processing and textiles which, in spite o f being traditional activities with supposedly com ­
petitive capacity in the export markets, their bias against expon are high; 55.42 percent for food 
processing, and 43.30 percent precent in the case of textiles. Agriculture, despite being con­
sidered a traditional exporter shows nevertheless a positive value (1S.24 %). Such a result may to 
some extent be explained by the existence o f "guarantee prices", in order to provide producers 
with incentives to produce for domestic markets. Finally, mining and petroleum A  petrochemi­
cals show a negative value. Such a result should be cautiously interpreted because it is not very 
representative of the incentives given to producers, especially in the case of petroleum which is 
mainly produced by the public sector where, usually, additional elements other than proAtability 
are involved.
All in all. however, it seems that the protection structure has created a very high bias against 
exporu. even for those sectors which are supposed to be competitive in the international markets. 
Naturally, it would have been necessary to explore a more disaggregated picture to assess with 
greater certainly the degree of bias in those specific sectors for which exporu are slgniAcam. 
Nonetheless, the protection system, as a whole, does seem to distort the incentives provided to 
exporters.
7.6 Sum m ary and Conclusions
Several Important considerations emerge from the analysis of ERP developed in this chapter, 
whose implications are relevant both from the point of view of economic policy aa well as from 
the methodological perspective.
Starting with the point o f view of economic policy, several remarks may be made. First and 
most important, it has been seen that the structure of prices created by the protection system has
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led to ■ very distorted scenario. On the one hand, heavy subsidies are granted by keeping energy 
prices down. On the other hand, the imposition of trade barriers has maintained the prices of 
several commodities at a level far higher than the corresponding world prices. The implications 
o f such an structure of protection in terms of the reallocation of resources is very evident when 
one looks at the values of ERP. In particular, it has been seen that the structure of protection 
favours the industrial sector, especially those industries producing intermediates and capital 
goods, even though these industries are not the most efficient from the point of view of their com­
parative advantages.
While this structure of protection can be explained in the light of the inward oriented policy 
followed during the decades of the sixties and seventies, it contrasts very much with the recom­
mendations made by the theory of domestic distortions, particularly regarding the protection of 
intermediates, whose distorting effects are transmitted to the remaining industries through the 
input-output structure. It has been seen, for instance, that the protection structure has allowed 
domestic producers to maintain higher prices than the corresponding world prices, thus reducing 
incentives to produce for export markets.
The issue is important because since the beginning of the eighties a reverse movement has 
been taking place in Mexico in an attempt to remove distortions and open the economy, as a part 
o f a more general programme of structural adjustment Surely the total or partial removal o f the 
protection system does have far reaching implications in terms of iu  presumably large 
macroeconomic effects Undoubtedly, they deserve to be assessed carefully.
A second important point to note is that the nominal levels of tariffs do not reflect accu­
rately the levels of protection accorded to production activities. This is for two main reaaons. On 
the one hand, import permits have played an important role as instruments of protection and. on 
the other hand, nominal tariffs do not reflect the protection granted by the provision o f cheap 
energy On this particular point our findings corroborate what we previously suggested in the 
preceding chapter regarding the fact that the petroleum sector alone plays a very important role in
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determining the protection accorded to the remaining sectors in the economy, both directly and 
indirectly by affecting non traded commodity prices, such as electricity.
More generally, and focusing on the public/private dichotomy of the Mexican economy, it 
can be said that commercial policy has benefited mainly the private sector o f the economy, since 
the participation of the public sector in the production of traded commodities (with some excep­
tions such as petroleum and capital goods) is on a relatively small scale.
Needless to say, our results should be interpreted cautiously because their validity Is only 
local in that the demand side of the economy does not play an active role. In particular, it should 
be remembered that in our calculations of ERP no account has been taken of the overvaluation o f 
the exchange rate in a protected situation and of the adjustment that a movement towards a free 
trade position implies.
Insofar as the methodological considerations are concerned, it has been seen that in deriving
lying assumption of ERP estimated in the I-O framework.
Our model also benefits greatly from our SAM approach, not only because the modeling 
capabilities are enhanced but also because it enables us to bring Into the picture several sources o f 
distortion of the price system together. An example was given by estimating ERP not only 
removing tariffs and export subsidies, as most studies do, but also adding the effects of removing 
domestic Indirect taxes.
Finally, and more related to the data used, our estimations of ERP are quite comprehensive 
in the sense that we are taking the actual differences between domestic and foreign prices as an 
indicator of the nominal levels of protection rather than the nominal tariff level which, in the 
Mexican context, are a poor Indicator of the level of protection. Thus, our calculations do take 




In thi* study we have sought to analyse the effects on relative prices arising from public 
sector pricing policy and performance as well as commercial policy. While our approach retains 
the characteristic that prices are formed independently of the level of productive activity, we 
incorporated some features which have not been dealt with by other studies of the price system. 
Specifically, our methodology goes beyond the traditional analysis of the price system, usually 
based on 1-0 models, in several respects
First, we have introduced the possibility o f substitutability in the use of raw materials at 
various points. Thus, for instance, when modeling public sector pricing policy and performance 
we postulated some limited degree of substitutability between domestic production and imports 
for the so-called traded commodities, hence recognising the fact that, in the absence of trade res­
trictions. producers usually have the possibility of choosing between these two sources of supply 
when formulating their cost minimising decision. Also, it was shown that our model generalises 
the analysis of ERP in that the traditional estimates constitute only a particular case of our model.
Secondly, to the extent that we used a SAM in which commodity transactions are valued at 
market prices as a data framework, our analysis o f price effects, as compared with the traditional 
analysis based on 1-0 models, is more accurate since the latter usually neglects the presence of 
trade and transport margins and indirect taxes. In doing that, we recognise the fact that market 
prices are the relevant ones when it comes to modeling economic behaviour.
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Thirdly, we relaxed the conventional principal product criteria for classifying production 
activities. In our framework, in addition to this criteria, we classified activities according to their 
form of organisation, namely public and private. This permitted us to incorporate into the 
analysis a very important feature of many developing economies; the public private dichotomy. 
This is not the only form of dualism present in developing countries. However, given the objec­
tives of the present study, the introduction of this second criteria enabled us to model more accu­
rately the behaviour of the public sector, which is often different from the behaviour of the 
private sector of the economy.
Finally, it should be mentioned that our model benefltted considerably from our SAM 
approach in that the modelling of the price system is greatly facilitated by it since different 
sources of price distortions of the economy are put together in a systematic and consistent 
accounting framework.
In developing our model we treated deviations of price from average cost and inefficiency 
of PEs as impltcit forms of indirect taxation. Insofar as their effects on the price system are con­
cerned. From this perspective our approach can be seen as pan of the literature on tax reform.
An important contribution of the thesis derives from our choice of the topic, since very little 
empirical analysis on the affects that PEs have on relative prices exist, even though the economic 
theory on this issue has developed very fast. It has been mentioned that one possible reason for 
that is the fact that information on PEs it usually scattered and unorganised, if not non-existent at 
a more detailed level From this perspective, then, the thesis hat an important derived product 
since, in putting our data in a SAM format, we managed to organise and put together some 
relevant information related to the public sector of the Mexican economy which, hopefully, will 
be useful for future research work Several important conclusions emerged from our analysis.
(I )  We have seen that the inward-oriented policy adopted in the Mexican economy since the
early fifties has led to a very distorted price scenario. In particular, commercial policy has
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maintained domestic prices far higher than foreign prices, thus allowing domestic producers 
to enjoy extra profits as a means of promoting certain industries. Our calculations of ERP 
reveal that the sectors that have benefited the most have been those producing intermedi­
ates and capital goods which, paradoxically, are not the most efficient in terms of their com ­
parative advantage. This result contrasts with the recommendations of the theory of dom es­
tic distortions, which argues that tariffs (and also quantitative restrictions) on intermediates 
ought to be avoided, if distorting efTects are to be minimised.
(2) Such a system of protection has been reinforced by the policy of keeping public prices 
down. Whereas all public activities seem to have followed such a policy, two sectors in par­
ticular -petroleum and electricity-, account for the bulk of the distortions in prices.
(3) The remaining public activities (other than petroleum and electricity), as noted, have 
also maintained low prices. Yet their effects on the whole structure of prices are on a much 
smaller scale since they tend to concentrate on the production of Anal consumer goods.
(4) Likewise, improving the economic performance of PEs by increasing their efficiency 
levels acts in the opposite direction to lowering prices and. therefore, inefficiency in PEs 
performs as an implicit indirect taxation system which, to some extent, mitigates the 
benefits granted through low public prices. The same can be said in regard to tariffs 
although their effects on costs are very low. since tariffs have not been the main instrument 
of protection.
(3) It has also been shown that, in the Mexican context, trade elasticities have some 
influence on the resulting price structure, particularly when petroleum prices change.
(6) We have seen that the assumption that some commodity prices are fixed may lead to 
substantially different results in terms of price effects, as compared with the traditional case 
in which all production sectors are assumed to follow the cost-plus pricing rule.
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(7) All in all. it can be said that both public pricing policy and performance of PEs as well 
as commercial policy have led to a very distorted structure of prices in the Mexican econ­
omy. Our estimations of value added effects suggest that the corrections of such distortions 
would have significant effects on both the microeconomic resource allocation and 
macroeconomic aggregates. The issue is indeed important in view of the major structural 
reforms that in recent yean have been taking place in the Mexican economy. On the one 
hand after the adhesion of Mexico to the GATT a major trade liberalisation programme has 
been implemented. On the other hand, significant reductions in the public sector deficit have 
been achieved through a revision of public prices, privatisation of several PEs. and fiscal 
reform.
We have focused our attention on distortions in relative prices arising from public pricing 
policy and performance of PEs as well as commercial policy. As usual, the cost of putting a limit 
to the scope of the analysis leads inevitably to some omissions which, often, are relevant. In the 
present case there are many, some of which could indeed have been covered within our own 
■ptmacll
Perhaps the two most significant omissions are indirect taxes and public sector wage policy 
The former has been partially tackled when dealing with ERP in Chapter Seven. More generally, 
however, the whole issue of tax reform can be easily incorporated into our analysis. The second 
omission, public sector wage policy. Is also relevant to the extent that It may influence the level 
of public prices. Indeed, the popular contention is that PEs' wages tend to be above market wages 
and thus they represent an additional clement of distortions in relative prices. The incorporation 
of these two issues into our analysis, however, should not pose a major problem. All we need is to 
obtain relevant information on the structure o f public wages in the economy and a sense of the 
likely direction and magnitude of taxation changes
No doubt extensions to the present study are both possible and desirable Two of them 
derive from the omissions referred to above. In particular, it would seem that the modelling of
2 2 1
public wages it  a necessary extension if the main sources of distortions in relative prices from 
PEs are to be analysed. Within our Ax-price approach another possibility is to get a higher level 
of commodity/acdvity disaggregation in the petroleum sector which, as we have seen, produces 
large effects on relative prices.
Turning now to the limitations of our approach, undoubtedly the most important one 
derives from the Ax-price nature of our model, which assumes that prices are formed indepen­
dently of the level of productive activity. Whether or not such an assumption can be sustained in 
the context of the Mexican economy will surely remain a debatable point. Ultimately, however, 
one should recognise that prices are also inAuenced by demand considerations and more generally 
by the level of economic activity. Our results, then, should be interpreted only as locally valid
From this perspective, it seems that a natural extension to the present study calls for a Aex- 
price model. Such an analytical framework would enable us to get some insight into such key 
questions as the public sector borrowing requirements and domestic resource mobilisation, ele­
ments which are determined by and at the same time inAuence public prices. From there, a whole 
range of aspect* related to macroeconomic effects need to be addressed. Having said that, it 
should not be forgotten that such a limitation is also a strength since it abstracts from other issues.
It would seem. then, that the empirical analysis of the effects of public sector intervention is 
far from exhausted and. therefore, a partial analysis of the price system ought to be seen only as 
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The problem for the producers of trade and transport is to maximise total revenue. J ftQ n .
subject to (S.8). That is. if. as before. T  refers to the activities trade and transport, and i indicates 
commodity markets, then the maximisation problem can be expressed as
Taking derivatives with respect to On
(5.1a)
(5Aa>
multiplying by O n. and remembering that total revenue of the producers is FtQt
then from (5.2.t)
£O n ? t  -  0 *  -  -  ^ rO r
- ( ^ r O r /O ^ O iT "
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Appendix D. E R P  With Input Substitutability
For calculation purposes, and given that we are postulating a constant elasticity of substitu­
tion (CES) function for the use of raw materials, it is always possible to specify a set of nested 
CES functions that combine at different levels. In particular, we have allowed for substitution 
between petroleum A petrochemicals, and chemicals, for all production activities, and. in addi­
tion. for the activities other manufactures and capital goods (both public and private), we allowed 
for further substitutability between the commodities capital goods and mining, trying to incor­
porate the fact that an important proportion o f the production of capital goods consists of iron A 
steel. Finally, at the upper level all the groups of inputs were assumed to  combine in Axed 
coefficients This is illustrated in figure D .l.
The results of our estimations are presented in Table D .l. for the case in which subsidies to 
mining and petroleum ft petrochemicals are removed. The associated vector of price effects is 
not presented because it is the same as the one presented in Table 7.4.
Table D.l has four columns. In column one we simply reproduced the ERP shown in Table 
7.4. to make comparisons easier. The remaining three columns describe ERP for three set of elas­
ticity values. The low set refers to a situation in which substitution between petroleum ft petro­
chemicals and chemicals, o. equals 0.5. and substitution between mining and capital goods. K
are. in turn, twice the medium values.
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Fleur* D . l .  Substitutability Specification
For All Activities. Except Capital Goods, and Other Manufactures.











Public agriculture 0.2087 0 2017 0.1956 0.1865
Private agriculture 0.1599 0.1578 0.1559 0.1529
Agriculture 0.1604 0.1582 0.1563 0.1532
Public mining -0.2180 -0.2186 -0.2192 -0.2203
Private mining -0.2114 -0.2119 -0.2124 -0.2132
Mining -0.2120 -0.2126 -0.2131 -0.2139
Public petrol. & petroch. -0 4496 -0.4507 -0.4522 -0.4559
Private petrol. & petroch. -0.4271 -0.4278 -0.4278 -0.4310
Petroleum & petrochemicals -0.4491 -0.4503 -0.4517 -0.4555
Public food processing 0.2768 0.2739 -0.2711 0.2666
Private food processing 02194 0.2177 0.2162 0.2136
Food processing 0.2229 0.2212 0.2196 0.2169
Public textiles 0.2838 0.2811 0.2797 0.2756
Private textiles 0.2231 0.2223 0.2216 0 2206
Textiles 0.2243 0.2234 0.2227 0.2217
Public chemicals . . . .
Private chemicals 1.6277 1.4581 1.3137 1.0924
Chemicals 1.8831 1.6644 1.4824 1.2104
Public capital goods 1.8131 1.7306 1.6614 1.5547
Private capital goods 0 9650 09409 0.9201 0.8867
Capital goods 1.0530 1.0241 0.9992 0.9595
Public other manufc 1.6355 1.5835 1.5395 1.4705
Private other manufc. 0.7293 0.7190 0.7101 06957
Other manufactures 0.734* 0.7244 0.7153 07006
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